[lit-ideas] Re: TLP1: Elements and their relations in giving the sense of 'p'
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Tue, 17 Feb 2009 08:50:04 +0000 (GMT)
And so, perhaps inevitably, we turn from Wittgn. exegesis to Ennsian...
--- On Tue, 17/2/09, Phil Enns <phil.enns@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> From: Phil Enns <phil.enns@xxxxxxxxx>
> Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: TLP1: Elements and their relations in giving the
> sense of 'p'
> To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Date: Tuesday, 17 February, 2009, 12:12 AM
> Robert Paul quotes:
>
> "'... A key dispute is whether, as Phil Enns
> claimed [affair], W's TLP
> offers the view that the sense of a proposition is
> determined only by
> the relations between the elements of the proposition; or
> whether, as
> I maintain(ed), the sense of 'p' also depends on
> the character or
> content of the elements.'"
>
> and then comments:
>
> "If this is what Phil claimed, then he was mistaken in
> claiming it.
> The sense of a proposition is, roughly, what would be the
> case if it
> were true. (False sentence have a sense; their falsity
> could not be
> determined otherwise.)"
>
>
> I did not make the claim that is ascribed to me above.
>
> For example, on 20 December, I wrote:
>
> "For Wittgenstein in the TLP, the sense of a picture
> lies in the
> states of affairs, that is the relations between things,
> that are
> represented."
>
> I stand by what I wrote earlier and am willing to defend
> what I, in fact, wrote.
First, as my post pointed out, the claim that sense lies in "the relations
between things" is ambiguous as it could mean (a) relations alone determine
sense, as a I suggested Phil suggested, or (b) it is the "ting" _and_ how they
are related that determines sense.
Second, the day before the post Phil quotes that he is willing to stand by, he
wrote the following that seems to me fairly conclusive in showing his position
is that at (a):-
"Donal McEvoy wrote:
"the picture is constituted by the objects/elements within it and by
their relations. If 'p' is "The cat is on the mat", we change the
sense of 'p' if we change the 'relation' of the objects/elements from
'on' to 'under'; but we also change the sense of 'p' if we change the
objects/elements to 'mouse' and 'running-wheel'."
For Wittgenstein in the TLP, the sense of the picture comes from the
relations between elements. The elements are the means for fixing the
picture against reality, but the elements do not contribute to the
sense of the picture. The elements serve the purpose of mapping the
picture on to reality.
One might think here of a dot on a map. The dot may represent a city,
but the sense of the map comes from the relation of this dot to other
similar dots and lines. The dot, by itself, is empty of sense.
Further, the dot may not represent a real city so that the map is
imaginary. In this case, the map still has sense though it is false."
So "elements do not contribute to the sense of the picture"? Seems pretty clear
what this means. Unless of course it is just very badly expressed.
Donal
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