[lit-ideas] Re: The Three Grices
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Mon, 20 Aug 2012 11:48:46 +0100 (BST)
________________________________
From: "Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx" <Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx>
>Critics usually refer to three Wittgensteins: the first Wittgenstein, the
second Wittgenstein, and the third Wittgenstein. >
To my knowledge, the standard view is not that there are three Ws [you may be
confusing him with the amigos] but an earlier W and a later W, with a W of an
interim or transitional period which may be referred to as the 'middle' period.
In this view, the earlier W centres on the Tractatus and the later W centres on
Investigations, and these are both are important and distinct philosophies. But
the interim or transitional period does not amount to an important and/or
distinct philosophy in itself.
It is possible to draw finer distinctions within the earlier and later W: so
the W of the Investigations might be differentiated from the W of On Certainty.
But, in broad terms, W has only two distinct and important philosophies - not
three.
But, contra Robert Paul, I take seriously the view - which I also take to be
W's view - that the later philosophy needs to be understood against the
background of the earlier. In fact we may say the following, and it is true of
both the earlier and later W and goes to the fundamentals of W's outlook: W is
concerned with the "logic of our language" such that this shows what language
has sense and what lacks sense; but this "logic of our language" cannot be said
but can only be shown; and it can only be shown because it marks the "limits of
language" in terms of language having sense; and these "limits" are such that
they can only be shown because any attempt to say them is an attempt to go
beyond the "limits of language". Further, traditional philosophy consists
(largely) of a misconceived attempt by philosophers to say what can only be
shown or to try, in language, to beyond the "limits of language"; and W's
philosophy is put forward as the antidote to
this kind of misdirected thought.
That said, there are large differences: the earlier W takes the "logic of our
language" as something that is systematic and entirely general, whereas the
later W takes the "logic of our language" are involving variations,
idiosyncracies and particularities that cannot be shown in a systematic and
entirely general account of language. Another large difference is that the
earlier W has a view that explains how language has sense in terms of its
systematic isomorphism with reality but this view is later abandoned.
But underneath those large differences is a 'key tenet' that.. excuse me,
someone appears to be strangling m..
--- Similarly, I refer to the three Grices (cfr. the pun on Canova's
famous statue, above: the three Graces).
--- The first Grice comprises the first third of Grice's life.
--- The second Grice comprises the second third of Grice's life.
--- The third Grice comprises the third third of Grice's life (Note that
'third third' is, here, NOT a tautology -- nor an oxymoron -- and that the
neither 'third' is otiose).
Cheers,
Speranza
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