I wanted to make a note or two regarding my most recent reading. Jaakko Hintikka's 'On Wittgenstein' (Wadsworth Philosophers Series, 2000). On pg 15 he takes up Wittgenstein's "The world of the happy is quite other than that of the unhappy." What's amazing to me is how he brings in a moral judgement against the unhappy, as if they were in some way inferior: "If we simply add to these Moorean conclusions the Wittgensteinian idea that the objects that constitute the substance of my world are the object of my experience, we must conclude literally that the unhappy philistine has different objects in his world than my object of experience." How did the attribute "philistine" creep in here. There's the implication the unhappy cannot experience beauty. I'm sorry, but if your beautiful daughter or wife is suffering an early demise and there's nothing you can do, then indeed your world is an unhappy place, but not because you're a philistine. Hintikka's portrayal of the unhappy world seems so devoid of compassion that I almost don't want to read any more of his book. Why should I trust him? The last thing we need is the "happy people" feeling morally superior to boot -- how do they live with themselves? I'll keep going though. He's a good writer. I'll forgive him this lapse into bad philosophy. Kirby _______________________________________________ Wittrs mailing list Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://undergroundwiki.org/mailman/listinfo/wittrs_undergroundwiki.org