[Wittrs] Correction - Re: What would Wittgenstein have said?
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 02 Apr 2010 21:51:55 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Gordon Swobe <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
> --- On Fri, 4/2/10, SWM <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
>
> > The fact that we have subjectness is NOT a denial of the
> > possibility of causal reduction of that subjectness and,
> > indeed, Searle seems to recognize this in his (generally
> > vague) assertions about brains causing minds -- but then he
> > seems to forget this when he turns his attention to other
> > possible "causal" platforms, i.e., computers.
>
> No, he doesn't forget anything. He just happens to understand that one cannot
> obtain conscious understanding of symbols merely from shuffling them around
> according to form-based (syntactic) rules.
>
. . . and misses the point that consciousness may well be a system property
(after all, it's not a given that it's a process property!), in which case it's
a function of the complexity of manipulation rather than being just the
manipulation itself.
Therefore, all the huffing and puffing about syntax not being the same as
semantics is irrelevant since non-identity does not imply non-causality.
> And that's all computers can do, Stuart. They can only shuffle symbols around
> according to syntactic rules. That's it. Nothing else. They have no means of
> attaching meanings to the symbols.
>
> -gts
>
>
You have a penchant for arguing by insistence, Gordon. But look at it this way:
The only reason we know brains can cause consciousness is because we experience
it ourselves (having brains) and see it in others like ourselves. We don't know
thisby looking at the physical features of or events in the brains because they
don't show the subjective experience.
Now suppose a computer could be built to operate in the same autonomous way as
entities like ourselves operate and suppose it had internals configured to do
the kinds of things Dennett suggests need to be done to produce consciousness.
On a view like yours you would STILL deny that computers could be conscious
BECAUSE of the idea that they are only syntactical at bottom.
Of course their "syntax" involves lots of flashing electrical circuitry, just
as brains have a kind of circuitry going on within them so it's physical in the
end. Here we have two physical platforms with the same kinds of observable
phenomena in the internals and the same behaviors on the outside and yet your
view would oblige us to dismiss the apparent consciousness of the machine while
affirming the consciousness of the brain purely on the grounds that the brain
is KNOWN to cause consciousness while, until the building of the machine in
question, computers were not known to do so. Thus we are asked to deny what the
evidence presents on the basis of a doctrinal claim as to the nature of what
consciousness is.
The ONLY reason for supposing the brain's consciousness is the real McCoy,
while thinking the machine's isn't, is that we already believe in brains and
don't believe in machines!
This is just dogma, Gordon.
SWM
=========================================
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
Other related posts:
