[Wittrs] Re: Bogus Claim 5: Searle Contradicts Himself
- From: "gabuddabout" <gabuddabout@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sat, 24 Apr 2010 16:42:01 -0000
--- In WittrsAMR@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "SWM" <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
>
> --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Justintruth <wittrsamr@> wrote:
>
> > I am confused. Can someone help me?
> >
> > What I don't understand is the idea of syntax in Searle's work.
>
>
> It's probably better to let those who count themselves Searleans respond
> first (before I try) because, on my view, Searle is the one confused on the
> use of "syntax".
This is because Stuart either can't read plain English or because Stuart is
overly fond of conflating computational properties (which are functional
properties which Searle calls syntax) with physics.
Once Stuart's overwhelming success in such a project is bought, one can
conclude that Searle's CRA harbors a form of dualism simply because Searle is
arguing that computers aren't the sort of thing that can cause either semantics
or consciousness.
It's a really sad argument. But, then, a lot of twentieth century philosophy
is likewise sad and Searle is not to blame for it.
So, that is what a Searle defender might say.
Stuart, on the other hand, just gets Searle wrong on purpose (since I've been
setting him straight) or is particularly benighted when it comes to reading
English, the kind of English used in Searle's target article from BBS which
Stuart has plainly opted to pretend he can't remember the details of..
Actually, it's more than all that. Stuart's project is a particularly
Wittgensteinian one where he is at pains to show how Searle is mislead by
language. How else does one argue that Searle has an idiosyncratic use of
"syntax" when in fact Searle is explicit in what he means?
Here's the meaning: Programs are syntactical, meaning they are formal.
When Stuart argues that no one ever meant to speak about programs abstracted
from their actual nonsyntactical RUNNING, he is faced with a dilemma. Either
the running of programs is spelled out in 1st order property terms (and such
terms are the ones from which Searle says that plainly brains cause
consciousness) which is Searle's position, or the running of programs involves
systems with hardware/software separability such that they are intrinsically
not 1st order property systems. And if not, they are noncandidates for a
theory of mind according to Searle.
Stuart just argues that Searle is wrong to distinguish between systems that are
S/H and those which (like brains) are nonS/H.
He keeps saying that brains are like computers.
But there is a crucial difference. In computers, there are logic gates that
the electricity courses through. This is what makes them syntactical/formal.
In Brains there are no logic gates.
But this doesn't prevent us from taking an intentional stance toward computers.
Just imagine they are like brains. Anyone who doesn't buy the imagining can
be argued with swiftly like Stuart argues:
If one argues against computers possibly causing consciousness, then one can be
interpreted as arguing agains brains as possibly causing consciousness.
It's a terribly bad argument and trades on blurring the meaning of words.
Something we are supposed to get so good at that such blurring itself is a form
of philosophical argument.
Now, let me say why philosophy is in contradiction with itself....
I won't suppose I was clear, though.
Cheers,
Budd
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