Popper distinguishes between truth and verosimilitude -- a concept coined
by Cicero! Geary, on the other hand, coined falsisimilitude.
In a message dated 6/21/2015 2:50:13 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
jejunejesuit.geary2@xxxxxxxxx writes:
True is apparently whatever one needs to be the truth. And that's the
truth. Ask any philosopher.
Well, if you ask Tennant*, he thinks that the true has to be TAMED.
Grice never used the word 'true' technically. He preferred "alethic". He
said it was the only good contribution by von Wright (pronounced /rixt/) to
philosophy, and he was /rixt/!
Tarski thought that truth was a wonder. Grice was more interested in the
fact that the usual implicature is for "No wonder", i.e. that while it is a
colloquial thing to say, "No wonder", it would be TOO Pre-Socratic (and thus
archaic) to utter "Wonder" _everytime_. Recall the Stagirite:
Quoting from his teacher Plato's "Theaetetus" that "philosophy begins in
wonder" (1555d), Aristotle expands:
"It was their wonder that first led men to philosophise and still leads
them" ("Metaphysics", 982b12).
Cheers,
Speranza
* Tennant poses a broad challenge to the realist views of meaning and
truth that have been prominent in recent philosophy. Tennant starts with a
careful critical survey of the realism debate, guiding the reader through its
complexities; it then presents a sustained defence of the anti-realist view
that every truth is knowable in principle, and that grasp of meaning must
be able to be made manifest. Sceptical arguments for the indeterminacy or
non-factuality of meaning are countered; and the much-maligned notion of
analyticity is reinvestigated and rehabilitated. Tennant goes on to show that
an effective logical system can be based on an anti-realist view; the
logical system that he advocates is justified as a body of analytic truths and
inferential principles. Having laid the foundations for global semantic
anti-realism, Tennant moves to the world of empirical understanding, and gives
an account of the cognitive credentials of natural scientific discourse.
Tennant shows that the same canon of constructive and relevant inference
suffices both for intuitionistic mathematics and for empirical science.
Contents
The Realism Debate
Irrealism
Against Meaning Scepticism
Avoiding Strict Finitism
The Manifestation Argument is Dead
Long Live the Manifestation Argument
Truth as Knowable
Analyticity and Syntheticity
Finding the right logic
Cognitive Significance Regained
Defeasibility and Constructive Falsifiability
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