gabuddabout wrote: > One early attempt did straight away with one of the clauses in the > third premise! I see now why. Stuart can't keep the > two clauses distinct somehow! So later he invented a > way of reading them to suit his taste for drawing a > conclusion he wanted to reach in any way he could. Right, Stuart just makes things up. It looks to me that ultimately he wants to make the third premise into a statement about whether syntax causes consciousness. Dennett does the same kind of thing, and Searle called him on it in his book _The Mystery of Consciousness_. It seems neither Stuart nor Dennett can handle the simple truth: that the 3rd premise represents nothing more than a fundamental and easy to understand axiom about the relationship between syntax and semantics. Like all good axioms, it stands on its own right. It stands true independent of the CRA and independent of any Searlian or Dennettian considerations about the nature and causes of consciousness. This inconvenient truth does not fit well into Stuart's theory, so he ignores it and sets up a strawman to his own liking. -gts ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/