[lit-ideas] Re: TLP1: Elements and their relations in giving the sense of 'p'
- From: Phil Enns <phil.enns@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Tue, 17 Feb 2009 07:12:31 +0700
Robert Paul quotes:
"'... A key dispute is whether, as Phil Enns claimed [affair], W's TLP
offers the view that the sense of a proposition is determined only by
the relations between the elements of the proposition; or whether, as
I maintain(ed), the sense of 'p' also depends on the character or
content of the elements.'"
and then comments:
"If this is what Phil claimed, then he was mistaken in claiming it.
The sense of a proposition is, roughly, what would be the case if it
were true. (False sentence have a sense; their falsity could not be
determined otherwise.)"
I did not make the claim that is ascribed to me above.
For example, on 20 December, I wrote:
"For Wittgenstein in the TLP, the sense of a picture lies in the
states of affairs, that is the relations between things, that are
represented."
I stand by what I wrote earlier and am willing to defend what I, in fact, wrote.
Sincerely,
Phil Enns
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