[Wittrs] Re: Dennett's Intentional Stance/Aggregates
- From: "gabuddabout" <gabuddabout@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 22 Apr 2010 21:59:23 -0000
--- In WittrsAMR@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "BruceD" <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
>
>
> --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "SWM" <SWMirsky@> wrote:
>
> > Cars do exist in the physical world as the aggregate of all the
> individual cars
>
> Aggregates, are abstractions, and don't exist in the physical world.
What doesn'r exist in the physical worlsd to which you are successfully
referring rigght now? Anything or nothing. Ah, aggregates. I see what you
mean. And that meaning is in your head unless you want to say that you are
directly referring to aggregates in a way that you just implied can't be done
since they are abstractions.
Well call me picky, but to what you continue to talk about below:
> Actually "cars" don't exist in the physical world. Only molecules or
> perhaps even smaller, more obscure entities.
Another nonsequitur. But you correct yourself a second later, so to that.
But certain organization of
> molecules (human beings we call them) have evolved whose molecules
> interact with these other molecules and, as a consequence, conceive of
> certain collection of molecules as a Volvo.
Yes, aggregates do in fact exist after all.
>
> The trick is to interact with another collection of molecules (called an
> independent mechanic who loves Volvos and the people who buy them) and
> hence keeps them going for thousands of miles at low cost.
And presumably another trick is to not waste time on philosophy forums when one
can focus on cars and other social transactions instead..
>
> Notice I can't tell you how to purchase and keep a Volvo running well at
> a reasonable price at the molecular level. I know that is no surprise to
> you. But what you do not see (yet?) is that when I switch to the human
> level, I abandon the notion of cause for the notion of intent and
> purpose.
Right, you might, but you _can_ have it another way a la Searle: There is
nothing inconsistent with a scientific view which gets at how intentionality is
realized in brains with what intentionality allows you to do via performance
enhancing features of the very thing that can have a causal explanation.
Indeed, when you give reasons for actions, it is the power that you have which
allows you to cause the world to bend to your wishes, given reasons. And
reasons are causes too; just a bit tricky and involve one in a possible debate
with Jagwaen Kim. Searle as a sort of nonchauvinistic type physicalist who
allows for mental powers because they are physical powers--nonproperty dualism.
Many think Searle a property dualist because not an ontological reductionist
(like I understand you to be no ontological reductionist given, well, what you
write sometimes at at least) even though a causal reductionist. So be it. But
they are wrong.
> If I try to say that my brain molecules caused me to search and find an
> honest Volvo dealer/mechanic, I feel I've stopped making sense.
That's fine. It would sound odd. Anyway..
>
> The next paragraph I'll leave for latter. For some reason, I can't seem
> to get my point across.
Stuart defended Searle below on the brain causing intentionality and above I
defended Bruce. And altogether I defended Searle and tried to describe how it
is that both Stuart and Bruce in this post have got some things right. I
tried, also, to show that there is no necessary tension that Bruce is trying to
produce between causes and reasons.
But it is a tricky problem if one doesn't take the Wittgensteinian plunge and
divorce the space of reasons from the space of causes.
Anyway, this is all I'm prepared to pronounce on today before practicing my
tennis serve with a Wilson T2000 racquet!!!!!! My poor left arm.
Cheers,
Budd
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