[lit-ideas] Re: Rationality: Popper vs. Grice
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- Date: Mon, 9 Feb 2015 08:31:48 -0500
We are discussing Popper's idea that rationality cannot be self-justifying;
a view that did not trouble Grice. Perhaps what both had in common is the
idea that rationality (as we know it) evolved from a 'pre-rational' state.
We are dating this and that. Can we speak of an early Popper and, to echo
Geary, 'a late Grice'?
In a message dated 2/9/2015 5:56:10 A.M. Eastern Standard Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes in "The Worlds of Sir Karl Popper" in reply to
a
query by O. K."
"Is it "early"? Maybe or maybe not: OSE was published, iirc, c.1945, ten
years after LdF - i.e. some ten years after P's most noted "early" work. But
OSE might yet be termed "early" given the length of Popper's publishing
career: Popper's 'Obj Knowl' was published c.1970 and TSAIB was published
c.1977, and the 3 volume 'Postscript' to LdF (though based on O.S. from the
late 50s) was only finally published in 1982. And there have been several
books since then, such as "The Myth of the Framework", though these are
usually based on writings that are not recent to their publication."
This of course should NOT be confusing. Recall that Grice's first book was
posthumous ("as opposed to pre-humous", as Geary humoristically recalls).
McEvoy:
"Afair, I did not claim that OSE was an early work but merely that certain
points - like the above - do not belong to Popper's "mature" philosophy.
(But more on this below: for Popper's revision does not amount to an
outright repudiation of what is written in OSE). Publication dates are not
always
the most reliable guide to classifying the time-periods in which thinking
developed: on the point raised above, afaik, Popper revised his OSE approach
to rationalism in the light of William Bartley's criticism. This revision
occurred in the 1960s."
In the case of Grice, his revision occurred in 1979, when he was invited to
give the John Locke lectures at Oxford on "rationality". He said to
himself: "What should I lecture these pompous Oxonians on?" (To give the John
Locke Lectures you have NOT to belong to Oxford, as Grice then didn't). So, he
recalled that two years ago he had given the Kant lectures on rationality
at Stanford, and hoped those pompous Oxonians wouldn't notice. They didn't.
McEvoy:
"The nub of Bartley's elaborate criticism is that it does not matter so
much whether adopting a rational attitude is a product of a rational or
non-rational process or 'commitment', or even an irrational 'commitment': what
matters is that adopting a rational attitude (or the rational attitude so
adopted) can be defended on rational grounds - rather than merely on
non-rational or irrational ones."
Or 'pre-rational' ones. If pre-posthumous is otiose, 'pre-rational' is not.
For rationality originates from the same psychological attitudes that
originate, say, 'akrasia', which is irrational and comes in two varieties.
Grice: "Most philosophers focus on practical akrasia: "This is what I
should rationally do; but I won't do it". My favourite topic of akrasia is
theoretical akrasia: "This is the truth of the matter, but I'll reject it".
McEvoy:
"A most important point is that this defence does not depend on justifying
'rationalism', in the traditional way of philosophy, but it is sufficient
if 'rationalism' itself withstands rational criticism. If rationalism can
be so defended, then it is "comprehensive" in that it owes no debt to
non-rationalism or irrationalism in terms of its defence."
Which may leave unanswered the question that rationality owes a BIG debt to
pre-rationality. E.g. monkeys, Chomsky says, are 'irrational' (hence the
famous adage, "Socrates is a man; therefore rational"). But monkeys and Man
share TOO MANY THINGS to deny that man's rationality is NOT based on a
pre-rational basis that we find in monkeys ("and other animals", as Durrell
would add -- he lived in a zoo, as Ritchie may recall).
McEvoy:
"In some ways Bartley's pov is implicit in Popper's early work where that
early work accounts for the rationality of science not in terms of the
'rational production' of scientific theories (in contrast to inductive accounts
which pretend to do so) but in the application of a rational/critical
methods to testing theories (irrespective of whether their production is, or
is
not, part of a 'rational' process). In this light, Popper's position in OSE
might seem surprising - as it might seem to fail to keep apart the issues
of the production of a 'rational attitude' and issues of whether a
'rational attitude' is itself rationally defensible (paralleling the
distinction
between issues as to whether the production of scientific theories is
'rational' and issues as to whether such theories are rationally defensible)."
Well, here is where Grice's mixed metaphor of entrenchment may play a role.
Or self-entrenchment, rather. Rationality originates in pre-rational
behaviour, and this is the context of the genesis. And Rationality gets
self-entrenched or self-justified -- By what means: by what Grice calls the
Bootstrap principle, or how to pull yourself rationality by your own
bootstraps.
McEvoy:
"Perhaps Popper was being too generous in OSE in conceding a kind of
priority to the non-rational or the irrational: but there is more to it, for
there is a core of important truth to the concessions made in OSE - namely,
that reason cannot be used to compel anyone to adopt an attitude of
reasonableness."
Perhaps he was too influenced by Plato, as Grice never was. Recall that for
Plato, it is the non-rational part of the soul (there are three of them)
that MOVES the man. Grice's approach to rationality is more Aristotelian in
nature, and while 'akrasia' was a topic that fascinated Aristotle, he knew
the way out of it!
McEvoy: "Popper's concessions were not part of a philosophy hung-up on
trying to compel the unreasonable to be reasonable - rather he was indicating
why, rationally speaking, they are a lost cause. OSE was after all part of
Popper's "war work" and he takes a clear line - as the title indicates -
between the friends and the enemies of the OS: the book is addressed to its
friends and potential friends and does not seek to convert its enemies
(though it of course had a powerful effect on many one-time enemies of the
OS)."
This is what perhaps makes Popper a Continental philosopher, since his
audience included enemies to the OS. Meanwhile, an "Anglo-American" (or Allies)
philosopher was just fighting the war as a Royal navy captain.
McEvoy:
"Another aspect of Popper's OSE treatment is that he is against forms of
'rationalism' that are excessive, both because they are false and also
likely self-defeating - for example, he makes clear that his form of
'rationalism' is not based on the assumption that people are entirely or mostly
'rational' or that 'rationalism' is an easy attitude to practice. In this he is
advocating a 'rationalism' that withstands rational criticism - and opposing
forms of 'rationalism' (or pseudo-rationalism) that do not withstand
rational criticism."
Perhaps this is best summed up in Grice's title for the John Locke
lectures: "ASPECTS of reason -- and reasoning". Surely we don't demand the same
criteria for rational moral behaviour as we demand of rational 'alethic'
behaviour. Different psychological attitudes are involved. And rational moral
behaviour may end up being 'ceteris paribus', 'defeasible', and, let's say,
more problematic. (Grice is refuting views by Philippa Foot, which Grice saw
as a too naturalistic approach to morality).
McEvoy:
"So whether the OSE is "early" or not, in Popper's "mature" philosophy
Bartley's criticism is acknowledged and there is no needless concession that
there is a priority of irrationalism or non-rationalism in terms of the
defence of rationalism."
Perhaps the keyword should be commitment. Grice never used the phrase --
less so 'rational commitment'. He would at most give a nod to what Quine had
said about ONTOLOGICAL commitment -- what is rationally justifiable to
count as 'existing': his example: "Pegasus flies." An irrational thing to say,
as Dodds ("The Greeks and the Irrational") would agree.
Cheers,
Speranza
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