I have a perhaps nasty suspicion that Tarski's definition of truth is
unassailable because it is nearly circular - the only difference between
the sentence in the object language and the sentence in metalanguage is the
quotation marks on the first. This is a very minimal definition which, as
noted, takes no position on whether the truth so defined is of objective or
subjective nature.
Still, I suppose that some definition is better than none.
O.K.
On Mon, Jun 22, 2015 at 8:26 AM, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
Tarski thought that truth was a wonder.>
If Popper is right about these things, Tarski cleared up the problems of
speaking of "truth":- rehabilitating the correspondence theory into the
bargain. Tarski showed how we can, provided we observe an object and
meta-language distinction, always state the terms under which a proposition
will be the "truth" - it turns out, for example, that "The snow is white"
will be "the truth" if the snow is white.
Tarski himself, and rightly, notes that his correspondence theory of truth
does not prove any further philosophical contentions, such as whether the
white snow is in an external world or is just a product of a human internal
world of experience. But Popper, again rightly, shows how Tarski's result
can be allied with a realism and a truth-seeking theory of knowledge.
Afaik there is no valid refutation of Tarki's theory - there is only often
muddled criticism by philosophers who do not understand it (because they
are inadequate logicians) and also dispute as to what further philosophical
conclusions might be derived from it or allied with it.
Tarski's theory stands as a most important result. Popper introduced it
into British philosophy in 1936, having run through the theory with Tarski
while they were both seated on a park bench in central Europe. A measure of
its importance is that Popper, although a believer in "truth", avoided the
term "truth" throughout his _Logik der Forschung_ so as not to stir the
hornet's nest of problems that were thought to attend speaking of "truth".
Tarski got rid of the hornet's nest by logical analysis, using an object
and metalanguage distinction.
Tarski brought the notion of "truth" back down to earth rather than
rendering it a "wonder". But Tarski's own theory is a wonder worth
contemplating.
Donal
On Monday, 22 June 2015, 6:53, David Ritchie <profdritchie@xxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
On Jun 21, 2015, at 6:52 PM, Mike Geary wrote:
Yes, my good friend Heidegger loves the word "aletheia". Says it meansthe "unconcealed" or some such. I like it because it makes me sound
erudite. I once knew a lovely young woman named Aletheia. She was very
impressed that I knew what her name meant. But she never did.
There had to be a poem or song in that. Never been to Greece myself. I
imagine this in a Welsh accent.
She seemed near incoherent,
a tab de-luded,
Greek Isles holiday wasted,
Socratic.
I meta.
Now it's her and
I
together.
After ouzo the universe tends to become two,
and true.
I remember we
dodged behind rocks to
widdle.
Not long before that, we syncopated.
Love was evident,
coherent,
on to logical.
Hey
high digger,
breakfast first and then
a swim,
or we die.
Just kidding.
David Ritchie,
Portland, Oregon
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