[Wittrs] Bogus Claim 5: Searle Contradicts Himself
- From: Joseph Polanik <jpolanik@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 22 Apr 2010 06:07:56 -0400
Justintruth wrote:
>I am confused. Can someone help me?
>What I don't understand is the idea of syntax in Searle's work. It
>seems to me that I can write a computer program which when executed
>processes the syntax of a language - as in the CR. But I can also
>write a program which when executed does not process the syntax of a
>language.
the syntax in question is the syntax of the program that is running, not
whatever syntax or conventions are observed in the input data.
>The second problem I have is with the notion of consciousness as a
>property. One analogy of consciousness to matter from earlier posts
>was the analogy of the turning of a wheel to the wheel. Another was
>the liquidity of water which was not due to any component or part of
>the water but due to the aggregate system. But it seems to me that
>both of those cases are false analogies because in both of those cases
>the relative motion of the material involved is what is needed to
>predict the effect.
>Water is liquid because the molecules are not held in rigid
>arrangement by the forces between them whenever the average energy of
>the molecules is great enough for them to escape from a bond between
>one and another. But it seems like experience in general - both
>consciousness and its correlates - cannot be predicted by motion alone.
>This means that not only syntactical processing but any detailed
>description of any physical device no matter how complex will not
>result in a prediction of consciousness or of its correlates the so
>called "quallia". So the problem of syntax becomes completely
>irrelevant.
>The problem is that the description of any physical motion of any
>system of material particles does not result in the prediction that an
>experience will occur. Some additional principle must be used.
>Something like: "Assemble a series of molecules in a certain way and
>start them moving and experiences of such and such will be had by that
>assembly."
one can not deduce Euclid's 5th postulate on the basis of the first
four. to get beyond the confines of 'absolute' or 'four-postulate'
geometry, one must add a 5th postulate. similarly, one can not deduce
the fact that there is or will be experience from the laws of physics.
in any event, there are other problems with the claim that an
explanation of the liquidity of water in terms of molecular motion
offers some insight into the relation of experience and brain.
for one thing there is disagreement as to the nature of the relation
between molecular motion and liquidity. is it an identity relation; or,
one of causation; or, one of constitution?
Joe
--
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
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http://what-am-i.net
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