Main articles: Philosophy of space and time and
Temporal
finitism
The Vedas, the earliest texts on
Indian
philosophy and Hindu philosophy dating back to the late 2nd millennium BC,
describe ancient Hindu
cosmology, in which the universe
goes through repeated cycles of creation, destruction and rebirth, with each
cycle lasting 4,320,000 years. Ancient Greek philosophers,
including Parmenides and Heraclitus, wrote essays on the
nature of time.[23]
In Book 11 of St. Augustine's Confessions, he ruminates on
the nature of time, asking, "What then is time? If no one asks me, I know: if I
wish to explain it to one that asketh, I know not." He settles on time being
defined more by what it is not than what it is,[24]
an approach similar to that taken in other negative
definitions.
In contrast to ancient Greek philosophers who believed that the universe had
an infinite past with no beginning, medieval philosophers and theologians developed the concept of the universe
having a finite past with a beginning. This view is not shared by Abrahamic
faiths as they believe time started by creation, therefore the only thing being
infinite is God and everything else, including time, is finite.
Newton's belief in absolute space, and a precursor to Kantian time, Leibniz believed
that time and space are relational.[
25] The differences
between Leibniz's and Newton's interpretations came to a head in the famous Leibniz-Clarke
Correspondence.
Immanuel Kant, in the
Critique of Pure Reason, described
time as an a priori intuition
that allows us (together with the other a priori intuition, space) to comprehend sense experience.[
26] With Kant,
neither space nor time are conceived as substances, but rather both are elements of a
systematic mental framework that
necessarily structures the experiences of any rational agent, or observing
subject. Kant thought of time as a fundamental part of an abstract
conceptual framework, together with space
and number, within which we sequence
events, quantify their duration, and
compare the motions of objects. In this view, time does not refer to any
kind of entity that "flows," that objects "move through," or that is a
"container" for events. Spatial measurements are used to quantify the extent of and distances between objects, and
temporal measurements are used to quantify the durations of and between events. (See Ontology).
Henri Bergson
believed that time was neither a real homogeneous medium nor a mental construct,
but possesses what he referred to as Duration. Duration, in Bergson's
view, was creativity and memory as an essential component of reality.[27]
sekhar
--- On Fri, 1/1/10, Cayuse <
z.z7@ntlworld.com> wrote:
From: Cayuse <
z.z7@ntlworld.com>
Subject: [C] [Wittrs] On Time
To:
wittrsamr@freelists.org
Date: Friday, 1 January, 2010, 1:37 AM
The following text has been copied from
"Lectures on Philosophy" (LW 1932-33):
http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/at/wittgens.htm
12 [...] In general the sentences we are
tempted to utter occur in practical situations. But then there is a different
way we are tempted to utter sentences. This is when we look at language,
consciously direct our attention on it. And then we make up sentences of which
we say that they also ought to make sense. A sentence of this sort might not
have any particular use, but because it sounds English we consider it sensible.
Thus, for example, we talk of the flow of time and consider it sensible to talk
of its flow, after the analogy of rivers.
13 If we look at a river in which
numbered logs are floating, we can describe events on land with reference to
these, e.g., "When the 105th log passed, I ate dinner". Suppose the log
makes a bang on passing me. We can say these bangs are separated by equal, or
unequal, intervals. We could also say one set of bangs was twice as fast as
another set. But the equality or inequality of intervals so measured is entirely
different from that measured by a clock. The phrase "length of interval" has its
sense in virtue of the way we determine it, and differs according to the method
of measurement. Hence the criteria for equality of intervals between passing
logs and for equality of intervals measured by a clock are different. We cannot
say that two bangs two seconds apart differ only in degree from those an hour
apart, for we have no feeling of rhythm if the interval is an hour long. And to
say that one rhythm of bangs is faster than another is different from saying
that the interval between these two bangs passed much more slowly than the
interval between another pair.
Suppose that the passing logs seem to be equal distances apart. We have an
experience of what might be called the velocity of these (though not what is
measured by a clock). Let us say the river moves uniformly in this sense. But if
we say time passed more quickly between logs 1 and 100 than between
logs 100 and 200, this is only an analogy; really nothing has passed more
quickly. To say time passes more quickly, or that time flows, is to imagine
something flowing. We then extend the simile and talk about the
direction of time. When people talk of the direction of time, precisely the
analogy of a river is before them. Of course a river can change its direction of
flow, but one has a feeling of giddiness when one talks of time being reversed.
The reason is that the notion of flowing, of something, and of the
direction of the flow is embodied in our language.
Suppose that at certain intervals situations repeated themselves, and that
someone said time was circular. Would this be right or wrong? Neither. It would
only be another way of _expression_, and we could just as well talk of a circular
time. However, the picture of time as flowing, as having a direction, is one
that suggests itself very vigorously.
Suppose someone said that the river on which the logs float had a beginning
and will have an end, that there will be 100 more logs and that will be the end.
It might be said that there is an experience which would verify these
statements. Compare this with saying that time ceases. What is the criterion for
its ceasing or for its going on? You might say that time ceases when "Time
River" ceases. Suppose we had no substantive "time", that we talked only of the
passing of logs. Then we could have a measurement of time without any
substantive "time". Or we could talk of time coming to an end, meaning that the
logs came to an end. We could in this sense talk of time coming to an
end.
Can time go on apart from events? What is the criterion for time involved
in "Events began 100 years ago and time began 200 years ago"? Has time been
created, or was the world created in time? These questions are asked after the
analogy of "Has this chair been made?", and are like asking whether order has
been created (a "before" and "after"). "Time" as a substantive is terribly
misleading. We have got to make the rules of the game before we play it.
Discussion of "the flow of time" shows how philosophical problems arise.
Philosophical troubles are caused by not using language practically but by
extending it on looking at it. We form sentences and then wonder what they can
mean. Once conscious of "time" as a substantive, we ask then about the creation
of time.
Extracted from WORD WEB WIKIPEDIA
thank yousekhar
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