SWM wrote: >Joseph Polanik wrote: >>Searle says that the brain causes consciousness. >But Searle already grants that consciousness is a product of brain >events. If so, it is either brought into existence as a new entry into >the universe or it IS a product of physical processes in brains. But if >the latter, then there is nothing in principle to tell us that it >cannot be a product of computer events, as well. >This is the crux of my point about Searle's argument and why I say he >is implicitly dualist while denying being that. yes, we've known for some time that the crux of this point is the apex of your thinking; so, get on with it. refine your diagnosis. does Searle have dualism cooties of the Cartesian strain or dualism cooties of the Chalmersian strain; and, (more importantly) how do you justify that diagnosis? >Look at my actual argument about what is implied in the CRA. I'm trying to clarify the basis for your claims; but, there's a problem. you alleged that Dennett agreed with you about the CRA; and, for supporting evidence, you directed us to a passage in Dennett's _Consciousness Explained_ where Dennett says "Cartesian dualists ... think that even human brains are unable to accomplish understanding all by themselves; according to the Cartesian view, it takes an immortal soul to pull off the miracle of understanding." you told us about the Mirsky System for identifying Cartesian dualists: someone who thinks that consciousness cannot be broken down to non-conscious constituents is a Cartesian Dualist. however, when I pointed out that there was no evidence that Searle believes that a human is/has an immortal soul, you admitted that someone may be designated a Cartesian dualist by the Mirsky System even though they do not postulate that the human is/has an immortal soul. you even hinted that there might be other key principles of Descartes' brand of interactive substance dualism that someone could reject and still be designated a Cartesian Dualist by the Mirsky System. however, you've declined my request for clarification as to what is essential to being classified as a Cartesian Dualist by the Mirsky System. so being/having a soul is not necessary, is that what you're saying? can a person still be designated a Cartesian Dualist without showing that the person hold interactive substance dualism? in any event, there is a tremendous contradiction between your view and Dennett's. he seems to 'get' Cartesian dualism. there's an immortal soul involved. you admit that there's no evidence of this in Searle's case, but the Mirsky System for outing Cartesian dualists designates him as such anyway. so your claim that Dennett agrees with you is dubious. Joe -- Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware @^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@ http://what-am-i.net @^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@ ========================================== Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/