--- On Sun, 4/4/10, SWM <wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> The eliminativist doubles his mistake when he, a la >> Dennett, falsely labels those don't fall into the same trap >> "Cartesians". > > > Now THAT you need to defend As Joe and others have repeatedly tried to explain, and as I now also try to explain, you suggest wrongly that Searle's view in some way entails something you call Cartesian dualism. I can understand why you might continue to make that mistake: you favor Dennett's philosophy. You see his as confirmation of yours, and his reeks of eliminativism. Under the guise of rejecting dualism and so-called folk psychology, eliminativists attempt to deny or to "explain away" the common-sense notions of qualia and intentional states. They simply fail to grasp how one can affirm the common-sense ordinary understanding of intentional states (as fundamental and intrinsic to consciousness) without also accepting something they falsely label "Cartesian dualism". In Dennett's case, instead of affirming intrinsic intentionality, he posits an obscurantist/eliminativist philosophy of "the intentional stance" that denies or at best ignores the truth about intentionality. He does not admit that intentionality exists as something intrinsic to minds as opposed to something merely ascribed to them by observers. Unlike Dennett, Searle affirms the ordinary understanding of intentionality as something intrinsic to the mind. He takes mental states at face value, in need of no elimination or reduction. Dennett wrongly see that as evidence of dualism. (And it seems apparent that you do too.) I've already explained how they make that mistake: they fail to see that after we truly reject Cartesian dualism, we can then assign first-person irreducible mental properties to brain matter in a straightforward manner, consistent with common sense, and we can do this without the problems associated with dualism. -gts ========================================== Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/