[Wittrs] Bogus Claim 3: Validity Issues: Conjunction or Equivocation
- From: Joseph Polanik <jpolanik@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sat, 24 Apr 2010 15:00:27 -0400
SWM wrote:
>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>you seem to think that a difference of opinion between you and Searle
>>(as to whether the third axiom is conceptually true) proves that
>>Searle is equivocating and, therefore, that the CRA is fallacious.
>>even if you are eventually found to be correct to say that Searle has
>>failed to show that the third axiom is conceptually true based on the
>>CRT, the most you that you will have established is that Searle has
>>failed to prove that the third axiom is true.
>Searle's assertion that the third premise is conceptually true is a
>claim that only applies to one reading of the premise.
utterly ridiculous.
Searle's assertion that the third premise is conceptually true applies
to my reading of the premise.
are you claiming that my reading is the only such reading?
>Since he applies it to the entire premise, he is obviously reading
>both sides of it in the same way.
what is obvious is that your argument is totally incoherent.
>>>>the third axiom is a compound statement (notice the conjunction
>>>>'and'). it makes two claims.
>>>No, the third premise is readable both ways as I've already shown,
>>the third axiom makes two claims, that syntax does not constitute
>>semantics and that syntax is not sufficient for causing semantics.
>The point is it makes these two claims based on a dual interpretation
>that is applicable across BOTH sides of the premise AND Searle's claim
>of conceptual truth for it is evidence that he interprets it THAT way.
I could say something analogous: that the third axiom makes these two
claims because it is the conjunction of two statements each of which
makes one of these claims. Searle's claim that the third axiom is
conceptually true is a claim that each of the conjoined statements is
conceptually true.
how does Stuart distinguish which of these readings is correct? by
inventing a bizarre new rule of logic!
>>the third axiom is the conjunction of two statements, each of which
>>makes a distinct claim:
>>[1] syntax does not constitute semantics
>>[2] syntax is not sufficient [for causing] semantics.
NB: just to be clear, [1] makes the non-constitution claim and [2] makes
the non-causality claim.
>>notice the 'and' that it contains. that indicates that the third
>>axiom is a complex statement.
>The presence of a conjunction does not imply anything about the way the
>phrases on either side of it should be interpreted.
logically, the presence of the conjunction, 'and', does not alter the
meaning of the statements it conjoins.
unless, of course, you invent a new rule of logic that is bizarre that
it is without precedent in the entire history of rational thought: that
'and', instead of being the conjunction operator, is really a
bidirectional assignment operator --- so that 'P & Q' (which looks like
a conjunction to everyone else) actually assigns the meaning of Q to P
and assigns the meaning of P to Q.
at which point Stuart shows up and says, "oh, look. there's an
equivocation there".
maybe we should just say that 'and' is the 'equivocation operator'.
Joe
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