[Wittrs] Re: Bogus Claim 5: Searle Contradicts Himself
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 21 Apr 2010 13:25:42 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:
> SWM wrote:
>
> >he [Searle] is in self-contradiction, holding one idea of consciousness
> >with regard to brains, another re: computers.
>
> >He gets by, doing that, by avoiding explicating how he supposes brains
> >do it (leaving that to science). But the mere supposition that brains
> >do it in a system way, dependent on physical processes, suggests that
> >other physical platforms could do the same and computers are physical
> >platforms, too. So the issue is why can't computers do it?
>
> >His argument purports to make a case that they can't because of what
> >they are, i.e., they are abstract in nature, just syntax as he likes to
> >say. But computers are no more abstract, no more syntactical, than
> >brains as far as we know. The obvious differences between brains and
> >computers are that computers are manmade, consist of inorganic
> >materials, and run on the principle of electrons flowing through
> >gateways embedded in silicon chips while brains are naturally
> >occurring, organic (cellular based on organic chemistry) and operate on
> >a chemical basis to generate their much slower electrical charges.
> nothing in what you've just said shows that Searle contradicts himself.
> he merely contradicts you.
Well that is your view, I suppose. If you don't see it (or won't) then there's
an end to this, isn't there? One can always keep these things going by denial
but I've made my case and given the evidence. You are free to deny it but
denial isn't enough, it doesn't change the points I've made.
> you are mistaken to say that Searle believes that computers can not be
> conscious.
>
> "Another misunderstanding is to suppose that I am denying that a given
> phsyical computer might have consciousness as an 'emergent property'.
> After all, if brains can have consciousness as an emergent property, why
> not other sorts of machinery?" ["Consciousness as a biological problem"]
>
Give us the link please so we can see the text in context. I have often seen
Searle say something in one breath and then, in another, something that so
qualifies it as to change the initial point. It's possible this quote you've
given us means just what you say, of course, but the best way to demonstrate
that is to provide the full context via a link, if possible, or citation,
including source and page number(s) if not, as I did when I provided the text I
transcribed onto this list from Dennett.
My guess is that Searle is here proposing that machines can be built to do what
brains do, but that computers qua computers aren't up to that. But what does it
mean to be a computer qua computer? Here is the usual problem of nailing down
Searle's actual meaning.
And, of course, since we DON'T KNOW WHAT BRAINS DO to achieve consciousness, we
don't know that computers qua computers are actually missing whatever
capabilities brains have. That is, we don't know that it isn't computational
processes running on a platform with sufficient capacity to sustain it after
all that's needed!
But let's see the full text from which you extracted this bit of text and go
from there.
> Searle's actual claim (from the CRA) is that computers can't be
> conscious merely by virtue of running a program.
>
In other words, programs aren't, themselves, conscious. Well, okay, we already
agree that syntax is not the same as semantics.
But let's try this another way: What else, besides running programs, do
computers do? They're not just electrical fans and motors and circuitry, after
all. What makes a computer a computer is that it computes by running the
various algorithms (programs) it is fed via mathematical calculation.
But can't a computer be conscious if we somehow infuse it with a soul, perhaps
by building in some kind of brain device (though we still don't know what that
might consist of)?
One is tempted to say yes, of course, except that little is really gained by
such a move since the issue remains: what does consciousness amount to?
That is, this comes right down again to deciding between competing accounts: is
consciousness (that which consists of the array of features we associate with
the term "consciousness") a system level property (i.e., the functional result
of many constituent processes which are not, themselves, conscious, running in
sync in a certain way) or is it a process level property (i.e., some
bottom-line irreducible property of a given particular constituent element
found in a system like the CR)?
> it's also a mistake to say that Searle discriminates against computers.
"Discriminates"? You mean because I say he treats consciousness differently
when discussing the capacities of computers for consciousness than when he
speaks of what brains do? How do you think it's a "mistake"? What in what I say
is in error?
> he concludes (in the CRA) that brains can't be conscious just by running
> a program.
>
> Joe
>
>
Well golly gee, THAT's what computers do, isn't it, run programs? That's what
makes them computers rather than toasters or garbage disposal units.
This is just the kind of thing Popper suggested was all too often used in
argument to avoid refutation, i.e., just keep moving the target so that
falsifiability becomes impossible. In this case we see a constant readjustment
by Searle over time of what he really meant by "computers" and the claims he
makes in his CRA.
Anyway the conclusions in the CRA are flawed for all the reasons already cited:
1) They hinge on an equivocal third premise;
2) They demand a presupposition about consciousness that is not self-evidently
true from the CR and which presumes the argument's conclusion, rendering the
CRA, finally, circular;
3) They imply a presupposition about the nature of consciousness that is
dualistic, thus contradicting Searle's own declared position re: dualism and
the way he, himself, treats brains.
SWM
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