[lit-ideas] Re: I will but I shan't
- From: Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 18 Mar 2014 11:48:53 -0700 (PDT)
The distinction between reason and cause was certainly not something invented
by Davidson. Schopenhauer in his essay The Fourfold Root of the Principle of
Sufficient Reason certainly makes a distinction between ' a reason as the
ground of a conclusion', and 'a cause of the occurrence of a real event.' Both
are thought to be forms of the more general Principle of Sufficient Reason (of
which there are four,) but they are to be kept firmly separate in their
distinct realms of application, the first being the realm of abstract reasoning
(especially of logic) and the second being the realm of the empirical world.
The other two forms of the Principle have their respective applications in
mathematics and in psychology (motive as the reason or ground of acting). I am
not sure whether playing with the slightly different senses of 'should' can
illuminate this much further.
O.K.
On Tuesday, March 18, 2014 6:04 PM, "jlsperanza@xxxxxxx" <jlsperanza@xxxxxxx>
wrote:
The implicature.
"Why You Would Believe Me"
-----Original Message-----
From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
To: lit-ideas <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Tue, Mar 18, 2014 8:50 am
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: How did Benjamin die?
"As to your more personal criticisms of me, I do not understand them
(i.e. your criticisms) and do not see what I could say in self-defence
or, if I said anything in self-defence, why you should believe me."
Oddly, Grice would focus on the tense in Latin and Greek.
Cfr. variants:
why you should believe me.
or direct question,
Why should you believe me?
versus
why you would believe me
Why would you believe me?
The point seems to be one made by Davidson: the distinction between a
reason and a cause.
Thus, when I, B, do believe that p (because, A has said that p) I am
acting (or believing) in terms of reasons and causes.
The causes lead me to believe that p (on the basis that A said it). Or
not, of course (i.e. not to believe that p, or to abstain from either
believing that p or not believing that p -- cfr. agnosticism)
The reason or reasons ALSO lead me to believe that p (on the basis that
A said it). Or not, of course.
I would (or should) not be surprised if Julius Caesar, back in the day,
when reporting on the War in Galliae, would further distinguish
Why would I believe?
Why should I believe
and
Why MUST I believe?
There is also the particularly English construction:
Why ought I to believe?
which differs from the other modal verbs in requiring an infinitive
followed by "to" (ought-to), and which is derived from what I 'owe'
(ought being the past of 'owe').
Grice distinguishes between
what I shall believe
and
what I will believe
Note that KRP uses 'should' "believe" which is the reported speech for
McEvoy's questioning himself:
Why should I believe?
Why SHALL I believe?
Grice thinks that
"Why will I believe?"
points to the factual circumstances, it's hardly intentional. So the
proper question should be
"Why should I believe?"
which is a modalised weakened version of the PROPERLY right question,
"Why SHALL I believe?"
Or not.
Cheers
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