[C] [Wittrs] Digest Number 108

  • From: WittrsAMR@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • To: WittrsAMR@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: 14 Jan 2010 10:36:41 -0000

Title: WittrsAMR

Messages In This Digest (11 Messages)

Messages

1.1.

!!!Re: Re: Metaphysical Versus Mystical

Posted by: "Rajasekhar Goteti" rgoteti@xxxxxxxxx   rgoteti

Wed Jan 13, 2010 6:46 pm (PST)



6.127 All the propositions of logic are of equal status: it is not the case

that some of them are essentially derived propositions. Every tautology

itself shows that it is a tautology.

JPDeMouy

Basically language may be compared to a rope trick of India.Magician orders the rope to move in to the space and ask his assistant to climb the rope.Later boy vanishes in to the thin air.Rope swirls back to the platform.
Language is tricky and can create its own world of fantasy.Reason one is acting as an spectator and doer.Clarity is to come out of this magical spell.
thank you

sekhar

The INTERNET now has a personality. YOURS! See your Yahoo! Homepage. http://in.yahoo.com/
1.2.

!!!Re: Re: Metaphysical Versus Mystical

Posted by: "jrstern" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Wed Jan 13, 2010 7:00 pm (PST)



--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "J D" <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
>
> Three of the principles used in the Tractatus (all of which would be rejected by the later Wittgenstein) are:
>
> 1. the treatment of universal quantification as an abbreviation for a conjunction and existential quantification as an abbreviation for a disjunction;
> 2. the replacement of identity statements (which standardly involve quantification over classes) with the requirement that in a logically perfect language, each symbol corresponds to one and only one object; and
> 3. the assumption that a complete analysis of a proposition will yield elementary propositions, each of whose truth-value is independent of the truth-value of every other elementary proposition.
>
> All of these are problematic, as every Wittgenstein scholar should know, but if one were to suppose them true, the idea an analysis requiring only first-order predicate logic becomes more plausible.
>
> I agree with you that he was wrong on this but I am more interested in why he's wrong and why he might have made such a supposition (aside from the face that insights such as Turing's and Godel's came later).

Well, you describe logical atomism, carried forward from Russell.

In the same period science was finally settling issues of physical
atomism. Modern logic was not yet born. I'm not sure one can find
much more of an answer than that.

Yet, it's not as if algebra and geometry were unknown, and it's not
like y = ax^2 + b simplifies to single values.

TLP Wittgenstein is trying to separate out mathematics from logic
from phenomenology. Vienna had not yet started talking about the
unity of science, reductionism was not yet an established dogma.

There are just those kinds of atavisms still at work in TLP.

Off the top of my head!

Josh

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2a.

Re: Analytic and Tautological

Posted by: "J D" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Wed Jan 13, 2010 6:51 pm (PST)



Niel,

> Analytic: true by virtue of the meanings of the terms used.
>

Note: this formulation and the earlier formulation involving a containment metaphor, i.e. the predicate is contained in the subject, both involve what Wittgenstein stigmatized as the Bedeutungskorper (meaning-body) picture of meaning.

Wittgenstein would actually have agreed with Quine in his attack on analyticity, though not with Quine's conclusion.

Saying that the meanings of the terms involved makes the proposition true leaves "meaning" as something mysterious.

Contrast with grammatical remarks, the truth of which are constitutive of the meanings of the words for whose usage the remark expresses a rule.

Wittgentein didn't eschew talk of "analyticity" and favor talk of "rules" and "grammatical remarks" just for stylistic eccentricity. Analyticity is a problematic concept in many cases and certainly accounts of it tend to be misleading.

>
> Both are usually unpacked in the literature as meaning
> "true in
> all possible worlds."

That way of putting things usually applies to necessity and those who speak that way often distinguish necessity from analyticity.

But to me, that seems wrong for
> "analytic."
> Instead, I want to say that "analytic" only
> implies "true in all
> worlds in which it is meaningful."

I believe that proponents of "possible worlds" would, if that point were raised, distinguish between "true in..." and "true OF..." or "true FOR..."

If one uses either of those expressions, then the suggestion that a proposition wouldn't be true where, e.g. English isn't spoken, there are no people, and so forth.

(Also, "proposition" rather than "sentence" might be used avoid that suggestion in some cases, depending on how much one sublimes "proposition".

(Mind you, I think talk of possible worlds confuses more than it enlightens and I am certainly not a proponent or defender of it.)

> Incidently, an alternative definition of
> "analytic", as I am using
> the term, would be "true by virtue of empirical
> practices."

And I take this to amount to the something like Wittgenstein's methodological propositions.

But also relevant are Wittgenstein observations about shifts between symptoms and criteria (BB and PI) and indeterminacy between methodological statements and statements within a methodology (PI and OC).

JPDeMouy

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3a.

Re: The Epiphenomenalism of Dennett-Consistent Philosophies of Consc

Posted by: "BruceD" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Wed Jan 13, 2010 7:40 pm (PST)




--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:

> perhaps that is how the sense of being a self (or subject or
experiencer
> or agent, etc) arises.

Right. There certain material conditions for there to be a self, i.e.,
an agent that isn't mechanically driven by prior causes. As you put
it...

> the point is that this sense of self experiences
> itself as the executing agent of its intentions.

but, as you put it...

> if the actual work is being done by the brain...

then intentions are illusions. Which leads to this paradox. If I'm
programmed and caused (by external stimuli) to say my brain is the cause
of all things, then my claim is neither true nor false, just what I'm
made to say.

I think we get to this paradox when we start a mindless world and then
are resistant to add a human spirit that troubles our scientific
attitude. But if we start with humans thinking about who and what they
are, it is easier to see that some aspects of them are machine like, our
brains, which we use, like an instrument to play what we are.

bruce

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3b.

Re: The Epiphenomenalism of Dennett-Consistent Philosophies of Consc

Posted by: "BruceD" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Wed Jan 13, 2010 7:49 pm (PST)




--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <SWMirsky@...> wrote:

> The point, as I am trying to convey... is that the sense of self
> we have is actually multiple,

Doesn't matter whether one or multiple. Are any of the many We not
simply reflecting the causal action of our brain or not?

The problem is that if the brain generates a free self then it is a
ghost in the machine. Your analogy is the water molecules cause wetness.
You can point to the causal chain to the brain. But then the brain
generates a self, that is both brain and not brain, that experiences the
wetness and resists the notion that the brain made it feel that way.

bruce

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3c.

Do Translation Issues Underlie the Mind-Body Conundrum?

Posted by: "SWM" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Wed Jan 13, 2010 8:33 pm (PST)



--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "BruceD" <blroadies@...> wrote:

> --- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <SWMirsky@> wrote:
>
> > The point, as I am trying to convey... is that the sense of self
> > we have is actually multiple,
>

> Doesn't matter whether one or multiple. Are any of the many We not
> simply reflecting the causal action of our brain or not?
>
> The problem is that if the brain generates a free self then it is a
> ghost in the machine. Your analogy is the water molecules cause wetness.
> You can point to the causal chain to the brain. But then the brain
> generates a self, that is both brain and not brain, that experiences the
> wetness and resists the notion that the brain made it feel that way.

> bruce

No, that's all wet, Bruce! The problem is you're still looking for the non-physical entity within the physical one, the homunculus (albeit without calling it that) in the head, the little clerk in the Searlean room. But on this model it's not needed to explain the occurrence of the entity image(s).

The operating brain does many things, including producing various pictures (complex networks of representations), both of observed phenomena (external and internal) and of the observing systems (or sub-systems). Sometimes "I" refers to one aspect of this complex of pictures, sometimes to another but the point is to note that it is the complex, with its physical aspects, that acts and that the self alluded to by Joe represents when it "speaks".

As Ramachandran shows, when certain operations within the brain are shut down for various reasons, specific aspects, features, of the conscious mind we are familiar with go away. (This isn't even controversial and I'm sure you are as familiar with the literature, maybe more familiar, than I am.)

When the damage is permanent, the lost features cannot be brought back (though sometimes the highly plastic brain can find new pathways to compensate and then some degree of partial recovery becomes possible). Of course Ramachandran is working with the hardest cases so recovery seems to be rare in his practice.

Anyway, I think Rmachandran's point is pretty interesting here, putting this whole problem that has plagued these discussions for four or five lists now (and which your point above seems to me to hinge on), down to one of translation. While his use of "language", to achieve his description of this as translation, is a little unorthodox, it's not out of the ballpark.

Why, after all, should we presume language is ONLY the activity of one conscious brain (at our level of consciousness) sending information to another roughly comparably conscious brain via sound or written symbols?

Ramachandran likens the utterly mindless communication of information from neurons to other neurons and (from clusters of neurons to other clusters) within a given brain to language. And why not?

No, it's not "language" as we usually use the term but it is certainly "language" as the term might be used in computer programming and as physicists, at times, describe the interaction of physical phenomena at a deep level. And as such it carries the same implications, i.e., one thing passing information to something else.

While it can be argued that this is conceptual overreach, a mistake or confusion, on reflection I think it's fair to ask why are we obliged to think of it in that way at all? Just because "language" usually means something like English or Chinese, say, or because this usage may have come before the idea of a language of the stars or of atoms or of computer programming, doesn't mean that we have completely different concepts here.

The notion of family resemblance is instructive here, but THAT very concept suggests there is NO real (essential) meaning to any word in our language, just the range of uses and how they relate to one another in the practice of speaking ordinary language.

If this is so, and I think it is, then Ramachandran has hit on a way of explaining why there seems to so many still to be a mind-body problem that presents insurmountable obstacles for the scientific study of brains and minds.

Now as you know I think there is another conceptual issue that perpetuates this mind-body perplexity and that is the fact that the mental aspect of our lives is not amenable to the kind of talk we apply to the physical, even though we have reason to think, in light of current information, that the mental is causally dependent on the physical (i.e., we have lots of good evidence for siding with that intuition rather than the one that tells us we are something more than "merely" physical).

Thus, every time we try to address this, we find our language pointing us back to physical pictures, physical models, when it's clear that what we mean by "minds" isn't some physical object (with mass, extension, texture, etc.). The existence of this linguistic limitation complicates the game because we keep looking for the referent of our term as though it were a physical object with observable physical features. So there are at least two language problems that seem to lie at the root of our penchant to be confused about minds and bodies (how they manage to connect, affect one another, etc.).

Ramachandran is addressing the question of how far we can go in this kind of study using the methods and standards of science and here he focuses on the question of whether "qualia" can be shared, i.e., whether their essential "privacy" can be overcome. And for scientific purposes I think he makes a good point. In fact it's akin to the one Eray made some time back on Analytic, that eventually science will develop and begin using brain prostheses.

This seems incredible to us (and, perhaps, a little scary) but if Ramachandran's account of how brains work is on target, there's little reason to think this accomplishment must be, in principle, beyond us. And then there would be no barrier to translating, as he uses the term, experiences between different minds and, without such a barrier, there is no reason to suppose there is a mind-body problem at all.

SWM

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3d.

Re: Dennett's Intentional Stance

Posted by: "BruceD" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Wed Jan 13, 2010 9:30 pm (PST)



http://www.consciousentities.com/dennett.htm

An interesting piece. Just what is Dennett's stance?

bruce

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3e.

Re: Do Translation Issues Underlie the Mind-Body Conundrum?

Posted by: "BruceD" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Wed Jan 13, 2010 9:45 pm (PST)




--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <SWMirsky@...> wrote:

> The problem is you're still looking for the non-physical entity within
the physical one,

You know better. I don't think in terms of entities. But you do. If the
brain causes the self, then the self has to be a something. Even if it
isn't a solid entity, it must be gas, a wave, some form of matter, or
perhaps a non-physical entity.

> The operating brain does many things, including producing various
pictures

for me to see? Where am I in this picture? Do I see the picture the
brain makes exactly as it makes it or can I distort it? If I can distort
it, then you have a ghost in the machine.

> ....when certain operations within the brain are shut down..features
of the conscious mind we are familiar with go away.

Correct. Now explain why. If my visual cortex is damaged.....

1. It doesn't make pictures and I, the ghost in the machine, am in the
dark.

2. I can't use my brain to see the world. The "I" in this stance doesn't
refer to any entity. Just a description of how I'm able to do what I do.

bruce

#1 places

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4.

therapy and grammatical investigations (for ABoncampagni)

Posted by: "Übersichtlichkeit" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Wed Jan 13, 2010 10:19 pm (PST)



In _Zettel_, we find:

472. Plan for the treatment of psychological concepts.
Psychological verbs characterized by the fact that the third person of
the present is to be verified by
observation, the first person not.
Sentences in the third person present: information. In the first
person present: _expression_. ((Not quite right.))
The first person of the present akin to an _expression_.
Sensations: their inner connexions and analogies.
All have genuine duration. Possibility of giving the beginning and the
end. Possibility of their being
synchronized, of simultaneous occurrence.
All have degrees and qualitative mixtures. Degree: scarcely
perceptible--unendurable.
In this sense there is not a sensation of position or movement. Place
of feeling in the body: differentiates
seeing and hearing from sense of pressure, temperature, taste and pain.

----------------------------------------------------------

Question: must a grammatical investigation subserve a therapeutic aim,
i.e. one of resolving a specific confusion?

(Some of my misgivings about questions like this are likely evidenced
by my enthusiasm for the "vaccine" simile Ms. Boncampagni shared with
us.)

Must such an investigation, even if it is not addressed to a
particular individual grappling with a particular confusion, at least
be undertaken with the aim of averting a particular misunderstanding?

Certainly, some of Wittgenstein's remarks, especially those mentioning
"therapy" or making comparisons between his method and
psycho-analysis, do suggest as much. Or rather, they have suggested as
much to many of his readers.

It is also true that in reading his remarks asking, "To whom is this
addressed? To what position would this be relevant? What
misunderstanding might this avert? What confusion might this
alleviate?" are all questions the answering of which often gives not
only an organization but a motivation to what might otherwise seem
rambling or pointless.

But must such questions always be appropriate?

In this passage from _Zettel_ have we "caught" Wittgenstein doing
something contrary to his professed method? And is it an aberration?
Or is it merely a case we'd have more trouble explaining away?

In most cases, we can assume that he must be addressing a particular
thinker. Or at least a particular puzzle or misunderstanding. But if
we don't assume that then there's no reason to view this passage as
exceptional.

My question: what gives philosophy its impetus and its form, if it is
not the construction of theories? Many readings of the later
Wittgenstein simply assumed, his eccentric claims to the contrary
notwithstanding, that a theory could be extracted from his remarks.

Those who now lean on the therapeutic metaphor find the motivation and
organization in the puzzles, confusions, misunderstandings, or
specific troubled individuals to whom the remarks are addressed.

I propose that there is another set of metaphors that can accommodate
what is right about the therapeutic reading while avoiding some of the
pitfalls. And it can accommodate remarks like the one that introduced
this missive.

Setting out to "shew the fly out of the fly-bottle" or helping someone
(perhaps oneself) who says, "I don't know my way about" are both
consistent with the therapeutic metaphors but they also can serve as a
bridge. Consider the Preface to _Philosophical_Investigations_ with
its talk of "travel over a wide field of thought criss-cross in every
direction" and of "sketches of landscapes which were made in the
course of these long and involved journeyings."

One can imagine then how such journeys might be in the service of
therapy without always having a therapeutic purpose as the immediate
concern. Consider also:

"Language contains the same traps for everyone; the immense network of
well-kept // passable // false paths. And thus we see one person after
another walking the same paths and we know already where he will make
a turn, where he will keep going on straight ahead without noticing
the turn, etc. etc. Therefore wherever false paths branch off I should
put up signs which help one get by the dangerous places." (BT 424)

What I want to suggest is that such journeys, such sketches may be
connected to therapeutic goals in a few ways at least:

1. As vaccination, as suggests Ms. Boncampagni's professor.
Deliberately and mindfully traveling down false paths so as to
recognize them in the future, thereby treating oneself.

2. Following Jung's "wounded healer" archetype, being able to better
recognize another's confusion on the basis of one's own intimate
experience with these issues.

3. As a basis for theorizing not about philosophical topics but about
the methods of treating philosophical ailments - diagnosis, etiology,
prognosis, treatment.

4. To stock and organize the medicine chest, not by the ailments one
wishes to treat but by the affinities between various treatments.

I think this last may be an especially useful way to approach remarks
like Z 472.

JPDeMouy
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5.1.

Re: [C] Re: !!!Re: Re: Metaphysical Versus Mystical

Posted by: "kirby urner" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Wed Jan 13, 2010 10:33 pm (PST)



On Wed, Jan 13, 2010 at 1:50 AM, kirby urner <kirby.urner@gmail.com> wrote:

<< snip >>

> Wittgenstein is less the positivist and more the mystic because "that
> which it makes no sense to speak about" ends up having high ethical
> value, whereas "that which is the case" is meaningless in a different
> way:  is simply what's so (is the case) and who cares about that?
> (Answer:  the self, but then "caring" is not a
>

Hmmm, going back and finding I didn't even complete that sentence.

Turns out I care, want to fix it.

(Answer: the self, but then "caring" is not a "fact in the world" so
much as a relationship to the world (of facts)).

I think the shift from the Tractatus to the PI is from "noun sense" to
"verb sense". The Tractatus is nominalist, in a sense Wittgenstein
might agree to.

[ Hey, who else has 'Wittgenstein - The Later Philosophy' by
Henry Le Roy Finch? Humanities Press, 1977. Good stuff on
"nominalism" in there.

"""
We cannot in Wittgenstein's philosophy get what the nominalist
wants -- names fastened to particulars in such a way that the
name stands for just this one unique thing. This may seem to
deny the possibility of proper names until we ask ourselves just
what proper names name and how they are used. We then
recall that we cannot even apply proper names unless we have
ways of identifying, so that even in this case it is not the unique
particularity which is being named, but rather some assemblage
of different recognizable features. Even proper names must
have senses or must have uses (PI 79, 87).
"""

Got to meet the author, invited by our Princeton faculty, to
share with us. A privilege and an honor. ]

PI is "verb sense" in that "to use" is "to do" -- one uses a tool. This
makes our role more creative, not just descriptive. The active agent
is in the mix somehow. In TLP (Tractatus), one is more removed,
an observer.

Not claiming this insight is unique with me, more just saying I agree
with this way of comparing them. The PI has a more liberal idea of
what language does. It's a participant, a decider, not just a describer.

Kirby
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6.1.

Re: [C] !!!Re: Re: Metaphysical Versus Mystical

Posted by: "kirby urner" wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

Thu Jan 14, 2010 1:17 am (PST)



On Wed, Jan 13, 2010 at 6:39 PM, CJ <castalia@optonline.net> wrote:

<< snip >>

> When Wittgenstein speaks of the "limits of _expression_" he is pointing
> directly to the manner in which the rules of a system of operations
> determine what will or will not fall within the scope or landscape of any
> such iteration of those operations or rules.  It is the rules or operations
> which essentially "limit" the domain of what can be expressed.  In "Group
> theory" this basic property is known as "closure."  It embodies the charting
> of a 'limit" from within and not having to be at external "vantage point" as
> one must be when seeking to express oneself in "sets".
> The integers are a "group" with respect to the operations "addition"  What
> this means is that you can repeatedly implement sequential  additions and
> you will never arrive at a number that is not an integer.  You need not have
> an external or God like vantage point to know that you can never be able to
> exceed the 'limits" determined by the successive implementation of these
> operations.  That is one of the definition s of a group:  It's closure or
> self contained nature.  IF you maintain the successive application of
> addition the successive application of its operations only leads to further
> members of the group. In a group such as the "shuffling of a deck of cards"
> no matter how many times you apply a 'shuffle" you are always only going to
> yield up the equivalent of another single "shuffle" that could have been
> made.  This group also demonstrates "closure".

I like seeing some group theory come in, with "closure" and "internally
consistent" or "internally logical" having some resonance.

There's a hermetic theme here, foreshadowing "private language"
and its (by definition) nonsensical nature. At the world limit, it's all
internal and therefore "private" in some sense (as in "belonging
to God"), yet it's still operational (follows rules, has grammar).

Group Theory gets Biblical with that "CAIN and Abel" language
game (a feature in some math texts), where CAIN stands for
Closure, Associative, Inverse and Neutral, the basic needs
of a group (Neutral means an identity element, 0 in the case of
addition, with an inverse being "that which forms the identity
when added to" whatever member of the group (to "subtract S"
means to "add the additive inverse of S")).

Having one's language be the limits of one's world is like having
the finite permutations of some character set, say the characters
of the I Ching, sufficient to picture not the details, but something
canonical nonetheless.

Note: I have some Group Theory on tap for teachers, with the
Flash animation being more kid-friendly, but fair warning
there's a "welcome to the machine" noise (Pink Floyd
allusion) so you might want to turn down those speakers:
4dsolutions.net/ocn/flash/group.html

The pun on Abel (as in CAIN and Abel) is of course some
groups are "Abelian" (named for Niels Henrik Abel), meaning
their binary operation is commutative, in addition to being
associative.

> When the further operation of "multiplication" is considered and we allow
> for the successive application of either of the two operations, addition or
> multiplication, we end up with a different group, the "rationals", and,l
> again that group is closed and the 'limits of _expression_" are known.....for
> those involved they do not need to have a "vantage point " or "view' from
> outside of irrational numbers or imaginary or complex numbers or so on in
> order to be aware (once they are aware of the grammar of use which arises
> from the restriction to the operations of addition and multiplication) that
> these are the 'limits of _expression_".
>

I see where you're going with this: waxing and waning.

If you play your cards right, you might graduate from grouphood to
ringhood to fieldhood.

The rationals form a field, meaning you have CAIN and Abel for
two operations (+ and *), two identities (0 and 1), and a distributive
law. By analogy, one could see these "new levels of closure" do
not predict one another, i.e. as you say "they do not need to
have a 'vantage point' or 'view' from outside of the irrational
numbers or imaginary or complex numbers or so on in order
to be aware".

Wittgenstein talked a lot about waking from a dream. These
context changes happen. There's no way to say "I am awake"
at a next level, when you're still awake in the previous dream.

> There is much more to the application of the language and stratagems of
> 'Group theory" to interpreting Wittgenstein.
> As to the notion of "form of life" and the relation of "form of life" to
> "language games", I believe that we are still operating while seeking to
> ignore the puzzle which remains as to just how "form of life" relates to
> "language game" other than as some amorphous "backdrop"....There is much
> more to this issue and to the far from automatic manner in which  a variety
> of "language games" arise from each of a variety of distinct 'forms of
> life".  The issue has to do with the manner in which "rules" or 'operations"
> are adopted by the participants...as the "language game " is shaped.
>  Moreover, the kind of "therapeutic" becoming familiar with the grammar of
> how we speak that Wittgenstein gives us is a crucial tool in our society
> coming to terms with how a form of life might give rise to one or another
> "language game" , with one or another set of rules and operations behind it.
>

You're continuing with the theme of "bringing to consciousness"
as in raising to a higher level of awareness, the rules one might
be following.

Because part of the grammar around "rules" is you don't need
to be aware of them to follow them.

Wittgenstein's techniques are therapeutic in bringing us to
greater appreciation of the rules we're actually following. He
adds an empirical dimension to philosophy, a field work
component, like anthropology.

The approach is refreshing, as one studies everyday
communications ("the media"), assembles reminders from
this raw material.

This gives philosophy a more "worker owned" feel, as
anyone is free to investigate language games.

Wholes unpredicted by their parts, waking up to the next
level of play... but then there's going the other direction
too. Dropping to a lower level, falling under a spell.

Fly's go back into fly bottles every day.

Kirby
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