[lit-ideas] Re: Philosophical dissertations (for the DPhil Oxon) -- on Grice & Popper: an index
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 2 May 2014 15:23:48 +0100 (BST)
>Granted, McEvoy's reference does not apply strictly to 'DPhil', since there
are other ways of getting a 'first class' degree: MA and BPhil, and it may
be a first class MA or even BA that McEvoy's commentary can apply, too!>
DPhils are not currently classed (but just wait), so my comments did not apply
to them but to the first BA degree. But ususally only those with Firsts may
find themselves able to pursue a doctorate - so culling pro-Popperian
approaches from Firsts at the degree stage means the doctoral stage can be kept
safe from such approaches. Of course, as a sop to intellectual integrity and
freedom, Oxbridge would doubtless accept that it may have to award a doctorate
to someone who took up Popper's work, or part of it, as the subject-matter of
their thesis - perhaps even gladly, say, if they wrote on Popper from a Gricean
POV.
What is shocking, though I suggest to be expected, is that Popper is left out
of consideration even in fields where he has had important things to say - a
while ago I mentioned a recentish example: an introductory text on the
philosophy of mind that manages to entirely pass Popper by, despite the many
aspects of his work that bear on this field, including one entire book The Self
And Its Brain that is more a work in philosophy of mind than any other field.
No one blinked.
So the thesis of this post is this: there are very few doctoral theses on which
Popper does not provide important and relevant work for consideration, yet the
number of theses that consider that work is tiny in comparison. We may compare
this to having only a tiny number of doctoral theses on induction that ever
consider Hume's arguments.
Dnl
On Friday, 2 May 2014, 13:46, "dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx"
<dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
In a message dated 5/2/2014 6:47:06 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
I seriously think, due what we might call 'institutional bias', it would
be virtually impossible to get a First Class degree in philosophy from
Oxbridge by arguing as Popper would argue, even though Popper is a far greater
philosopher than anyone who gains such a First Class degree.
It may do to explore the Bodleian for actual dissertations on Popper --
and, while we're at it -- or in it -- Grice -- to test the modal claim (a
'virtual impossib[ility]') referred to as per above.
One example might be Anita Avramides (originally from Brooklyn, currently
of Somerville) and her DPhil ('advised' by Strawson) on Grice. It was
published as a M. I. T. title, and it's, mainly, a discussion of Davidson!
I'm sure there are LOADS of dissertations -- along the years -- in Oxbridge
(i.e. both Oxford AND Cambridge) on Popper. There might be bigger loads at
LSE, no doubt, but...
Now, the passage above refers to what we may call a "Popper-type of
argument", and this may need further clarification. One thing is the way Popper
_would_ argue in "Logic of Scientific Discovery" and another the way he WOULD
argue in "Poverty of Historicism" (vide Geary, "Poppers").
Granted, McEvoy's reference does not apply strictly to 'DPhil', since there
are other ways of getting a 'first class' degree: MA and BPhil, and it may
be a first class MA or even BA that McEvoy's commentary can apply, too!
Cheers,
Speranza
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