[lit-ideas] Re: Univocal philosophy as the value of transcendental claims?

  • From: "Phil Enns" <phil.enns@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Sat, 3 Jan 2009 13:44:22 +0700

Eric Dean wrote:

"I pursue this because I think the term 'transcendental' is
unnecessary, i.e. because there are more perspicuous ways of pointing
out the class of things it is supposed to refer to, and because I
think that class is empty, i.e. that there actually are no cases of
transcendental truth, in the relevant sense, to be had in this
sublunary existence or elsewhere."

I haven't been following this thread with the attention it deserves,
but I wonder what Eric would suggest to replace 'transcendental'?

Here on the island of Java, it is rude to give something to someone
with one's left hand.  However, if I were to do it, Javanese would
still think it rude but most would overlook it since I am obviously
not Javanese.  On the other hand (sorry!), Javanese would consider
stealing wrong no matter who did it.  One way of understanding the
difference between using one's left hand and stealing is that one
could be legislated as a law for all of Indonesia while the other
couldn't.  Furthermore, the quality that makes it possible to have a
law against stealing also makes it possible to ask whether any person
could agree that stealing was wrong.  If there is a quality of
stealing that makes it possible to say that all Indonesians would
consider it reasonable to make it illegal, then couldn't we also say
that it would be reasonable that all human beings could consider
stealing as wrong?  But what is that quality that distinguishes the
wrongness of stealing and the rudeness of using one's left hand?

Kant's response was to say that beyond the usefulness of making
stealing wrong, there is an imperative: "Don't!"  This imperative does
not consider the value of not stealing, as though the moral judgment
on stealing depends on a cost/benefit analysis, nor does it consider
cultural context, as though stealing is only wrong for some people.
(This does not mean that there isn't a real benefit to obeying the
imperative against stealing, Kant believes there is, nor does it mean
that there isn't always a cultural context within which this
imperative is instantiated, also accepted by Kant, but that the moral
quality arises elsewhere.)  Rather, according to Kant, what makes the
prohibition against stealing to be a moral prohibition, as opposed to
a cultural prohibition like using one's left hand, is the universal
quality of the imperative "Don't".  Put differently, a moral
prohibition cannot be a moral prohibition without that universal
"Don't".  Likewise, the moral claim 'Tell the truth' qua moral claim
commands, 'Obey!'  Furthermore, if we want to look for more moral
claims, alongside all the historical contingencies that are necessary
for the production of norms, we would examine the candidates for this
universal imperative.  Just as all laws in a liberal democracy must
satisfy the criterion of equality, so also all moral claims must
satisfy the criterion of a universal imperative.

Perhaps Eric D. prefers a different term than 'transcendental',
perhaps Eric disagrees with Kant, but I would be curious to know how
the above is not a sublunary example of a transcendental analysis.  I
am pretty sure Walter has already given better examples and
explanations so I apologize if I am repeating what has already been
said.


Sincerely,

Phil Enns
Yogyakarta, Indonesia
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