[lit-ideas] Re: "the space of reasons" from Morc Huck Pump
- From: wokshevs@xxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, Robert Paul <rpaul@xxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sat, 22 Mar 2008 18:23:16 -0230
Walter of the long arrow returns ------------->
Quoting Robert Paul <rpaul@xxxxxxxx>:
> Walter of the big arrow wrote
>
> > -------------> A reason, on its own, can never provide an argument. You
> need a
> > conclusion for an argument. Reasons are always reasons for some
> conclusion,
> > otherwise they ain't "reasons." The concept is a relational one,
> internally
> > connected to a conclusion. On its own a statement is neither a reason nor
> a
> > conclusion.
RP:
> Man in a theater queue to woman ditto: 'You're standing on my foot.' Is
> this just an interesting observation, an elliptical request, or a reason
> advanced for her moving her foot? One can say, 'Polite society demands,
> etc., and besides, 'Ceteris paribus, as we all know is of course
> assumed?,' but must books of etiquette and evidence be brought out to
> show that the statement is no mere observation but a reason for the
> woman to move her foot, if she could and if she would? Another example
> comes to mind: 'Your pants are on fire.'
-----------> As it stands (no pun intended) we don't know. We may infer that
the
woman wishes the man to remove his foot from hers. It may very well be an
elliptical request for a romantic evening on the town. (I've certainly been
approached by women with even less imagination than that in my day.) It may
even be the woman's reply to his question, asked in a crowd: "Which of these
feet are yours?" Without that information, the prince is unable to return the
slipper to its original owner. As to "Your pants are on fire" - this
ejaculation has an innumberable number of possible meanings, not all of them
epistemic, if you know what I mean. It could well be said by the princess some
time after having her slipper returned to her by her prince.
RP:
> It may be that Walter is stressing too much the sorts of reasons which
> lead to conclusions that are themselves other statements, as in
> 'arguments,' but often reasons support or lead to actions.
---------> Reasons do not support actions; reasons can support the rightness of
an action, or its prudential or technical value. Reasons can support the truth
of a statement(conclusion) exhorting one to action. A reason has only an
epistemic function, not a conative one. Alas, the will does not always perform
the act legislated by reason.
RP:
>There is some
> slight inductive evidence, slight because it's based on the experiences
> of a single person, moi, that although I can often give reasons,
> sometimes even good ones, why I acted in a certain way, these often, of
> necessity, come after the fact. I swerve the car to avoid hitting a
> squirrel in the roadway. Afterwards I can tell a story about a universal
> respect for living things; about not wanting to clean squirrel matter
> from the wheel well; or even that I mistook the squirrel for a rock.
> What I do not do is run through a little practical syllogism before I
> act, and thus I am not moved to action by its conclusion.
---> Agreed. The principles motivating your actions behind the wheel have been
appropriated by you in the form of dispositions. "In the act" you do not
require to rehearse the epistemic value of these principles to your reasons -
you simply act. But that act is not itself a conclusion; it is an act performed
because of the conclusions you have arrived at regarding moose, I mean
squirrels. (Btw, I don't think Aristotle believed that one must consciously
"run through" a syllogism before acting on the basis of the reasons provided.
The actions that supposedly follow from the premises of a syllogism may be
dispositional, i.e., not requiring explicit attention every time a relevantly
similar set of circumstances is encountered.)
RP:
> One way out would be to adopt Aristotle's (brief and unsatisfactory)
> account of practical reasoning in which the conclusion of a 'practical
> syllogism' just is an action, not a further propositon. 'Straightway, he
> acts.'
-----------------------> You mindreader, you. Yes, the agent acts
"straightaway," but only because the epistemic warrant (logical validity) of
the syllogism having true premises has previously been accepted by her and is
now dispositionally embedded in her character.
RP:
> Are there squirrels that far north? I know there are rocks.
-----------> There are a few squirrels left. But it's a dwindling species given
that they are considered a delicacy when served in a mash of fried baloney, cod
tongues, brewer's yeast and potatoes. And, yes, we do have rocks. Would you be
interested in purchasing a small sample of the underwater rock that disabled
the Titanic? There are only a few pounds of it left, given our successes with
American tourism over the years. And of course we still have a good supply of
Titanic iceberg water, for those special occasions. And I would be remiss not
to mention our rectangular rolling pins - very useful, they never roll off the
table.
Walter O.
Director and Chief Sales Agent
Ministry of Tourism
Government of Newfoundland and Labrador
>
> Robert Paul
>
>
>
>
>
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>
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