There has, imvho, been an absence of properly talked-through examples of what W meant by Eps in TLP. This is perhaps hardly surprising if W provided not one single such example nor talked it through. Such a possible fact should still give us all pause I feel. Though perhaps like a lawyer looking at certain sections of legislation while realising anything he says might be knocked down in some other section he overlooked (a risk the TLP?s presentation possibly exacerbates), here are some short comments ? specifically re objects at the 2 section. 1.1 ?The world is the totality of facts, not of things? (Pears and McGuinness translation throughout, God help us). Here is one explanation for this. That ?There is no elephant in my room? may be a fact, but it is a not a thing: no thing corresponds to it; it is the absence of the dreaded thing, ?the elephant in my room?, that constitutes the fact. Yet, and quite rightly from a logical POV, W wants to insist such facts should be seen as being as much a part of the world conceived as ?the totality of facts? as ?things? usually are. If this is so, though we might accept the existence or non-existence of a cat will be part of the ?totality of facts?, it seems far removed from showing that the cat may be a simple ?object?. Or is this missing the point of 1.1 completely, or somewhat etc? As to ?objects?, we start at 2.02 with the claim ?Objects are simple?. Can a ?cat? can be ?simple object?? Here are some potted comments on the text that someone might wish to explain away. 2.022 ?It is obvious that an imagined world, however different it may be from the real one, must have something ? a form ? in common with it.? Ie. Another ?imagined? world than the actualised world must nevertheless have something in common with the actualised world ? a ?form?. 2.0233 ?If two objects have the same logical form, the only distinction between them, apart from their external properties, is that they are different.? This, unless we take the ?If? as not implying a genuine possibility, assumes A. different objects can have the same logical form; B. they can differ for a different reason than their mere ?external properties? differ (or even are the same?). I take ?external properties? to refer to, say, colour. 2.024 ?Substance is what subsists independently of what is the case?. That is:- objects, since these ?make up the substance of the world? (2.021), are independent of ?what is the case? ie. ?the world? ? objects are ?the unalterable form? (2.023), no matter what is ?the case? or ?the totality of facts?. 2.0251 ?Space, time, and colour..are forms of objects?. Ie. These mere forms are not objects ? objects are beyond these mere forms. Of course, this may all rest on my colossal misunderstanding of the text - but it may be worthwhile to clarify this, if so. But the question arises: if objects are somehow beyond space, time and colour ? if they are crucially independent of ?what is the case? - surely this implies they are phenomenally unknowable ?objects? since the only stuff we can know phenomenally must be known (at least ?as if?) in space or time or colour. If they are not phenomenally knowable, how is it right to think that their content is to be established by science, experience etc.? ? even though the logician may deign to tell us, from on high as it were, a priori that they _simply must_ exist. How, fer feck sake, is a ?cat? or a ?blue dot? etc. an ?object? that subsists independently of space, time and colour? Donal Still In Puzzleland Hoping not to be passed over in silence ____________________________________________________________ Yahoo! Messenger - Communicate instantly..."Ping" your friends today! Download Messenger Now http://uk.messenger.yahoo.com/download/index.html ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html