[Wittrs] Re: Ann: SEP article on "Underdetermination of Scientific Theory"
- From: "iro3isdx" <xznwrjnk-evca@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 19 Aug 2009 21:28:10 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "jrstern" <jrstern@...> wrote:
> Humean skepticism is skepticism about any claims that an observed
> regularity is a law.
Scientific laws are established by edict, not by observation. For sure,
the edict might be influenced by observation. But observation is not
determinative.
If the truth of a law is established by edict, on what grounds would we
doubt it?
> But what other alternative is there, to speak of all laws as
> ontological, and either true or false?
Somebody sets out to document all of the detail of an ancient
cathedral. The first thing he is going to do is build a scaffolding,
as a platform from which observations can be made.
I am saying that scientific theories are scaffolding. They are neither
true nor false. They are constructed to provide a platform from which
observations can be made. There are abitrary choices to be made in
erecting such a scaffolding, and the choice are made on a pragmatic
basis, not on the basis of true/false.
> Whichever direction, that is why underdetermination of scientific
> theories is of concern to any kind of philosophy of science.
Underdetermination of how to erect a scaffolding is an every day
phenomenon in the building trades. Nobody seems find that a cause for
concern.
> Then, is Wittgenstein a "skeptic" because he does not adhere
> to nomological facts about, oh, I dunno, numerical series,
> or propositional attitudes? Is he not a skeptic just because
> he is an epistemologist?
That's not my problem to decide. It seems to me that Wittgenstein is a
skeptic by virtue of the traditions of philosophy. As a heretic, I see
no need to be bound by those traditions.
Regards,
Neil
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