[lit-ideas] Gee whiz,another one of those ignorant people <irony intended>
- From: "John McCreery" <john.mccreery@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 26 Apr 2006 12:42:49 +0900
From this morning's International Herald Tribune
----------
Zbigniew Brzezinski TMSI
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 26, 2006
WASHINGTON Iran's announcement that it has enriched a minute amount of
uranium has unleashed urgent calls for a preventive U.S. air strike by
the same sources that earlier urged war on Iraq.
If there is another terrorist attack in the United States, you can bet
your bottom dollar that there will be also immediate charges that Iran
was responsible in order to generate public hysteria in favor of
military action.
But there are four compelling reasons against a preventive air attack
on Iranian nuclear facilities:
1. In the absence of an imminent threat (with the Iranians at least
several years away from having a nuclear arsenal), the attack would be
a unilateral act of war.
If undertaken without formal Congressional declaration, it would be
unconstitutional and merit the impeachment of the president.
Similarly, if undertaken without the sanction of the UN Security
Council either alone by the United States or in complicity with
Israel, it would stamp the perpetrator(s) as an international
outlaw(s).
2. Likely Iranian reactions would significantly compound ongoing U.S.
difficulties in Iraq and in Afghanistan, perhaps precipitate new
violence by Hezbollah in Lebanon, and in all probability cause the
United States to become bogged down in regional violence for a decade
or more to come. Iran is a country of some 70 million people and a
conflict with it would make the misadventure in Iraq look trivial.
3. Oil prices would climb steeply, especially if the Iranians cut
their production and seek to disrupt the flow of oil from the nearby
Saudi oil fields. The world economy would be severely impacted, with
America blamed for it. Note that oil prices have already shot above
$70 per barrel, in part because of fears of a U.S./Iran clash.
4. America would become an even more likely target of terrorism, with
much of the world concluding that America's support for Israel is
itself a major cause of the rise in terrorism. America would become
more isolated and thus more vulnerable while prospects for an eventual
regional accommodation between Israel and its neighbors would be ever
more remote.
It follows that an attack on Iran would be an act of political folly,
setting in motion a progressive upheaval in world affairs. With
America increasingly the object of widespread hostility, the era of
American preponderance could come to a premature end.
While America is clearly preponderant in the world, it does not have
the power - nor the domestic inclination - to both impose and then to
sustain its will in the face of protracted and costly resistance. That
certainly is the lesson taught both by its Vietnamese and Iraqi
experiences.
Moreover, persistent hints by official spokesmen that "the military
option is on the table" impedes the kind of negotiations that could
make that option redundant. Such threats unite Iranian nationalism
with Shiite fundamentalism. They also reinforce growing international
suspicions that the United States is even deliberately encouraging
greater Iranian intransigence.
Sadly, one has to wonder whether in fact such suspicions may not be
partially justified. How else to explain the current U.S.
"negotiating" stance: the United States is refusing to participate in
the on-going negotiations with Iran but insists on dealing only
through proxies. That stands in sharp contrast with the simultaneous
negotiations with North Korea, in which the United States is actively
engaged.
At the same time, the United States is allocating funds for the
destabilization of the Iranian regime and is reportedly injecting
Special Forces teams into Iran to stir up non-Iranian ethnic
minorities in order to fragment the Iranian state (in the name of
democratization!). And there are people in the Bush administration who
do not wish any negotiated solution, abetted by outside drum-beaters
for military action and egged on by full-page ads hyping the Iranian
threat.
There is unintended but potentially tragic irony in a situation in
which the obscene language of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (whose
powers are actually much more limited than his title implies) helps to
justify threats by administration figures who like to hint of mushroom
clouds, which in turn help Ahmadinejad to exploit his intransigence to
gain more fervent domestic support for himself as well as for the
Iranian nuclear program.
It is therefore time for the administration to sober up, to think
strategically, with a historic perspective and with America's national
interest primarily in mind. Deterrence has worked in U.S.-Soviet
relations, in U.S.-Chinese relations, and in Indo-Pakistani relations.
The notion that Iran would someday just hand over the bomb to some
terrorist conveniently ignores the fact that doing so would tantamount
to suicide for all of Iran since Iran would be a prime suspect and
nuclear forensics would make it difficult to disguise the point of
origin.
It is true, however, that an eventual Iranian acquisition of nuclear
weapons would heighten tensions in the region. Israel, despite its
large nuclear arsenal, would feel less secure. Preventing Iranian
acquisition of nuclear weapons is, therefore, justified, but in
seeking that goal the United States must bear in mind longer-run
prospects for Iran's political and social development.
Iran has the objective preconditions in terms of education, place of
women in social affairs and in social aspirations (especially of the
youth) to emulate in the foreseeable future the evolution of Turkey.
The mullahs are Iran's past, not its future; it is not in our interest
to engage in acts that help to reverse that sequence.
Serious negotiations require not only a patient engagement but also a
constructive atmosphere. Artificial deadlines, propounded most often
by those who do not wish the United States to negotiate in earnest,
are counterproductive. Name-calling and saber-rattling, as well as
refusal to even consider the other side's security concerns, can be
useful tactics only if the goal is actually to derail the negotiating
process.
Several conclusions relevant to current U.S. policy stem from the foregoing:
The United States should become a direct participant in the
negotiations, joining the three European negotiating states, as well
as perhaps Russia and China (both veto-casting UN Security Council
members), in direct negotiations with Iran, on the model of the
concurrent multilateral talks with North Korea;
As in the case of North Korea, the United States should also
simultaneously engage in bilateral talks with Iran regarding mutually
contentious security and financial issues;
The United States should be a signatory party to any quid-pro-quo
arrangements in the event of a satisfactory resolution of the Iranian
nuclear program and of regional security issues.
At some point in the future, the above could perhaps lead to a
regional agreement for a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East,
especially after the conclusion of an Israeli- Palestinian peace
agreement, endorsed also by all the Arab states of the region. At this
stage, however, it would be premature to inject that complicated issue
into the negotiating process with Iran.
The choice is either to be stampeded into a reckless adventure
profoundly damaging to long-term U.S. national interests or to become
serious about giving negotiations with Iran a genuine chance to be
productive. The mullahs were on the skids several years ago but were
given a new burst of life by the intensifying confrontation with the
United States.
The U.S. strategic goal, pursued by real negotiations and not by
posturing, should be to separate Iranian nationalism from religious
fundamentalism. Treating Iran with respect and within a historical
perspective would help to advance that objective.
American policy should not be swayed by a contrived atmosphere of
urgency ominously reminiscent of what preceded the intervention in
Iraq.
Zbigniew Brzezinski was national security adviser to President Jimmy
Carter. This Global Viewpoint article was distributed by Tribune Media
Services International.
--
John McCreery
The Word Works, Ltd.
55-13-202 Miyagaya, Nishi-ku
Yokohama 220-0006, JAPAN
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