[lit-ideas] Re: Grice and Geach on "A Bit of English Grammar"

  • From: Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Tue, 7 Jan 2014 10:02:34 -0800 (PST)

That is all right but I believe that we had another misunderstanding - in my 
view Socrates denies possessing propositional knowledge (knowledge that), not 
procedural knowledge.

O.K.



On Tuesday, January 7, 2014 3:53 PM, Walter C. Okshevsky <wokshevs@xxxxxx> 
wrote:
 
Omar,

That I engaged in s-o-h is an allegation made by Donal, not you.  Sorry for not
being clear.  

Walter O
MUN


Quoting Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>:

> If I express certain views or ideas in a (loosely phrased, and unaddressed
> except once) reply to you, it surely does not logically entail that I am
> ascribing the opposite views to you. There are various creative ways in which
> I can treat humanity as not in itself an end, and constructing a straw man is
> only of these. The only possible 'sleight of hand' would be the reference to
> Orthodox Christmas, but if you were sitting here in my place listening to
> pranks and occasional small arms fire in the spirit of piece in Christ, I
> think you might understand.
> 
> Mir gospodnji, i pokušaću da odgovorim na ostale poente kasnije,
> 
> O.K.
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, January 6, 2014 11:56 PM, Walter C. Okshevsky <wokshevs@xxxxxx>
> wrote:
>  
> Just a few remarks:
> 
> 1. S Rozhdyestvom Hristovom! (or not). (My new Volvo better be sitting under
> the tree tomorrow.)
> 
> 2. I agree with everything OK says below. Is there something in there to
> which
> I'm supposed to object? 
> 
> 3. Well, almost everything OK says. On Socratic ignorance: Perhaps OK can
> tell
> us where Plato has Socrates say what OK attributes to Socrates below? Last
> time
> I checked, that's not what Socrates said he was ignorant about, acc to Plato.
> I
> believe OK is correct in that it is procedural knowledge of a particular sort
> that Socrates denies possessing. (Without wishing he possessed it,
> interestingly.) But what OK gives us in quotations isn't it.
> 
> And, if I may, one final quibble, the knowledge Socrates denies possessing is
> not philosophical knowledge ... or even practical wisdom, I don't think. OK
> will
> clear this all up before New Years, I'm sure.
> 
> Already noseing the fragrance of piroshki with meat and with potato and rice
> wafting from the kitchen. (Only 2 kinds of piroshki there. And yes, you can
> have a box of piroshki. And yes, the accent is on the 3rd syllable. And no,
> that is not a transcendental fact. And I never claimed stuff like that was.)
> 
> Soon to leave you all to your own devices, as my University's spirit of
> altruism in conserving energy during our rotating power outages is not
> without
> end and will indeed come to an end Wednesday morning when it opens.
> 
> Valodsya Mihailovich ... and on and on ...
> 
> P.S. Does anyone know from where the expression "sleight of hand" hails? And
> does it really connote (apologies to linguistic relativists for the
> "really"),
> as I believe it does, some deceptive end underlying the performance of an
> action? So that to claim that a person is engaged in s-o-h is to impugn the
> epistemic and/or moral character of that person? Moreover, Your Honour, if I
> may tax the patience of the court just a trifle longer, would not such an
> accusation be a clear instance of ad hominem for which the duly promulgated
> punishment is 4 continuous hours of viewing reruns of Gilligan's island on a
> b&w tv set? Finally, Your Honour ... (Perry Mason is interrupted by Paul
> Drake
> who draws Perry's attention to the b&w law set out in chapter 2 of Copi's
> book
> *Logic* - "Informal Fallacies." Drake explains that this text is frequently
> referred/appealed to by the likes of Learned Hand, Hans Kelsen, Lon Fuller
> and
> Ronald Dworkin. Perry asks the name of the rock group these people are
> members
> of.)
> 
> 
> P.P.S. A query re a bit of philosophical propriety (yet again) before I join
> the
> others upstairs, who are already savouring mugs of salted herring and glasses
> of
> paprikash and smashing their depleted vodka bowls into our fireplace. (No, we
> don't have a fireplace.)
> 
> If someone charges you with, attributes to you, s-o-h in critiquing your
> views
> and arguments, is that charge worthy of a response? Isn't it something like
> denying accusations of having an affair with [insert relevant
> person as per your cultural mores] where the very act of denial acknowledges
> the
> respectability of and dignifies the critique? 
> 
> I realize our listserv isn't quite the Cambridge Moral Sciences Club
> but surely some minimal standards of philosophical propriety remain
> applicable
> across slices of time and space? Lizzie Anscombe would be the first to agree;
> and she's an Aristotelian! 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Quoting Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>:
> 
> > To develop this a little - it is Orthodox Christmas Eve here, and I am
> bored
> > - 'knowing how' seems a fairly clear case of knowledge that is not
> > conditioned by JTB criteria. With simple skills like riding a bike it may
> be
> > that there is one 'correct' way of doing it, but even then it is not
> chiefly
> > a matter of knowing what one needs to do, but of being able to do it. With
> > more complex skills like tennis, there are various 'correct' ways of doing
> > it, depending on what works for the player. While players and trainers can
> > and sometimes do debate these matters, even then they usually point to
> > utility criteria (what works) rather than to truth criteria (what is the
> > case). The relevant test for tennis skills is practical play, and the
> > relevant justification is provided by practical results (or not, as JL
> would
> > say). Thus, we are more or less left with (practical) justification, and
> may
> > dispense with truth and beliefs.
> > 
> > I'll leave open the question of whether the philosophical knowledge is more
> a
> > case of 'knowing how' or of 'knowing that.' If we agree with Socrates that:
> > "I know that I don't know (that) anything.", it might well be a case of
> > 'knowing how.'
> > 
> > O.K.
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > On Monday, January 6, 2014 9:02 PM, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
> > wrote:
> >  
> > W.O.: "Learning-how" and "teaching-how", on the other hand, would seem to
> > beepistemically conditioned in that there is a right and wrong way to chop
> > wood,
> > right and wrong ways of making love, a right and wrong way perform a
> forehand
> > smash or return a backhand slice in table tennis where
> > all this "rightness" and "wrongness" is open to justification on various
> > technical, prudential, moral and strategic criteria. 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > On Monday, January 6, 2014 7:51 PM, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
> > wrote:
> >  
> > "I know to ski off the side" is sayable in Serbian, at least informally.
> >  O.K.
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > On Monday, January 6, 2014 7:13 PM, Walter C. Okshevsky <wokshevs@xxxxxx>
> > wrote:
> >  
> > A very interesting post from Jl, at least that part I think I understood. A
> > few
> > replies:
> > 
> > 
> > "Learning-that" and "teaching-that" are not epistemically
> >  conditioned
> > locutions/uses; they are sensible/intelligible even if what is being taught
> > or
> > learnt is false or incorrect. I.e.: "I was taught that Sadam had WMDs"; "I
> > learnt that Bucharest is the capital of Serbia." Even if P is false, you
> were
> > still taught and you still learnt that P. Anyone who has ever gone to high
> > school or college, knows well that we learn an awful lot of crap in the
> > classrooms.
> > 
> > "Learning-how" and "teaching-how", on the other hand, would seem to be
> > epistemically conditioned in that there is a right and wrong way to chop
> > wood,
> > right and wrong ways of making love, a right and wrong way perform a
> forehand
> > smash or return a backhand slice in table tennis where
> > all this "rightness" and "wrongness" is open to justification on various
> > technical, prudential, moral and strategic criteria. 
> > 
> > "Learning-to-be/become" and "teaching-for" (as in teaching for dispositions
> > of
> > critical thinking, autonomy, democratic engagement, erotic sensibility) are
> > also uses that seem to require epistemic correctness. "Learning to become
> > brave," for example, involves participation in pedagogical strategies and
> > techniques which really do foster a justified sense of "bravery" in
> > differentiation from recklessness and cowardice. (Aristotle's NE, bk 3 & 8)
> 
> > 
> > While I can learn that the earth is the center of the universe, I cannot
> > learn
> > to be virtuous if the conception of virtue governing and guiding the
> learning
> > outcomes is false/immoral/etc.. Similarly with "teaching for:" teaching for
> > democratic
> >  deliberative competence must be differentiable from indoctrination.
> > 
> > Not "or not."
> > 
> > Walter O
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > Quoting Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx:
> > 
> > > In a message dated 1/5/2014 4:53:19 P.M. Eastern  Standard Time, 
> > > wokshevs@xxxxxx writes:
> > > While "knowledge" permits a  propositional (k-that) and a
> > > procedural (k-how) sense, there is no such thing  as "knowing to." So
> one 
> > > can
> > > learn how to tie one's shoes and learn that  Wolfau is in Austria
> through 
> > > the
> > > acquisition of
> >  one kind of knowledge or  another.  But one can't learn to be
> > > courageous, just or kind simply  through the acquisition of a form of 
> > > knowledge.  
> > > 
> > > This is a good point.
> > >  
> > > However, it brought to mind the words of the late professor emeritus of 
> 
> > > logic at Leeds, Peter Thomas Geach (he died December last year). On p. 47
> > of 
> > > 
> > > "Reason and argument", which he published with Blackwell, he talks, alla 
> > > Grice,  of 'bits of grammar'. 
> > >  
> > > The logic professor (and Grice, too, is described as a "British
> logician"  
> > > by Bartlett) warns the philosophy student (or student simpliciter; his
> book
> > 
> > > is  meant as an intro to undergrads who
> >  WON'T proceed with logic in the 
> > > curriculum)  to distinguish between
> > >  
> > > logical form
> > >  
> > > and
> > >  
> > > implicature or worse, what Geach calls
> > >  
> > > 'bits of grammar'.
> > > 
> > > So the same may apply to W. O.'s point about there not being in English 
> a 
> > > phrase to the effect that one knows TO.
> > >  
> > > Geach is discussing the copula:
> > >  
> > > "S is P"
> > >  
> > > Or "Every S is P" (he finds "All S is P" as being non-English).
> > >  
> > > And he writes (brilliantly, as was his wont):
> > >  
> > > "The word 'is' is a
> >  mere concession to English grammar and 
> > > plays no essential logical role (cf. Russian "John clever", "John
> > > rascal" [*It is not surprising that Geach should quote from  a
> > > Slavonian language, since his mother was Polish]"
> > >  
> > > and later on the same page:
> > >  
> > > "Every F is G" will be interpreted as "Every(body) who 
> > > is luckier than Elsie, Elsie envies". The '-body' part 
> > > of 'everybody' expresses the choice of Universe; and
> > > 'who is' is just a bit of English grammar -- these words
> > > could be left out in another language (say Latin)."
> > >  
> > > Loved it.
> > >  
> > > In another context, he goes on to discuss the subjunctive in Latin and
> adds
> > 
> > >  the note, to the effect that "this will mean nothing to the student who
> 
> > > doesn't  speak the language". (Is Geach contradicting his self here;
> don't 
> > > think so).  After all, HE did, as well as Grice, since both had made the
> > > right 
> > > choices  during his student years at Oxford (at Balliol and Corpus 
> > > respetively) when  following the Lit. Hum. course -- 'classics' today,
> > rather
> > > than 
> > > the Oxford later  combo of PPE (Philosophy, Politics and Economics --
> cfr. 
> > > "Philosophy, Culinary,  and Demographics"). 
> > >  
> > > So, I would suggest that we examine the logical form.
> > >  
> > > W. O. makes a good point that 
> > >  
> > > 'to believe
> >  how to bake a cake' 
> > >  
> > > makes little sense. This is what Walter calls the 'procedural' sense (I 
> 
> > > prefer 'use') of 'belief'. But we could still express that the agent has
> a 
> > > WRONG  procedure. He is not _certain_ about it, and it may lead to
> failure.
> > > So 
> > > there IS  a way to express a 'procedural' way of something like the
> absent 
> > > 'procedural  'use'' of 'believe'.
> > >  
> > > Grice discusses 'mean', 'mean-that', and 'mean-to' (as in "He meant to
> go  
> > > to London") ("Meaning"), and concludes that 'to mean to go to London" is 
> > > like  the 'mean' in "Smoke means smoked salmon": what he calls a
> 'natural'
> > > use 
> > > of  'mean' (I may disagree).
> > >  
> > > "Know to" may be a similar 'natural 'use''. Walter O. is concerned with
> "He
> > 
> > >  learned to be brave", with 'factive' "learn". As in "He learned that
> the 
> > > earth  was flat". Someone 'wrongly?' taught him that the earth was flat,
> > and
> > > 
> > > he  believed it. Some purists disqualify this use of 'learn' (I do): you
> > can
> > > 
> > > only  learn WELL; there's no such thing as 'mislearn': this is just a
> bit 
> > > of English  grammar, to be merely implicated or disimplicated on
> occasion.
> > >  
> > > Seeing that 'learn to' (be brave, etc.) is correct grammar, it seems
> THIS  
> > > is the expression for a 'to' use of 'know' that W. O. is looking for. Or 
> > > not, of  course. (Donal may agree with
> >  this, seeing that he allows, alla 
> > > Popper, for uses  of 'know' that are hardly factive: 'Ptolemy knew that
> the
> > > sun 
> > > rotated around the  earth', or "Newton knew things that were later
> > falsified
> > > 
> > > by Eddington" -- vide  Popper, "The source of [our] ignorance."
> > >  
> > > 'To' uses of 'know' that are not factive ("He mislearned to be brave")
> are 
> > 
> > > then what Popper would call ignorance. At the beginning of this British 
> > > Academy  lecture he grants of the oddness of speaking of the source for 
> > > something that is  not there (ignorance) but he goes on with the title
> as,
> > to
> > > echo 
> > > Geach's initial  quote, 'a concession to English grammar' -- or German
> in 
> > > this case,
> >  initially,  one may think?
> > >  
> > > Cheers,
> > >  
> > > Speranza
> > >  
> > >  
> > >  
> > >  
> > > Cheers,
> > >  
> > > Speranza
> > >  
> > >  
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> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > O.K.: If learning how to play tennis is epistemically conditioned, it is
> not
> > so conditioned on the criterion of truth. There is no 'true' way to play
> > tennis, only more or less efficient ones. There is hardly a one 'correct'
> way
> > to play tennis, too; different players have different techniques,
> strategies,
> > and styles which work for them to varying extents.

> 
> > 
> > O.K.
> 
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