SWM wrote: >... my view is that Searle's position on consciousness implies dualism >of the Cartesian variety (but not that he is a subscriber to Descarte's >complete philosophical doctrine[s]). as usual, there are unanswered questions: what, specifically, is the position that Searle explicitly takes that tells you that Searle is implicitly (not explicitly) a Cartesian dualist? is it the claim that understanding of syntax does not produce semantic understanding? is it the claim that the causal reduction of consciousness to the brain is not also an ontological reduction? if it is something else, then what is it? what does 'implies' mean today? are you saying that Searle's position presumes Cartesian dualism; or, are you saying that Cartesian dualism follows (can be deduced) from Searle's position? and what exactly does 'Cartesian dualism' mean when you use that phrase? does it mean something other than interactive substance dualist? >NO ONE, NOT DENNETT AND NOT ME, is saying that Searle subscribes to >all the philosophical doctrines of Descartes. I understand that. I'm just trying to understand how much or how little of Descartes' philosophy of interactive substance dualism a person would have to accept in order to be classified *by you* as a Cartesian dualist. does a person have to be a substance dualist to be a Cartesian dualist as you use the phrase, "Cartesian dualist"? Joe -- Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware @^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@ http://what-am-i.net @^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@ ========================================== Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/