SWM wrote:

>Joseph Polanik wrote:

>>SWM wrote:

>>>Joseph Polanik wrote:

>>>>SWM wrote:

><snip>

>>I deferred comment on some of the material in your last post because I
>>wanted to focus on a core idea; and, since I must correct your various
>>misunderstandings of my last post, I may do the same with some of the
>>material in your last post.

>>first, there is no one to one mapping from my system for numbering
>>reality types to von Neumann's system for numbering the divisions of
>>the world.

>>this should have been obvious.

>Why "obvious" since you initially presented this as von Neumann's
>thesis which, if true, you said would mean that a mechanistic picture
>of how consciousness works would be wrong.

I undertook to show that your mechanistic, Dennett-based theory of
consciousness can't possibly be true unless von Neumann is wrong.

>So why would it have been "obvious" to me that you weren't actually
>presenting von Neumann's thesis but Joe Polanik's?

>I, II and III is his.

yes; and, therefore, it should have been obvious that I was presenting
von Neumann's interpretation of QM when I was discussing his analysis of
the measurement process; his division of the world into divisions I, II
and III; and, his conclusion that, even after the entire physical
universe is placed in (I + II), there is something else, the abstract I,
that is in division III.

>1, 2 and 3 yours

yes; and, therefore, it should have been obvious that I was presenting
my own taxonomy of reality types when I spoke about numbering reality
types 1, 2 and 3 so that these numbers may be used for subscripting
pronouns by reality types.

I've been presenting this taxonomy and using these subscripted pronouns
for several years now, almost always in connection with Cogito like
arguments (I experience; therefore, I am) to clarify the reality type of
the I that demonstrates its own reality.

I've been doing this on various mailing lists *including* Analytic and
Analytic Borders while we were both there. so there is really no excuse
for you to conflate my taxonomy of reality types with von Neumann's
division of the world.

>But this is all an assumption, i.e., there is no evidence from this
>particular schematic of how things are that there actually IS some
>consciousness that stands apart from the rest of the otherwise physical
>universe in all ontological senses. Essentially you are saying THIS is
>how von Neumann depicts the way things are and this picture means that
>consciousness (or some essential part of it) is outside the physical.
>But why should we accept that as evidence for, or reason to believe
>that, that is how things are?

as noted above, I undertook to show that your mechanistic, Dennett-based
theory of consciousness can't possibly be true unless von Neumann is
wrong. I did not claim that I could prove that von Neumann was right;
and, while I have no objection (in principle) to discussing the evidence
pro and con, I will defer doing so until after:

[1] we've clarified the extent of the incompatibility between your
mechanistic, Dennett-based theory of consciousness and the von Neumann
Interpretation of QM; and,

[2] we clear up the confusion engendered by the discourse to this point.

the principle confusion stems from the ambiguity of the word
'consciousness'.

clearing up *that* confusion is the reason I introduced my subscripted
pronouns and the taxonomy of reality types which the subscripts encode.

my point is that, when people translate 'abstract I' as 'consciousness'
(for example, to allege that consciousness causes the collapse), they
are not using that word the way you are using it when you advocate a
mechanistic, Dennett-based theory of consciousness.

my claim i that 'consciousness' as a synonym of or translation for
'abstract I' refers to an (alleged or postulated) entity of reality type
3; whereas, 'consciousness', as you use it, refers to phenomenological
(type 2) realities (experiences and the subject of its experiences).

would you agree with that claim?

Joe

--

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--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:
<snip>
>
> >>this should have been obvious.
>
> >Why "obvious" since you initially presented this as von Neumann's
> >thesis which, if true, you said would mean that a mechanistic picture
> >of how consciousness works would be wrong.
>
> I undertook to show that your mechanistic, Dennett-based theory of
> consciousness can't possibly be true unless von Neumann is wrong.
>

Yes, you did. On that score I would say you haven't yet made the case.

As to the issue of von Neumann's being wrong or not, that's why I was interested in what von Neumann had actually said (the I,II,III scenario), i.e., I was interested in the implications of his thesis. Since high level physics is above my paygrade, this would be even more interesting if von Neumann's view on the matter were also the consensus view.

However, whether it is or is not the consensus view (and it seems not to be), I don't see the negative implications in it for Dennett's model thus far, nor do I fnd your tweaking of von Neumann's thesis to alter his category II in terms of what is said to be included within it implied by his thesis. By itself, von Neumann's thesis seems to have no implications for Dennett's proposal as far as I can see at this point while your tweaked version strikes me as an effort to shoehorn an extra thesis into von Neumann's.

> >So why would it have been "obvious" to me that you weren't actually
> >presenting von Neumann's thesis but Joe Polanik's?
>
> >I, II and III is his.
>
> yes; and, therefore, it should have been obvious that I was presenting
> von Neumann's interpretation of QM when I was discussing his analysis of
> the measurement process; his division of the world into divisions I, II
> and III; and, his conclusion that, even after the entire physical
> universe is placed in (I + II), there is something else, the abstract I,
> that is in division III.
>

And his thesis and its implications were the crux of your claim that:

"[SWM's] mechanistic, Dennett-based theory of consciousness can't possibly be true unless von Neumann is wrong."

Needless to say, you intrigued me with this claim and I wanted to better understand it, i.e., what is it about von Neumann's claim that, if true, undermines a Dennettian model of consciousness?

Apparently YOUR claim depends on a shift in the contents of von Neumann's category II, which von Neumann does not himself make. Thus the claim is really that Dennett's model can't be true unless Joe Polanik's version of von Neumann's claim is wrong. And THAT is a very different issue.

It is still worth exploring, of course, but now it comes down to understanding the Polanikian version which, as far as I can see, hinges on a move von Neumann doesn't make and also on a presumption of "metaphenomenal" phenomena. But why should we accept such a presumption? What would such phenomena consist of? Do we need to invoke such a concept at all to explain the occurrence of experiential aspects of reality?

> >1, 2 and 3 yours
>
> yes; and, therefore, it should have been obvious that I was presenting
> my own taxonomy of reality types when I spoke about numbering reality
> types 1, 2 and 3 so that these numbers may be used for subscripting
> pronouns by reality types.
>
> I've been presenting this taxonomy and using these subscripted pronouns
> for several years now,

I'm sorry but I haven't been following your presentations "for several years now", but only briefly on Analytic when you began actively posting there and since you came to this list. Frankly, I haven't paid very close attention to the exchange here about your 1, 2 and 3 which you were having with others until you made the claim that Dennett's model cannot be true unless von Neumann's thesis about quantum theory and the collapse of the wave function is wrong.

That got my attention and I asked you to explicate von Neumann's thesis. Subsequently it has come to light that you were explicating not his thesis but a hybrid thesis for which you are responsible.

Well, all right, that is interesting, too, if you can make the case for your claim that it obviates Dennett's conception of consciousness. But nothing you have so far presented sustains that claim though, by adding your own 1, 2 and 3, you do introduce certain presumptions that are at odds with Dennett's model. But no one, and certainly not I, will dispute a claim that Dennett's model can't be true if you take certain assumptions to be true that are at odds with it. But that's not an argument against the model, it's just a denial.

For Dennett's thesis to be judged mistaken, before any empirical testing of it, it must be shown to be illogical, incoherent or incapable of accounting for the features it claims to account for.

Your argument against Dennett, that his model 'can't be true unless von Neumann's thesis is wrong', addresses the third possibility, that there is something about consciousness that is not accounted for mechanistically (in the broad sense of "mechanistically", of course).

When I have asked you what that something is you have referred back to the argument that von Neumann's category III consists of an "abstract I" and that it is this which is a part of any definition of consciousness and which is extra physical because it is definitionally found outside the physical categories of von Neumann's I and II.

I have already told you why I don't find this convincing, i.e., it is not at all clear that such an "abstract I", as the term is used by von Neumann, must be something which cannot be physically derived, even if it has a different standing in the set of relations addressed. After all, its derivation from the physical is ALL that Dennett's thesis is about.

My question boils down to this: What is the argument, either from von Neumann or from you, that the I that is the subject in an observing relation cannot be understood as physically derived?

> almost always in connection with Cogito like
> arguments (I experience; therefore, I am) to clarify the reality type of
> the I that demonstrates its own reality.
>

You have said you are not a Cartesian but if this is a variation of the cogito then you are at least a variation of a Cartesian, no?

> I've been doing this on various mailing lists *including* Analytic and
> Analytic Borders while we were both there.

I don't recall you on Borders though I do recall your coming onto Analytic where we didn't have many exchanges. We have had more here though.

> so there is really no excuse
> for you to conflate my taxonomy of reality types with von Neumann's
> division of the world.
>

I'll say it again. You said (and I'll just quote you from your own words in this very post, above) that you:

"undertook to show that [SWM's] mechanistic, Dennett-based theory of consciousness can't possibly be true unless von Neumann is wrong."

To which I responded by asking you what von Neumann's thesis specifically claims. Apparently you gave me a hybrid Polanik/von Neumann thesis which is NOT what I asked about and not what was in question, given your very specific claim (repeated above).

Now this dispute looks to be more smokescreen than substance, at this point. My interest, my only interest in this, has to do with whether you have found a sound criticism of a Dennettian model of consciousness. Instead of answering THAT question you have now sidetracked us with your indignation over whether I should have known that you were really always hybridizing the argument from the beginning.

So I'll tell you what, I'll stipulate to that. I shall agree that I should have known what you had in mind from the beginning and that I am guilty of not having read your past offerings closely enough to have been cognizant of the actual nature of your claim, i.e., that it was less about von Neumann (despite your repeated references to him!) than it was about Polanik's take on him. All right? Feel better?

Now let's get to the nitty-gritty which is all that ever interested me: WHAT IS YOUR ARGUMENT (WHETHER FROM VON NEUMANN OR YOUR OWN MUSINGS) THAT DENNETT'S MODEL CANNOT ACCOUNT FOR ALL THE FEATURES WE EXPECT CONSCIOUSNESS TO HAVE?

So far we are here: You say that von Neumann's thesis should be reinterpreted to replace physical instruments of measurement (his II) with phenomenal features of reality (your 2) and that his III, the "abstract I" should then be seen as your 3, i.e., whatever is left over when one has peeled away the physical things observed and the phenomenal features of those observations. On your view, we are left with something like an unperceived perceiver, a Kantian type "transcendental I" and, since a full description of reality can only be achieved via this 1,2,3 breakdown, if we accept 1 and 2 we must also accept 3.

Please feel free to once again correct my restatement of your argument. IS THE ABOVE YOUR ARGUMENT FOR WHY THERE MUST BE A FEATURE IN CONSCIOUSNESS THAT IS EXTRA PHYSICAL AND WHICH DENNETT'S MODEL HAS FAILED TO ACCOUNT FOR?

> >But this is all an assumption, i.e., there is no evidence from this
> >particular schematic of how things are that there actually IS some
> >consciousness that stands apart from the rest of the otherwise physical
> >universe in all ontological senses. Essentially you are saying THIS is
> >how von Neumann depicts the way things are and this picture means that
> >consciousness (or some essential part of it) is outside the physical.
> >But why should we accept that as evidence for, or reason to believe
> >that, that is how things are?
>

> as noted above, I undertook to show that your mechanistic, Dennett-based
> theory of consciousness can't possibly be true unless von Neumann is
> wrong. I did not claim that I could prove that von Neumann was right;

As I have noted above, I do not believe that you have made THAT case for the reasons given.

Note that I do not argue this on whether von Neumann-on-wave-theory-collapsing or von Neumann/Polanik on that same subject are right. I am only interested in whether there is anything in either thesis that demonstrates the existence of some feature of consciousness which is extra-physical and thus not accounted for in a Dennettian physically based model of consciousness.

You DO NOT NEED TO PROVE VON NEUMANN'S CLAIMS ABOUT WAVE THEORY COLLAPSE AND ITS CAUSES ARE TRUE OR NOT. ALL YOU HAVE TO DO IS SHOW WHY, IF THEY ARE TRUE, THEY UNDERMINE DENNETT'S THESIS ABOUT CONSCIOUSNESS AS YOU HAVE CLAIMED.

> and, while I have no objection (in principle) to discussing the evidence
> pro and con, I will defer doing so until after:
>
> [1] we've clarified the extent of the incompatibility between your
> mechanistic, Dennett-based theory of consciousness and the von Neumann
> Interpretation of QM; and,
>

It's really quite simple: Dennett's thesis (and mine) stands or falls on whether all the features of consciousness are being adequately accounted for. If anything is left out, then they are not and the theory is unsound.

You have asserted that something associated with consciousness, von Neumann's "abstract I", is left out, therefore Dennett's thesis collapses (along with those waves).

I am asking you to show why that is the case in a way that goes beyond merely assuming that there is something that is extra-physical in the relevant sense (because that would be circular). That is, I see no reason, in principle, why an observer, described as an "abstract I" (since we know that "I" plays a different role than other naming words in language) cannot be physically derived in the way Dennett describes.

You need to show that it cannot be for your claim to work.

> [2] we clear up the confusion engendered by the discourse to this point.
>

Blow away all the smoke about 1,2 and 3 vs. I, II and III and whether I should have read you more closely when I wasn't reading most of your posts way back when then and focus on the issue. IF DENNETT'S THESIS (WHICH I AGREE WITH) IS WRONG BECAUSE OF THE WAVE THEORY COLLAPSE ISSUE, SHOW US WHY.

> the principle confusion stems from the ambiguity of the word
> 'consciousness'.
>

That ambiguity cannot be helped. Like most of our words it has many uses. (Minsky argues we should do away with it entirely and just talk about its different features.) I have given my way of applying the term in the present context already. Below you give us yours.

> clearing up *that* confusion is the reason I introduced my subscripted
> pronouns and the taxonomy of reality types which the subscripts encode.
>
> my point is that, when people translate 'abstract I' as 'consciousness'
> (for example, to allege that consciousness causes the collapse), they
> are not using that word the way you are using it when you advocate a
> mechanistic, Dennett-based theory of consciousness.
>

That could well be. I agree that this is about competing conceptions of mind, of consciousness, and I have always said that it was (which you would know if you had been following MY past posts on Analytic and Borders).

IF ONE BEGINS BY ASSUMING THAT THERE IS A TRANSCENDENTAL CORE UNDERNEATH IT ALL, A LA KANT, THAT THERE IS AN UNPERCEIVED PERCEIVER, THEN DENNETT'S MODEL CERTAINLY EXCLUDES THAT. BUT THEN ONE IS SAYING THAT ONE IS SIMPLY DEFINING CONSCIOUSNESS IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ASSUME THE NON-PHYSICAL AND THAT IS NOT AN ARGUMENT AGAINST DENNETT BECAUSE IT STANDS ON ASSUMING DENNETT IS MISTAKEN!

It means that one is assuming dualism at the start and discounting any thesis that rejects that very assumption. But what if that assumption IS mistaken? What if there ain't no such animal as a "transcendental I", an extra physical element underlying the physical? Suppose Dennett's approach yields a machine that operates with all the indications of consciousness (a mental life) that we find in creatures like ourselves. Would we then be stuck saying that such an entity has no mind, despite all evidence to the contrary, because it lacks what we have though we cannot show that we have it? Or would we have to say that someone must have slipped an "abstract I" into it somehow?

> my claim i that 'consciousness' as a synonym of or translation for
> 'abstract I' refers to an (alleged or postulated) entity of reality type
> 3;

I would say that is mistaken. We do not need to assume an extra-physical core to consciousness to speak of consciousness. It's true that some people do and that, if you do, Dennett's thesis looks wrong. But that is the point of this, i.e., Dennett's model explains consciousness WITHOUT ASSUMING THE PRESENCE OF ANYTHING EXTRA-PHYSICAL YET STILL MANAGES TO ACCOUNT FOR ALL THE ACTUAL FEATURES WE "SEE" WHEN WE CONSIDER WHAT WE MEAN BY "CONSCIOUSNESS". In fact, positing another, invisible feature, is unnecessary precisely because, if Dennett's model is to prove out empirically, we ought to be able to get synthetic consciousnesses in every relevant way without the added presence of this inexplicable, invisible extra feature.

This is why Dennett's model is consistent with a physicalist account of things and why, if it's viable, it eliminates the need to posit anything else, e.g., a dualist picture of things.

>whereas, 'consciousness', as you use it, refers to phenomenological
> (type 2) realities (experiences and the subject of its experiences).
>
> would you agree with that claim?
>
> Joe

I would and I'd add that if all the features of consciousness can be accounted for in this way, including both the phenomenal elements of experience and the experiencing function (which includes an experiencer), then there's no reason to insist on yet one more thing, a thing we cannot see or know but must just presume to be there. If consciousness as we recognize it can be fully accounted for mechanistically, then there is NO reason to import a deus ex machina to complete the picture.

Now a side note. Joe, I am willing, even pleased, to exchange posts with you and others on issues that interest me nor do I want the exchanges to be rancorous in any way. But I have noticed that there is something about me that seems to bring out the worst in other posters. I have had sometimes vigorous but, too often, angry debates on too many lists on which I have participated, from the Critical Rationalism list to Wittgenstein-dialognet to Analytic-Borders to Analytic and now, suprisingly, here.

I know that Sean has set out to make this list different but it seems that there is something about list culture and certainly about me (as a catalyst or lightning rod for personal attacks) that apparently cannot be overcome, even by Sean. Hell, I've even had set-to's here with Sean and we are generally on the same side!

I must assume that there is something about me that does not do well on Internet lists. Perhaps it's my style of debate. So I am seriously thinking of ceasing to post here. I am interested in pursuing this discussion with you though I am not convinced we can make anymore progress than I have with Bruce (one of the few people with whom I have had an ongoing, if somewhat testy, long term list relationship).

If I decide to leave this list, I am extending you the invitation to exchange remarks about this subject with me off-line. A private exchange is often less fruitful because the interlocutors don't have the benefit of outside minds to provide additional useful perspectives. But perhaps it has the benefit of reduced the incentive for posturing since we would be without an audience.

In any case, I haven't made a decision about this yet and may defer it a while longer. But I really am fed up with the attacks that I seem to draw no matter where I post my thoughts. Maybe I'm too thin skinned but, frankly, I'm not young anymore and don't have the energy to waste on foolish prattle when there are real ideas that I find interesting and would like to consider.

SWM

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Defining 'Physical'

SWM wrote:

>Joseph Polanik wrote:

>>SWM wrote:

>>>Assuming we can get past the question of whether we are each talking
>>>about the same thing by our respective uses of the term "physical" (I
>>>don't mean "a physical object" but anything that is a feature of the
>>>physical universe and I presume you mean the same),

>>by 'physical object' I mean a reality of type 1.

>Okay

>>I don't know what you mean by a feature of the physical universe that
>>is not a physical object;

>Hmmm, here I see some fuzziness creeping in. Perhaps it is just an
>artifact of our different uses though.

>By "physical object" I mean any object of reference that has tangible
>physical features in some finite sense, e.g., a rubber ball, a rock, a
>tree, a particular mammal, a planet, a star, etc. I do not mean certain
>aspects of the physical universe which are part of that universe but
>not identifiable as particular objects in space/time, such as
>hurricanes, electromagnetism, gravity, light waves, microwave
>radiation, the motion and trajectories of billiard balls, etc., as well
>as the various properties we associate with physical objects (as
>described above) such as colors, textures, extension, mass, density,
>etc. All of these latter are perfectly physical, too, and can even be
>thought of as "objects" when we are referring to them, that is they can
>be singled out as objects of our reference. But they are not particular
>objects in space/time (even though such objects ARE objects of our
>reference too).

>Thus, when I speak of being physical I don't only mean what I've called
>physical objects above. Until told otherwise by you, I will assume we
>share the same understanding of the usages in question here.

similarities and differences between us:

1. I agree that a rubber ball, a rock, a tree, a particular mammal, a
planet, a star, etc. are all objects.

2. hurricanes - I'd classify these as events; but, they could be
considered objects as well.

3. electromagnetism, light waves, microwaves - the photons that make up
electromagnetic radiation behave like particles when observed;
consequently, I'd consider them as objects --- quantum objects rather
than classical objects to be sure, but objects nevertheless.

4. extension, mass and density - these are properties of physical
objects; so, by linguistic convention, one may call these physical
properties.

5. colors (and other qualia) - these are quales of experience rather
than properties of objects; and, as such, are canonical examples of
phenomenological realities. I would not consider these physical.

Joe

--

Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware

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Whether or not I have given what you have to say any less than it deserves, I have given you less than you deserve as a person deserving of respect and dignity. Whether or not your interpretations and arguments merit anything more than a dismissal, you as a person have a right not to be treated shabbily. And I have treated you shabbily. I should do better. Summary dismissals are rude but sometimes justified but my behavior has gone beyond that into gratuitous rudeness. And this isn't the first time.

Whether or not you attract such treatment is for you to consider (or not: it's not my place to say) but my responsibility as a human being interacting with other human beings is to show some basic civility. I apologize again.

My behavior is unjustified and unjustifiable because there is no moral basis for exempting someone from common decency on the basis of something as ultimately unimportant as the quality of their readings or their reasoning. And my treating you as I have, against my better judgment, does not speak well for me as either a moral or a rational being.

You should feel free to participate according to your time, interests, and abilities, no doubt facing criticisms as you do so, but without being subjected to attacks on your character or intelligence.

If my behavior has made you feel unwelcome, the fault lies squarely with me.

JPDeMouy

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Joe, I don't think we have too much difference about what's physical based on what you've said though I'm certainly not in the quale camp. I think, though, that the really important differences in our views came out in that last post you did and which I have already responded to. So we don't need to pay too much attention to what I take to be differences that aren't material to the question of the challenge posed to Dennett's model by your interpretation of von Neumann's quantum theory claim. So let's focus on what came out in that other post then, i.e., whether there is an argument in your interpretation of von Neumann for an extra-physical feature of what we mean by consciousness or whether it is just a matter of our working with different assumptions, reflecting a different conceptualization on each of our parts. If it is this latter, then there is probably no way to argue it as it will just be a matter of how we each see (as in "understand") the referent of the word "consciousness". -- SWM

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SWM wrote:

>Joseph Polanik wrote:

>>I undertook to show that your mechanistic, Dennett-based theory of
>>consciousness can't possibly be true unless von Neumann is wrong.

>Yes, you did. On that score I would say you haven't yet made the case.

how absurdly ironic this conversation has become!

for years now, you have been claiming that this or that person who
disagreed with you had latent dualistic tendencies; indeed, in another
recent post you accuse Bruce of 'implicit dualism'.

nevertheless, when I presented the von Neumann Interpretation of QM
(which is as overtly dualistic as one can get without actually
plagiarizing from Descartes scrapbook), you resist the suggestion that
the von Neumann Interpretation is incompatible with your mechanistic,
Dennett-based theory of consciousness.

>I don't see the negative implications in it for Dennett's model thus
>far, nor do I fnd your tweaking of von Neumann's thesis to alter his
>category II in terms of what is said to be included within it implied
>by his thesis. By itself, von Neumann's thesis seems to have no
>implications for Dennett's proposal as far as I can see at this point
>while your tweaked version strikes me as an effort to shoehorn an extra
>thesis into von Neumann's.

how exactly did I alter the contents of von Neumann's division II?

are you saying that I've included in division II something that von
Neumann excluded? if so, what do you say I added?

are you saying that I've excluded from division II something that von
Neumann included? if so, what do you say I subtracted?

>It is still worth exploring, of course, but now it comes down to
>understanding the Polanikian version which, as far as I can see, hinges
>on a move von Neumann doesn't make and also on a presumption of
>"metaphenomenal" phenomena.

what is the move that you think I make that von Neumann doesn't make?

I deny presuming that there are metaphenomenal phenomena. what did I
write that made you think otherwise?

--

Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware

@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
http://what-am-i.net
@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@

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my claim i that 'consciousness' as a synonym of or translation for

'abstract I' refers to an (alleged or postulated) entity of reality type

3; whereas, 'consciousness' , as you use it, refers to phenomenological

(type 2) realities (experiences and the subject of its experiences) .

would you agree with that claim?

Joe

Dear sir
Chapter communication may be able to clarify your doubt regarding experience,self,I,consciousness.Please bear it that language is three dimensional by its very structure.One post stands as a witness for the interaction between two.Language is a story of a triangle.Post which stands as a witness is also interchangeable so it is called with different names to explain.
Ex: Time as past  present future
Present stand as a witness to the past and derive future.

You are aware we both write,speak,think,correspond but with what?So also with oneself.
So also communication with an object or with ones subject.
Communication is a process of transferring information from one entity to another. Communication processes are sign-mediated interactions between at least two agents which share a repertoire of signs and semiotic rules. Communication is commonly defined as "the imparting
or interchange of thoughts, opinions, or information by speech,
writing, or signs". Although there is such a thing as one-way
communication, communication can be perceived better as a two-way process in which there is an exchange and progression of thoughts, feelings or ideas (energy) towards a mutually accepted goal or direction (information).[1]
Communication is a process whereby information is enclosed in a
package and is channeled and imparted by a sender to a receiver via
some medium. The receiver then decodes the message and gives the sender
a feedback. All forms of communication require a sender, a message, and
a receiver. Communication requires that all parties have an area of
communicative commonality. There are auditory means, such as speech, song, and tone of voice, and there are nonverbal means, such as body language, sign language, paralanguage, touch, eye contact, and writing.
You may be kind enough to see that what is it causing movement for these symbols and signs.So that you are free of your doubt.
thank you

sekhar

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