[lit-ideas] Re: Moral Distinctions Not deriv'd from Reason
- From: palma <palmaadriano@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 4 Sep 2014 18:56:01 +0200
the point (indicated) by omar K is crucial. one can (and many have)have a
theory in which there are clear specification of what is good because it is
good (think of Platonic notions of the good life being the life of she who
in touch with the forms of the beautiful, the good and the true) and
nothing is said on the why why one should (or "ought" to have a good life.
variations are available in endless series of vedic texts, in which the
kings lead a good life (arjuna's example) and nothing says that somebdoy
"ought" to be arjuna.
hence, my provisional conclusion that the so-called deep discovery of the
"natural fallacy" is wholly demented idiots. when one takes Hume more
seriously, in fact my belief is that he had in mind something very
difficult and rather subtle, about the necessary conditions of motivation
over a range of cases.
On Thu, Sep 4, 2014 at 6:50 PM, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> However, moral discussions can also proceed in terms of what is right or
> wrong without necessarily passing to 'ought,' can they not ? I can argue
> that something is right in theoretical terms without necessarily commanding
> that it ought to be done. (It is possible to do wrong, or not do what is
> right, after all.)
>
> O.K.
>
>
> On Thu, Sep 4, 2014 at 2:45 PM, Redacted sender Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx for
> DMARC <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>> My last post today. The passage analysed by Pigden is as per below. From
>> Hume's pen:
>>
>>
>> ‘Moral Distinctions Not deriv’d from Reason’.
>>
>> In those days, philosophers felt like ENTITLING things and sections. But
>> the title is not relevant. What is relevant is the content of the section:
>>
>> Hume writes:
>>
>>
>> "In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have
>> always
>> remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of
>> reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations
>> concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that
>> instead of
>> the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no
>> proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This
>> change is
>> imperceptible"
>>
>> This seems hyperbolic, since HE perceived it, and so do I. So he means
>> that
>> the change is _subtle_ rather. He ought to use words more precisely!
>>
>> Hume (or "Home", as the original spelling went) goes on:
>>
>> "; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought
>> not, expresses some new relation or affirmation,’tis necessary that it
>> shou’
>> d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a reason should be
>> given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can
>> be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it … [I] am
>> persuaded, that a small attention [to this point] wou’d subvert all the
>> vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice
>> and
>> virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is
>> perceiv’d by
>> reason."
>>
>> I think that von Wright and H. Paul Grice would use an 'alethic' operator
>> here (unknown to Hume):
>>
>> ˫p
>>
>> We then oppose this assertion sign (which is in fact a double sign,
>> 'affirmation' and 'judgement') to an 'imperative' sign (which would
>> comprise the
>> cases that Hume perceived -- though he deemed imperceptible) of an 'is'
>> turning into an 'ought to':
>>
>> !p
>>
>> Hume: "that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is
>> not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an
>> ought not."
>>
>> Hume mentions: discussions of God -- natural theology, say -- or
>> philosophical theology, as opposed to dogmatic theology of this or that
>> religion.
>> And then he mentions 'vice' and 'virtue' and 'human affairs'.
>>
>> I agree with Pigden that the issue is very complex!
>>
>> Hume speaks of 'copulation'. He means 'copula', as in
>>
>> The S is P.
>>
>> versus
>>
>> The S OUGHT TO BE P.
>>
>> Where 'ought to be' is another copulation or copula. An 'imperative'
>> copulation, as it were, and not an assertoric copulation involved in the
>> Frege
>> sign.
>>
>> Since 'virtue' (not to mention 'God') seems like a value- or ought-laden
>> expression, it's not surprising that an author (such as Hume criticises)
>> would use, to vary the prose, an 'is' here, and an 'ought' there,
>> because he
>> would rely on his addressee to understand that he is staying in the
>> realm of
>> 'morality'.
>>
>> The title to the section refers to Hume's fork or 'law' (which admittedly
>> sounds rather grand, as Pigden notes). But while Hume woke Kant up from
>> his
>> dogmatic slumber, Kant was courageous enough to, following Aristotle,
>> assert strongly that THERE is such a thing as the place of reason in
>> ethics!
>>
>> -----
>>
>> Oddly, Witters once got very offended when he found out that Toulmin had
>> borrowed all his ideas from him on this very issue! (*)
>>
>> Cheers
>>
>> Speranza
>>
>> *. The title of Toulmin's dissertation at Cantab. is "The place of reason
>> in ethics", later turned, typically, into a hardcover book!
>>
>>
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>
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