[lit-ideas] Grice and Popper on "know"
- From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2013 07:09:42 -0400 (EDT)
In a message dated 4/30/2013 8:13:23 A.M. UTC-02, donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx
writes:
"what may be true is that there a concept, or a particular conception, of
"knowing" where "knowing" implies that a belief is true. But this
particular conception is not the only one and cannot try to win the epistemic
debate
by claiming it is the only one."
and earlier:
"No serious epistemology can hinge on whether we stipulate "knows" one way
or the other: anyone who thinks otherwise is simply mistaking a linguistic
morass for philosophical wisdom."
"It is risible to think the semantics of "knowing" are adequate to rebut
Popper."
Cfr. "Grin and bear it"?
Just to quote from this passage in an early paper by Grice repr. in his WoW
(Way of Words), which may be helpful:
In brief, I would like to consider that perhaps McEvoy should find evidence
of some English native anglophone using 'know' as Popper did, such that
such anglophone was a philosopher of Grice's Play Group (as it were:
philosophy dons meeting at St. John's college, every Saturday morning,
post-war
Oxford).
Grice writes:
"If a particular expression E [say "know"] was given by some of the people
with whom I talk in my daily life a substantially different use from the
one which I gave to it, then I should almost certainly have discovered this;
one does discover people's linguistic idiosyncrasies. But more
important,even if my ascription that what goes for me goes for others is
mistaken, it
does not matter. _MY_ philosophical puzzles [with "know" such that turns,
Popper's remarks puzzling] have arisen in connection with _MY_ use of E
["know"], and my conceptual analysis will be of value TO ME -- and to any
others
who may find that their use of E ["know"] coincides with mine. It may also
be of value to those whose us of E is DIFFERENT, though different only in
minor respects [and not to those like Popper who think that you can know
what is false]. But if this is not so, then we have a different use of E, to
be dealt separately, to be subjected to SEPARATE conceptual analysis [as I
may want to proceed should I want to read "Objective Knowledge"] This we
can do IF THE NEED ARISES (since cooperation in conceptual analysis does not
DEMAND identity as regards the use of analysed expressions. I CAN, WITH YOU
[say, Popper], attempt the conceptual analysis of YOUR use of an
expression [say "know"] even if your use is different from mine."
Grice in "Logic and Conversation":
"What I suggest is something along the following lines."
A knows that p just in case
1. p
2. A thinks that p.
3. Some condition placing restriction on how he came to think p (cf. causal
theory).
Grice adds: "However if I utter "I know that p" there may be a mere
conversational implicature of strong or conclusive evidence (mot mere thinking
that p, with p is true) [as the strong theory of knowledge suggests] cf. "He
loves her". But this is not the only intepretation. It can also mean, "You
don't need to tell me". However, I would be willing to accept that an
examination candidate at an oral DOES KNOW that the Battle of Waterloo was
fought on June 18, 1815. He may know this without conclusive evidence. He may
even answer after hesitation, showing in the end that he does know the
answer" -- "So it is important, in conceptual analysis, to distinguish real
'meaning' [or 'sense'] from a mere 'implicature" -- "while keeping in mind
that
it is anathema to multiply senses beyond necessity.")
Cheers,
Speranza
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