I'm not understanding the "it is not vacuous." We could better say that this is the case today, but it wasn't always so. There was a time . . . ". . . researchers believe that key versions of immune system genes in modern humans appear to have been passed down by archaic relatives, including Neanderthals, after all. . ." ". . . DNA inherited from Neanderthals and newly discovered hominids dubbed the Denisovans has contributed to key types of immune genes still present among populations in Europe, Asia and Oceania. And scientists speculate that these gene variants must have been highly beneficial to modern humans, helping them thrive as they migrated throughout the world. . . "[from http://www.latimes.com/news/science/la-sci-neanderthal-immune-genes-20110826 ,0,377237.story ]" In another article, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/08/26/MN971KQCVQ.DTL we read, "A fast-growing population of modern humans eventually drove the Neanderthals to extinction 30,000 years ago, but the benefits of those early dalliances between the two groups live on. "The Neanderthals, it seems, passed on to humans many of the genes that now mark our greatly improved immune systems, according to an international team of researchers led by a Stanford group." The most telling bit of information insofar as this discussion is concerned comes from http://www.dailytech.com/Neanderthal+Genome+Complete+Provides+Evidence+of+Ev olution+Interbreeding/article18326.htm : "Researchers found that sequenced human genomes from one San from southern Africa, one Yoruba from West Africa, one Papua New Guinean, one Han Chinese and one French person shared 1 to 4 percent common genomic material with Neanderthals, the result of these people's ancient ancestors interbreeding with the close relative. The genes appear to offer no benefit and be randomly placed. Additionally the transfer appears one way, from Neanderthals to humans." Note the last sentence. Thus, the mother raised her half-Neanderthal child in a human environment. It grows and has some advantage over its 100% human kin and passes on the Neanderthal benefits. But what happened to the Neanderthal father? Did he stay in the human tribe with his human wife or did he merely rape her and return to his Neanderthal tribe? I am inclined to think the latter even though the articles written by the scientific journalists call it "romance." But if so, why wasn't the transfer two way? In any case, there was a time when a human mother had a child that was half-human and half-Neanderthal, thus falsifying, at least for a time, "HUMANS HAVE HUMAN OFFSPRING AND ONLY SO." Lawrence From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Adriano Palma Sent: Saturday, August 27, 2011 7:44 AM To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Necessity is not an established fact, but an interpretation Importance: High note simple cases of necessity 1. people (as in humans, homo sapiens etc.) are born of people (vastly non refuted conjecture, to keep a popperian view of the matter) hence (2) stronger conjecture [it involves all sorts of observable, and some observed and some not and some never to be observed, events HUMANS HAVE HUMAN OFFSPRING AND ONLY SO then [the conclusion[ it is a necessity given "humanity" (the property of being human) that humans have human offspring notice that it is not vacuous since (Darwin docet) there appears to be )or have been) cases of people with non human parents (Mrs. Lucy of africa..) >>> Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx> 8/27/2011 4:31 PM >>> --- On Sat, 27/8/11, Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx <Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx> wrote: Leaving aside "Geary should think", which might lead us back on the road to whether it follows that he "..should think or subscribe to JLS' webcoven of Griceans"; and leaving aside what Nietzsche had in mind; and a few other things.. Cannot "necessity" be both a fact [e.g. it is the case that there is a universal law such that "All Xs are Ys"] and also an interpretation [i.e. we interpret, or theorise, the correlation between X and Y as one of 'necessity', as opposed to contingency]. If neither excludes the other, then the fact 'necessity' can be regarded as an interpretative device does not exclude it being also regarded as a fact, and indeed being a fact. When we ask whether interpreting a relation in terms of 'necessity' is correct, we are asking whether it is true that such a relation holds, and if it is true it holds then it is a fact that there is such a relation. This leaves open in what way is 'necessity' "established". Taking the "necessity" in a 'universal law' or, better perhaps, 'universal generalisation' ['UG']:- such a UG as "All swans are white" cannot be established by induction though it may, conjecturally and non-inductively, be falsified by a counter-example such as a black swan. But even if we had empirical omniscience, so that we could survey the whole universe and observe that the only colour swans came in was white, this would not be enough to establish "necessity" in the sense of law: it would not show that a non-white swan was not a physical possibility. So there is a further sense in which "necessity" cannot be "established": to assert "necessity" as a relation between phenomena is to assert something beyond a universal but contingent link between phenomena - yet what we observe, even if it were the whole universe, is consistent with any UG that holds being only contingently true. Thus Popper rightly claims that the whether there exists even one natural law, or natural "necessity", is a metaphysical question. It cannot be "established" empirically. All that can be "established" empirically, and then only conjecturally and non-inductively, is the non-existence of a claimed 'natural law' by adducing a falsifying counter-example. Can we establish the existence of natural laws by metaphysical argument? Not conclusively, but the balance of the argument favours it as Popper sees things. In any case, the search for UGs would be fruitful even if their truth were contingent, for it would still be universal. And so the absence of a clear metaphysical proof of the existence of any natural laws (which is not a disproof of their existence), does not affect the rationality of searching for such invariants. This argument can be reworked even for 'propensities', that is probabilistic relations between phenomena that fall short of necessity. As to whether the search for some kind of "regularity" is itself a 'necessity' of some kind, Popper would affirm for Kantian reasons: without being oriented to interpret the world as forming patterns we would be lost. But this does not mean we are lost because our world lacks _complete_ regularity; only that it is necessary that we search for some degree of it and that there appears [contingent or not] to be some degree of it. Donal Your friendly neighbourhood Popperian Ldn