[C] [Wittrs] Re: Analytic and Tautological
- From: "J D" <ubersicht@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2010 02:51:20 -0000
Niel,
> Analytic: true by virtue of the meanings of the terms used.
>
Note: this formulation and the earlier formulation involving a containment
metaphor, i.e. the predicate is contained in the subject, both involve what
Wittgenstein stigmatized as the Bedeutungskorper (meaning-body) picture of
meaning.
Wittgenstein would actually have agreed with Quine in his attack on
analyticity, though not with Quine's conclusion.
Saying that the meanings of the terms involved makes the proposition true
leaves "meaning" as something mysterious.
Contrast with grammatical remarks, the truth of which are constitutive of the
meanings of the words for whose usage the remark expresses a rule.
Wittgentein didn't eschew talk of "analyticity" and favor talk of "rules" and
"grammatical remarks" just for stylistic eccentricity. Analyticity is a
problematic concept in many cases and certainly accounts of it tend to be
misleading.
>
> Both are usually unpacked in the literature as meaning
> "true in
> all possible worlds."
That way of putting things usually applies to necessity and those who speak
that way often distinguish necessity from analyticity.
But to me, that seems wrong for
> "analytic."
> Instead, I want to say that "analytic" only
> implies "true in all
> worlds in which it is meaningful."
I believe that proponents of "possible worlds" would, if that point were
raised, distinguish between "true in..." and "true OF..." or "true FOR..."
If one uses either of those expressions, then the suggestion that a proposition
wouldn't be true where, e.g. English isn't spoken, there are no people, and so
forth.
(Also, "proposition" rather than "sentence" might be used avoid that suggestion
in some cases, depending on how much one sublimes "proposition".
(Mind you, I think talk of possible worlds confuses more than it enlightens and
I am certainly not a proponent or defender of it.)
> Incidently, an alternative definition of
> "analytic", as I am using
> the term, would be "true by virtue of empirical
> practices."
And I take this to amount to the something like Wittgenstein's methodological
propositions.
But also relevant are Wittgenstein observations about shifts between symptoms
and criteria (BB and PI) and indeterminacy between methodological statements
and statements within a methodology (PI and OC).
JPDeMouy
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