[lit-ideas] Re: Moral Distinctions Not deriv'd from Reason
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 4 Sep 2014 21:47:54 +0100
Walter writes:
>I agree that it is possible to do moral wrong (though not intentionally). But
>I
don't see how that fact connects up with our discussion.>
Is this first sentence one where Walter meant "unintentionally" where it says
"intentionally"?
Dnl
Ldn
On Thursday, 4 September 2014, 20:15, Walter C. Okshevsky <wokshevs@xxxxxx>
wrote:
Just a couple of Kantian thoughts from the dacha:
There are technical, prudential, etc, meanings of "right" and "wrong." However,
to speak of *moral* right or wrong is to speak either of obligation (ought) or
permissibility in moral terms. What is morally right is either obligatory or
permitted. What is morally wrong is either morally forbidden or morally
impermissible.
So, yes, I would think that if you claim that action or maxim P is right, you
may only be claiming that P is morally permissible but not obligatory (i.e.,
ought to be done).
I agree that it is possible to do moral wrong (though not intentionally). But I
don't see how that fact connects up with our discussion.
If you claim that something is right "in theoretical terms" only, you are not
making a moral (practical judgement). There is no "simply theoretical" when it
comes to practical judgement. I guess that's how it got it's name.
Walter O
MUN
Quoting Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>:
> However, moral discussions can also proceed in terms of what is right or
> wrong without necessarily passing to 'ought,' can they not ? I can argue
> that something is right in theoretical terms without necessarily commanding
> that it ought to be done. (It is possible to do wrong, or not do what is
> right, after all.)
>
> O.K.
>
>
> On Thu, Sep 4, 2014 at 2:45 PM, Redacted sender Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx for
> DMARC <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> > My last post today. The passage analysed by Pigden is as per below. From
> > Hume's pen:
> >
> >
> > ‘Moral Distinctions Not deriv’d from Reason’.
> >
> > In those days, philosophers felt like ENTITLING things and sections. But
> > the title is not relevant. What is relevant is the content of the section:
> >
> > Hume writes:
> >
> >
> > "In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have
> always
> > remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of
> > reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations
> > concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that
> > instead of
> > the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no
> > proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This
> > change is
> > imperceptible"
> >
> > This seems hyperbolic, since HE perceived it, and so do I. So he means
> that
> > the change is _subtle_ rather. He ought to use words more precisely!
> >
> > Hume (or "Home", as the original spelling went) goes on:
> >
> > "; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought
> > not, expresses some new relation or affirmation,’tis necessary that it
> > shou’
> > d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a reason should
> be
> > given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can
> > be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it … [I]
> am
> > persuaded, that a small attention [to this point] wou’d subvert all the
> > vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice
> > and
> > virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is
> > perceiv’d by
> > reason."
> >
> > I think that von Wright and H. Paul Grice would use an 'alethic' operator
> > here (unknown to Hume):
> >
> > Ë«p
> >
> > We then oppose this assertion sign (which is in fact a double sign,
> > 'affirmation' and 'judgement') to an 'imperative' sign (which would
> > comprise the
> > cases that Hume perceived -- though he deemed imperceptible) of an 'is'
> > turning into an 'ought to':
> >
> > !p
> >
> > Hume: "that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is
> > not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an
> > ought not."
> >
> > Hume mentions: discussions of God -- natural theology, say -- or
> > philosophical theology, as opposed to dogmatic theology of this or that
> > religion.
> > And then he mentions 'vice' and 'virtue' and 'human affairs'.
> >
> > I agree with Pigden that the issue is very complex!
> >
> > Hume speaks of 'copulation'. He means 'copula', as in
> >
> > The S is P.
> >
> > versus
> >
> > The S OUGHT TO BE P.
> >
> > Where 'ought to be' is another copulation or copula. An 'imperative'
> > copulation, as it were, and not an assertoric copulation involved in the
> > Frege
> > sign.
> >
> > Since 'virtue' (not to mention 'God') seems like a value- or ought-laden
> > expression, it's not surprising that an author (such as Hume criticises)
> > would use, to vary the prose, an 'is' here, and an 'ought' there, because
> > he
> > would rely on his addressee to understand that he is staying in the realm
> > of
> > 'morality'.
> >
> > The title to the section refers to Hume's fork or 'law' (which admittedly
> > sounds rather grand, as Pigden notes). But while Hume woke Kant up from
> his
> > dogmatic slumber, Kant was courageous enough to, following Aristotle,
> > assert strongly that THERE is such a thing as the place of reason in
> > ethics!
> >
> > -----
> >
> > Oddly, Witters once got very offended when he found out that Toulmin had
> > borrowed all his ideas from him on this very issue! (*)
> >
> > Cheers
> >
> > Speranza
> >
> > *. The title of Toulmin's dissertation at Cantab. is "The place of reason
> > in ethics", later turned, typically, into a hardcover book!
> >
> >
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