Eric Dean wrote: "I pursue this because I think the term 'transcendental' is unnecessary, i.e. because there are more perspicuous ways of pointing out the class of things it is supposed to refer to, and because I think that class is empty, i.e. that there actually are no cases of transcendental truth, in the relevant sense, to be had in this sublunary existence or elsewhere." I haven't been following this thread with the attention it deserves, but I wonder what Eric would suggest to replace 'transcendental'? Here on the island of Java, it is rude to give something to someone with one's left hand. However, if I were to do it, Javanese would still think it rude but most would overlook it since I am obviously not Javanese. On the other hand (sorry!), Javanese would consider stealing wrong no matter who did it. One way of understanding the difference between using one's left hand and stealing is that one could be legislated as a law for all of Indonesia while the other couldn't. Furthermore, the quality that makes it possible to have a law against stealing also makes it possible to ask whether any person could agree that stealing was wrong. If there is a quality of stealing that makes it possible to say that all Indonesians would consider it reasonable to make it illegal, then couldn't we also say that it would be reasonable that all human beings could consider stealing as wrong? But what is that quality that distinguishes the wrongness of stealing and the rudeness of using one's left hand? Kant's response was to say that beyond the usefulness of making stealing wrong, there is an imperative: "Don't!" This imperative does not consider the value of not stealing, as though the moral judgment on stealing depends on a cost/benefit analysis, nor does it consider cultural context, as though stealing is only wrong for some people. (This does not mean that there isn't a real benefit to obeying the imperative against stealing, Kant believes there is, nor does it mean that there isn't always a cultural context within which this imperative is instantiated, also accepted by Kant, but that the moral quality arises elsewhere.) Rather, according to Kant, what makes the prohibition against stealing to be a moral prohibition, as opposed to a cultural prohibition like using one's left hand, is the universal quality of the imperative "Don't". Put differently, a moral prohibition cannot be a moral prohibition without that universal "Don't". Likewise, the moral claim 'Tell the truth' qua moral claim commands, 'Obey!' Furthermore, if we want to look for more moral claims, alongside all the historical contingencies that are necessary for the production of norms, we would examine the candidates for this universal imperative. Just as all laws in a liberal democracy must satisfy the criterion of equality, so also all moral claims must satisfy the criterion of a universal imperative. Perhaps Eric D. prefers a different term than 'transcendental', perhaps Eric disagrees with Kant, but I would be curious to know how the above is not a sublunary example of a transcendental analysis. I am pretty sure Walter has already given better examples and explanations so I apologize if I am repeating what has already been said. Sincerely, Phil Enns Yogyakarta, Indonesia ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html