[lit-ideas] Israeli-Hezbollah conflict
- From: "Lawrence Helm" <lawrencehelm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 18 Jul 2006 16:34:52 -0700
Here is an interesting analysis of the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict that I
just received from Stratfor.
Lawrence
Special Report:
Situation Review
By George Friedman
We have been following developments in the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict
closely for several days. At this writing, the air-rocket war continues to
rage, but the Israeli ground offensive that we would have expected by now
has not yet been launched. There is some speculation that it will not be
launched -- that a combination of air operations and a diplomatic process
will be sufficient, from Israel's point of view, to negate the need for a
ground attack.
While the various processes grind their way along, it is time to review the
situation.
The first point to bear in mind is that the crisis did not truly begin with
the capture of two Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah. The kidnappings presented
a serious problem for Israel, but could not, by themselves, define the
geopolitical issue. That definition came when Hezbollah rockets struck
Haifa, Israel's third-largest city, on July 13. There were also claims
coming from Hezbollah, and confirmed by Israeli officials, that Hezbollah
had missiles available that could reach Tel Aviv. Israel's population is
concentrated in the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem corridor and in the Tel Aviv-Haifa
corridor. In effect, Hezbollah had attained the ability to strike at the
Israeli heartland. Hezbollah has been hitting the northern part of this
heartland, as well as pounding Israel's northern frontier.
The capture of two soldiers posed a symbolic challenge to Israel, but the
rocket attacks posed a direct geopolitical threat. Israel had substantial
room for maneuver regarding the captured troops. The threat to the
heartland, however, could not be evaded. To the extent possible, Israel had
to stop the missile attacks. As important, it also had to eliminate
Hezbollah's ability to resume such attacks. The Israelis can tolerate these
strikes for a certain period of time, so long as the outcome is a final
cessation. What was not an option for Israel was to engage in temporary
solutions that would allow Hezbollah to attack the heartland regularly, at
its discretion. Hezbollah has posed a problem that Israel cannot choose to
ignore.
Hezbollah's reasons for doing so at this time are not altogether clear. It
certainly has to do with the crisis in Palestinian politics: Hezbollah wants
to stake a place for itself as Palestine redefines itself. It also has to do
with the vacuum created by the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon and
freedom of action for Hezbollah that previously has been denied it by the
Syrians. Finally, it is clear that Iranian and Shiite politics within the
wider Islamic world have made Hezbollah action at this time attractive for
the group's Iranian patrons.
However complex Hezbollah's motives might be, the consequences of its
actions are crystal-clear: From the Israeli perspective, it is imperative
that the rocket attacks must be shut down.
Israel's Imperfect Options
Israel has three tools at its disposal.
One is diplomacy. There is a general consensus, even among many in Lebanon
and Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, that Hezbollah's actions have been
unreasonable and undesirable. It would not be too difficult, we would think,
to create a circumstance in which the two Israeli soldiers are released, a
cease-fire is declared and an international monitoring team inserted into
the region. That is what the French, for example, have proposed, and what is
being discussed now.
The problem with this option, from the Israeli point of view, is that it
puts off a solution to the deeper problem posed by Hezbollah to a later day
-- one that might not be so advantageous for Israel. Israel has a built-in
distrust of international peacekeeping operations -- dating back to May
1967, when the United Nations, without consulting Israel, withdrew
peacekeepers from Sinai at the behest of the Egyptians. This cultural bias
against peacekeepers is reinforced by the fact that Hezbollah could rearm
itself behind the peacekeeping shield. Whether the peacekeepers would
conduct operations to prevent this -- in effect, carrying out
counterinsurgency operations in Lebanon in support of Israel's goals -- is
doubtful in the extreme. Instead, the presence of a peacekeeping force might
facilitate a more substantial Hezbollah capability down the road. This is,
at least, how the Israelis think of it, and their position therefore has
been consistent: The outcome of this conflict must be the destruction of
Hezbollah, or at least its offensive capability, for an extended period of
time.
That leads to Israel's other two options, both of which would be carried out
with military force.
The first step has been the Israeli air campaign. All modern military
operations by advanced powers begin with air campaigns. Their purpose is to
prepare the battlefield for land attack and, in some cases, to force a
political settlement. In Kosovo, for example, air attacks alone were
sufficient to convince the Yugoslav government to concede its control over
Kosovo. In the case of Desert Storm, the air campaign came in preparation
for a ground attack.
Air forces around the world like to make extravagant claims as to what air
power can do; the Israeli air force is no exception. However, while an air
campaign can severely hamper Hezbollah -- particularly by attacking launch
sites and storage facilities, and generally making launches difficult -- the
likelihood that air power can, by itself, eliminate the threat is unlikely.
To reiterate a key point, the nature of the threat is continual attacks on
Israel's geopolitical heartland. Now, it is possible that Israeli air
operations could force some sort of political settlement, but again, as with
the diplomatic option, it is difficult to conceive of a political settlement
that guarantees what Israel wants. Even a Hezbollah withdrawal from southern
Lebanon, coupled with occupation of the area by the Lebanese army, does not
solve the problem. This solution assumes that the Lebanese army has the will
and ability to prevent Hezbollah's return. For this to work, the Lebanese
army would have to agree to dismantle Hezbollah's infrastructure, and
Hezbollah would have to agree to let them do so -- and Israel would have to
place its faith in both Hezbollah and the Lebanese army and government. It
is difficult to imagine a situation in which the Israelis can reach a
satisfactory political settlement. The air campaign as a political tool
suffers from the same defect as the diplomatic track: It is of value only if
Israel is prepared to accept a solution that does not guarantee a complete
end to the threat posed by Hezbollah -- and potentially might leave the
Israelis in a worse position, militarily, down the road.
There is an additional political fact and problem. Obviously, any threat to
a heartland generates a unique political response. In Israel, the Olmert
government is heir to Ariel Sharon's quest for an imposed political
settlement on the Palestinians. This is a strategy opposed from the right,
by Benjamin Netanyahu of Likud, who argues that any settlement that leaves
military options in the hands of the Palestinians is unsustainable. The
Hezbollah issue is the Palestinian issue on steroids. If Olmert were to
agree to any settlement that does not include dismantling Hezbollah's
capabilities or that relies on a third party to police that dismantling,
Netanyahu would attack hard -- and we suspect that enough of Olmert's
coalition would defect to force a political crisis in Israel.
There has been no attack from Netanyahu, however. This can be partly
explained by the Israeli tradition that politics stops when war begins. But
we suspect this goes deeper than that. Olmert is keeping Netanyahu informed
as to his intentions and Netanyahu is content with the course being pursued,
making it clear in public that his support depends on the government
faithfully pursuing that course -- meaning the destruction of Hezbollah as
an organized entity. Olmert does not have much room for maneuver on this,
nor is it apparent that he wants any. The goal is the destruction of
Hezbollah; anything less would not work, on any level, for Israel.
The Logic for a Ground Offensive
From this, we must conclude that the air campaign comes in preparation for
what is Israel's third option: a ground offensive. If Israel's goal is the
destruction of Hezbollah's ability to strike the Israeli heartland for an
extended period of time, the only way to hope to achieve this is from the
ground. Those conducting air operations can see only what can be seen from
the air. And even if they can hit whatever they see, eliminating the threat
requires a ground presence. Therefore, we continue to believe that logic and
evidence argue for an Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon -- and that any
possible diplomatic or political resolution, however tempting, ultimately
could not satisfy Israel's security requirements.
When we say invasion, we do not mean occupation. Israel has had its fill of
counterinsurgency operations in Lebanon. This would be a raid in force. A
large force would push into Lebanon, with two missions: the destruction of
Hezbollah as an army and the location and destruction of all heavy weaponry.
This solution would not be permanent, but it would achieve two ends. First,
it would mean that for Hezbollah or a successor organization to regroup
would take years. Second, it would leave no third party shielding Hezbollah
while it regrouped. This strategy gives Israel what it wants now and options
in the future.
Three more Israeli battalions were mobilized today. The United States, which
certainly knows Israel's intentions, is now extracting U.S. citizens from
Beirut. Israeli aircraft are working over Hezbollah positions in the Bekaa
Valley. The United States, Israel's patron, is clearly in favor of the
destruction of Hezbollah and there is no broad-based opposition to an
Israeli offensive internationally. It is a window of opportunity that Israel
will not pass up. The very thing that makes diplomatic solutions possible
also makes invasion, for the Israelis, attractive.
Our analysis therefore runs as follows:
1. Only an invasion on the ground can provide Israel with the solution it
wants to the threat Hezbollah has posed.
2. A diplomatic or political settlement not only cannot guarantee this
outcome, but it would make later Israeli responses to Hezbollah even more
difficult. Israel has more room for maneuver internationally now than it
will have later.
3. The internal politics of Israel will make it very difficult for Olmert to
come out of this with a less-than-definitive outcome.
4. Israel will seek to deal with Hezbollah without undertaking
counterinsurgency operations in the long term. This means attack,
sterilization of the threat, and withdrawal.
There has been much speculation about diplomatic solutions, the possibility
that there will not be an invasion, and so on. But when we ignore the
rhetoric and look at the chessboard, it is difficult to see how this
conflict ends without some action on the ground. When we examine the
behavior of the Israelis, they are taking the steps that would be needed for
an invasion. Obviously we could be wrong, and clearly the invasion has not
come at the earliest possible moment, as we had predicted. Nevertheless,
when we step through the logic, we keep coming out with the same answer:
invasion.
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