[lit-ideas] Re: Rational Choice Philosophy
- From: Robert Paul <rpaul@xxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2011 15:51:31 -0700
John McCreery wrote
> From today's New York Times.
>
>
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/19/the-failure-of-rational-choice/?nl=opinion&emc=tya2
>
>
>
> I look forward to your comments.
I'm not clear as to what Opinionator's opinions are. Is this a
historical account of 'rational choice' (itself a neutral, if vague,
expression)? The view that we are somehow purely rational would seem to
have been demolished by Hume, and many others (whom Walter knows about
but I don't); and, if raised to the level of 'theory,' by the
experiments of Tversky, and others.
I had naively thought that the notion of a rational agent in economic
theory had been shown to be false, and that economists had either given
it up or added enough epicycles as to make it unfalsifiable---usually a
bad thing for a theory of any sort.
Aside from 'rational choice' having no explanatory force, the claim that
our actions are guided by our beliefs that certain ends will best suit
our needs, and that that is what 'rationally' guides us to seek them (so
making what we do to attain them 'rational' as well) leaves out of the
account something like Harry Frankfurt's 'second order desires,' which
are desires about desires. For example, an addict may or may not care if
he is addicted (or not, /pace/ JL), but if he does care, and desires
notto desire that to which he's addicted (i.e., desires not to have that
desire) this desire may appear rational. It presumably has as its object
whatever good comes from not being addicted.
However, if his second order desire carries him all the way to action
(it overcomes his desire to get what he's addicted to), it will (by
definition) be stronger than the desire it 'replaces.' What of that?
Well, for one thing it suggests that it's pretty much desires all the
way down (Hume, I think, can be seen as believing something like this.)
Nothing is rational in itself. Actions are only rational given that the
agent has particular wants and desires in a specific situation, and
although rational choice theory/philosophy does some hand waving about
this, its gestures are too broad and too general to be of any help.
I was going to say more but I have to go see what the dog's barking at.
Robert Paul
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