[C] [Wittrs] Re: On Time
- From: "J" <ubersicht@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 04 Jan 2010 06:26:07 -0000
Cayuse, AB, SW,
These lectures are of some relevance to my previous discussion with Sean
concerning the range of Wittgenstein's "transitional period". To Sean's way of
thinking, Wittgenstein's work of 1929/1930 reflects a transitional period, but
I am more inclined to describe 1929 until 1933 and the completion of "The Big
Typescript" (first published in part as _Philosophical_Grammar_) as all
"transitional". At the time, _The Blue_and_Brown_Books_ were the subject of
dispute and since we both agreed that those were both clearly "later"
Wittgenstein, our differences didn't much matter. But this lecture is from
1932/1933, so clearly sits in the disputed period.
I'll be commenting on the excerpts with this in mind.
http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/at/wittgens.htm
Suppose the log
> makes a bang on passing me. We can say these bangs are
> separated by equal, or
> unequal, intervals. We could also say one set of bangs was
> twice as fast as
> another set. But the equality or inequality of intervals so
> measured is entirely
> different from that measured by a clock.
We might compare this to listening to music and recognizing a pulse as regular
or syncopated, steady or speeding up or slowing down. Also recognizing a
rhythmic pattern as iambic, anaepestic, and so forth. Also that the two
crotchets are followed by two quavers.
And the judgment of a trained musician or skilled listener may be quite precise.
(In working with electronic music or in analyzing musical recordings with a
computer, we do use clocks of finer resolution than the clocks with which we
typically keep time in our day to day lives. And so we can then speak of
measuring these differences with clocks. But that is a special case. And it
is not how we listen.)
A comparison: seeing that there are 3 glasses on the table("just by looking",
i.e. without counting them) and counting that there are 11 glasses on the bar.
Or: seeing that there are the same number of knives as forks on the table (each
place setting has a knife and a fork) and counting that there are 36 knives and
36 forks in the drawer.
The phrase
> "length of interval" has its
> sense in virtue of the way we determine it,
and differs
> according to the method
> of measurement.
Notice the verificationism here which Sean noted as characteristic of his
transitional period.
Compare: "Sameness of number and sameness of length" (section 21 of
_Philosophical_Remarks_)
Compare: symptoms and criteria and family resemblances in the later work.
Compare: Part III of _Remarks_on_the_Foundations_of_mathematics_, e.g.
44. Now if a proof is a model, then the point must be what is to count
as a correct reproduction of the proof.
If, for example, the sign '| | | | | | | | | |' were to occur in a
proof, it is not clear whether merely 'the same number'
of strokes (or perhaps little crosses) should count as the reproduction of it,
or whether some other, not too small,
number does equally well. Etc.
But the question is what is to count as the criterion for the
reproduction of a proof--for the identity of proofs.
How are they to be compared to establish the identity? Are they the same if
they look the same?
I should like, so to speak, to shew that we can get away from logical
proofs in mathematics.
Hence the criteria for equality of
> intervals between passing
> logs and for equality of intervals measured by a clock are
> different.
Certainly!
We cannot
> say that two bangs two seconds apart differ only in degree
> from those an hour
> apart,
Of course we can!
for we have no feeling of rhythm if the interval is
> an hour long.
That we cannot apply the feeling of rhythm as a criterion in the hour long
interval is not to say that we cannot apply the criterion of the stopwatch to
both.
And to
> say that one rhythm of bangs is faster than another is
> different from saying
> that the interval between these two bangs passed much more
> slowly than the
> interval between another pair.
These two expressions are characteristic of different criteria being applied.
However, we do speak of "the rhythm of the seasons" and "the rhythm of the
week". And these are not simply metaphors.
>
> Suppose that the passing logs seem to be equal
> distances apart. We have an
> experience of what might be called the velocity of these
> (though not what is
> measured by a clock).
Compare: recognizing a gesture as frantic or as nonchalant. Watching a slug or
a worm speeding up or slowing down.
Let us say the river moves uniformly
> in this sense. But if
> we say time passed more quickly between logs 1 and
> 100 than between
> logs 100 and 200,
(A quibble: the comparison here should be to the time that passed between logs
101 and 200. At least, I am pretty sure he's not intending to compare
intervals between unequal numbers of logs!)
this is only an analogy; really nothing
> has passed more
> quickly.
Anna, I want to emphasize this for you. Earlier he did speak of the interval
between one set of bangs passing more quickly than the interval between
another. And that does make sense. So, he's not denying an experience of
duration here.
But in this case, given the uniform motion of the logs, if we speak of time
passing more quickly, we are using an analogy. (It might express something
like boredom or impatience during one interval or the other.) But we may
become confused because it sounds like we are using two different criteria (the
uniform motion of the logs and the the sense of interval that passes between
the logs) and arriving at different results!
In fact, the second criterion doesn't apply in this case but the expression
characteristic of using that criterion is still being used. Except that we
speak of the passage of time itself rather than the passage of an interval.
Hence, its use is being called an analogy.
(Calling this an analogy is a bad way of putting it and Wittgenstein would not
have spoken quite this way later. Compare the discussion of days of the week
being "fat" or "lean" in the PI. Compare also various discussions of how
pictures are used.)
To say time passes more quickly, or that time
> flows, is to imagine
> something flowing.
No, it is to use an expression characteristic of one case applied to another.
He would later distinguish between making a mental picture (imagining, a mental
process having real duration) and making use of a picture. Identifying the
picture someone is using - like identifying other sources of philosophical
confusion - is more akin to psycho-analysis, but he is more circumspect than
many psycho-analysts. "For only if he acknowledges it as such, is it the
correct expression."
Of course, what he describes here is very probably a common source of
philosophical confusion, a picture people commonly make and extend in various
ways that lead to mental cramps.
We then extend the simile and
> talk about the
> direction of time. When people talk of the direction of
> time, precisely the
> analogy of a river is before them.
By the time he wrote the part of BTS titled "Philosophy", he would be a lot
more circumspect than he is here. Which is not to say that the generalization
he makes here would not express a reasonable suspicion in many actual cases.
> "Time" as a substantive is terribly
> misleading. We have got to make the rules of the game
> before we play it.
Compare discussions of games and being bounded by rules on all sides.
> Discussion of "the flow of time" shows how
> philosophical problems arise.
> Philosophical troubles are caused by not using language
> practically but by
> extending it on looking at it.
This is akin to the "idling" and "on holiday" similes, but he would later speak
of philosophical troubles arising from various sources, e.g. "craving for
generality".
We form sentences and then
> wonder what they can
> mean.
" Philosophers are often like little children who first scribble some marks on
a piece of paper at random and now ask the grown-up 'what's that?'--It happened
like this: The grown-up had often drawn something for the child &
said: 'this is a man', 'this is a house' etc. And now the child makes some
marks too and asks: and what's this then?"
JPDeMouy
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