"Why do you think being a subject implies being non-physical in any
possible way if we can give an account
of a physical entity as a subject (as Dennett does)"
Here is a possible way:
To "be physical" means something like being a collection of particles
interacting according to physical laws that predict future locations
based on past locations and their rates of change. Operating on the
state of any collection of particles the laws of physics predict
another arrangement of those particles at least to some certainty.
To "be a subject" means (among other things) being aware.
It may be that a particular arrangement of particles causes awareness
but if it is true we currently do not know
what arrangement that is although we know, and have known since the
first caveman ducked a rock,
that it has to do with brains.
Certainly, however, no arrangement is awareness because the term aware
does not mean to be an arrangement of particles. In fact it is
possible to conceive of any arrangement as not being aware and in fact
current physics does this. There is no mention in the physics of
awareness - no property of matter corresponding to the idea of it. If
there is then you should be able to point to that law of physics or
state of matter described in some physics book as having that
property. It is not in the classical physics, quantum mechanics, or
relativity theory, so where is it?
My understanding is all aspects of chemistry are the result of physics
and aspects of biology are result of
chemistry and the brain a result of biology. If that is true then
there is something missing - some principle that correlates the
existence of awareness with some level of organization of the
material. Certainly it is in neurology and the ties are being advanced
daily. Since current physical law does not contain this (these)
principle(s) then to "be a subject" is non-physical.
We could modify the current physics to include descriptions of what is
now called non-physical. Then we could make the statement that being a
subject does not imply being non-physical but then the physics as we
know it when judged from the physics as it currently stands would
include non-physical statements. Not that we would need to refer to
them as such once the new statements were admitted to what we would
then call physics.
A corollary of this is that Dennett has not given an account of a
physical entity as a subject by using the laws
of physics to show how the existence of awareness is predicted. At
some point he has to modify the laws of physics or refer to something
that is not predicted by them. Otherwise he just gets a geometric
rearrangement of the unaware matter.
There is one other possibility. It is possible that Dennet possesses
no consciousness of his own awareness and it
is even at the extreme edge of possibility that what we call Dennet is
unaware. That he does not really exist but
is a zombie. Then when he testifies to the fact of his lack of
awareness he does not need to explain anything because in fact, in
him, there is no awareness - and this is not a lack of consciousness
but a genuine fact. We could be listening to a pure machine. If that
is true then Dennet in fact may be right. Right about himself but not
about me I can assure you.
I can assure you that that is not true for me as I experience directly
the fact that I am aware and by that I do
not mean that I am a material arrangement. I might in fact be one - in
a sense - but if I am then there is
more to a material arrangement than what is currently described in the
physics. If I am then there is some principle that associates certain
structures with awareness. I can tell this because I have had
anesthesia and
by a slight altering of my brain I lost awareness. I remember loosing
it and I remember when I gained it. Nothing in my reading of the
physics remotely predicts such an event. If it is there can you show
me where?
In a limited sense, when we posit something as really existing we
necessarily posit it as not being my
experiencing of it. Reality is then the opposite of the "purely
subjective". After all isn't that what distinguishes
a hallucination from a reality? Whether it is just someone "just
seeing something" as opposed to something really being there? Reality
is then what exists objectively and is not merely subjective. And if
this is the measure of being then any experiencing of the subject is
an inherently unreal experiencing of nothing. If we believe this We
could then be fooled into believing that awareness is purely physical.
This is solved by a better understanding of what it means to be real.
Claude Shannon states that the information associated with signals has
nothing to do with their meaning. Yet it seems that in the assembly of
matter into a device where information is most highly collected,
processed and (presumably) stored we also have the creation of
awareness. Perhaps there is in fact a relation between the two and
perhaps someday as neurology and computer science progress we will
find it and define it. What we find will be a relationship between
what we now call physics and entropy and what we now call, for
example, awareness.
We already have a lot of the picture. we know for example that vision
has something to do with signals from
the eyes traveling to the back of the head. We routinely use phrases
like "he lost sight in one of his eyes". As imprecise as these are
they are such an association. We need only make them precise enough to
admit them to the physics somehow. I think neurology and cybernetics
has a chance on achieving such generality.
That will be a new scientific principle and we may deem the result a
part of what we will then call "physics". Absent that advance the
relationship between awareness and physics is unknown and it seems
misleading to ascribe to the current physics predictions that it does
not make.
Once the association is known we will be able to do that. We will be
able to say that if a particular arrangement of matter is made then an
awareness forms or occurs. But when we do that the awareness that
forms will not in fact be reducible to the arrangement. It will be a
result of it.
Perhaps even a new form of the word "be" will have to be added to the
list in the other thread as such an assignment will be different than
those in the list.
On Jan 28, 7:39 am, "SWM" <
SWMir...@aol.com> wrote:
> --- In
Wit...@yahoogroups.com, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@..
.> wrote:
>
> <snip>
>
>
>
> > it's rather obvious that whatever causal efficacy the turning wheel has
> > is due entirely to the physical object that is the turning wheel.
> > consequently, if consciousness is to the brain as the turning is to the
> > wheel; then, the causal efficacy that some might attribute to
> > consciousness is more accurately attributed to the brain.
>
> Only in part since a wheel doesn't turn by itself. It requires the force of wind or gravity or a push. The point is that we can speak of the turning just as we can speak of the wheel and both are manifestly part of the physical universe (which includes electrical current and electromagnetism and gravity, etc.). The question is whether, because consciousness is not identifiable as a physical entity in the universe we must conclued that it is therefore not part of the physical universe. The wheel analogy shows there is no need to do that.
>
> But then the question is whether the current picture of the universe, with all its disparate phenomena is sufficient to account for consciousness or if we have to posit something extra to explain its occurrence. Chalmers suggests we do (hence his dualism). Dennett that we don't.
>
> > but, that undermines your claim that consciousness as Dennett conceives
> > it could fill the role of an abstract I in the von Neumann
> > Interpretation. if you recall, von Neumann removed all things physical
> > from his Division III, the actual observer.
>
> > Joe
>
> The issue is what does it mean to remove all things physical in this way (a question I have posed to you before). If the I,II,III scenario is about roles that phenomena play, then there is no reason a subject derived entirely from the physical universe cannot play the part of observing consciousness that you call (based on something else von Neumann said) the "abstract I" in this three way picture. To be a subject does NOT, by itself, imply a purely non-physical point of consciousness in the universe. It only implies that, in certain relationships, certain phenomena in the universe play the observing role.
>
> You haven't yet addressed that possibility but, instead, simply repeat this "von Neumann" mantra. So I have to repeat my question again: Why do you think being a subject implies being non-physical in any possible way if we can give an account of a physical entity as a subject (as Dennett does)?
>
> SWM
>
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http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/
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