[lit-ideas] Moral Distinctions Not deriv'd from Reason
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- Date: Thu, 4 Sep 2014 08:45:49 -0400
My last post today. The passage analysed by Pigden is as per below. From
Hume's pen:
‘Moral Distinctions Not deriv’d from Reason’.
In those days, philosophers felt like ENTITLING things and sections. But
the title is not relevant. What is relevant is the content of the section:
Hume writes:
"In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always
remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of
reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations
concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that
instead of
the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no
proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change
is
imperceptible"
This seems hyperbolic, since HE perceived it, and so do I. So he means that
the change is _subtle_ rather. He ought to use words more precisely!
Hume (or "Home", as the original spelling went) goes on:
"; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought
not, expresses some new relation or affirmation,’tis necessary that it shou’
d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a reason should be
given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can
be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it … [I] am
persuaded, that a small attention [to this point] wou’d subvert all the
vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and
virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv’d by
reason."
I think that von Wright and H. Paul Grice would use an 'alethic' operator
here (unknown to Hume):
˫p
We then oppose this assertion sign (which is in fact a double sign,
'affirmation' and 'judgement') to an 'imperative' sign (which would comprise
the
cases that Hume perceived -- though he deemed imperceptible) of an 'is'
turning into an 'ought to':
!p
Hume: "that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is
not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an
ought not."
Hume mentions: discussions of God -- natural theology, say -- or
philosophical theology, as opposed to dogmatic theology of this or that
religion.
And then he mentions 'vice' and 'virtue' and 'human affairs'.
I agree with Pigden that the issue is very complex!
Hume speaks of 'copulation'. He means 'copula', as in
The S is P.
versus
The S OUGHT TO BE P.
Where 'ought to be' is another copulation or copula. An 'imperative'
copulation, as it were, and not an assertoric copulation involved in the Frege
sign.
Since 'virtue' (not to mention 'God') seems like a value- or ought-laden
expression, it's not surprising that an author (such as Hume criticises)
would use, to vary the prose, an 'is' here, and an 'ought' there, because he
would rely on his addressee to understand that he is staying in the realm of
'morality'.
The title to the section refers to Hume's fork or 'law' (which admittedly
sounds rather grand, as Pigden notes). But while Hume woke Kant up from his
dogmatic slumber, Kant was courageous enough to, following Aristotle,
assert strongly that THERE is such a thing as the place of reason in ethics!
-----
Oddly, Witters once got very offended when he found out that Toulmin had
borrowed all his ideas from him on this very issue! (*)
Cheers
Speranza
*. The title of Toulmin's dissertation at Cantab. is "The place of reason
in ethics", later turned, typically, into a hardcover book!
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