[Wittrs] Re: Pateman On Wittgenstein Chomsky, Behaviorists & Cognitivists
- From: "jrstern" <jrstern@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 23 Sep 2009 16:16:56 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@...> wrote:
>
>Wittgensteinians and Chomskyans:In Defence of Mentalism
>Trevor Pateman
> http://www.selectedworks.co.uk/wittgensteinianschomskyans.html
Very interesting paper. I've just scanned it and read the first
sections, and of course (!?) I of course take the Chomskian side in
almost everything - only I suggest there are not really *sides* to
*be* taken. Chomsky and Wittgenstein are focusing on two separate
things, two different parts of the elephant. There is a middle ground
common to both - but on that, they agree - there is no such thing
as a formal grammar for English that explains in any rule-based way
what a sentence means, so there is no way such a language
could ever be private!
Say that a W says to C, "The cat is on the mat", and it turns out to
mean to C, in this usage, that the cat is on the mat. A good
Wittgensteinian can look at this, and say, "See, the meaning is the
use, normative social processes were at work in a public way."
Nobody is going to argue with that. Unfortunately, it does not
in any way explain how it is that W's vocal apparatus came to
form just those sounds, nor how those sounds impinging on C's
auditory apparatus came to be understood as comprising those words.
THOSE are the aspects that Chomsky focuses on, and that he suggests
are rule-based (and no, the mechanical operation of the vocal and
auditory apparatii are nomological but not rule-based as such, it's
the processesing of their logical inputs and outputs that are
rule-based).
There is a tendency - a tradition - in philosophy especially, of
talking about "language" as if it were an entity. This and that
aspect of language is talked about endlessly, and is endlessly
misleading. Agents use language, and there is no language without
agents. There is a public language which must be normative in
some way - but must also be nomological in some ways, too, the
alternative being random sounds carrying specific meanings. However,
there must also be a private language, or something very much like
it (neural networks, whatever) that are internal and methodologically
solipsistic, etc.
Wittgenstein never said a word about such things. It is my assertion
that what Turing did was show how many of the same concepts from
Wittgenstein's linguistic turn can and do also serve these
internalist questions, and it is in the mechanist, even
computationalist tradition that Chomsky also writes.
I see very little conflict between Wittgenstein and Chomsky, that
is not immediately dissolved by understanding their respective
meanings and uses, and indeed they share a great deal.
Josh
WEB VIEW: http://tinyurl.com/ku7ga4
TODAY: http://alturl.com/whcf
3 DAYS: http://alturl.com/d9vz
1 WEEK: http://alturl.com/yeza
GOOGLE: http://groups.google.com/group/Wittrs
YAHOO: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Wittrs/
FREELIST: //www.freelists.org/archive/wittrs/09-2009
Other related posts:
