I had asked you: > Are you claiming that that a name like "cat" that can be analysed in terms >of other names (eg. leg, head, tooth) can be an EP? That any name that be so > broken down can at the same time be "elementary"? It appears, if I understand you right in your reply, that your answer is that such a name/element can function as one of the elements in an EP whose every element corresponds to an object/situation in the world. It also appears to me that you are implying that the fact the object or situation might be differently described in terms of some other proposition, does not preclude as being an EP _any_ proposition whose elements each correspond to the object or situation being described. (Or is your claim more restrictive?) Of course, I am uncertain I understand you right. Perhaps we should clarify this before proceeding any further? __________________________________ Some other comments:- 1. You make a number of adverse comments re P&M. I am not an expert to judge but on a quick reading what you say seems reasonable. In particular, P&M's "2.13 In a picture objects have the elements of the picture corresponding to them." seems to me quite atrocious English. As to your alternative suggestion, "2.13* In the picture the elements of the picture correspond to the objects. [In the picture [of a face] the elements of the picture correspond to the face. In the picture [of a city] the elements of the picture correspond to the city." This is much clearer. But English is so slippery that this might be taken to suggest that the correspondence between pictorial elements and objects happens "in the picture"; so why not just say "The elements of the picture correspond to the objects", or "Each element of the picture corresponds to an object"? As to your suggestion: "2.1* We make ourselves pictures of the facts. [just a suggestion]" Why not just forget "ourselves" and say "We make/create pictures of the facts"? Otherwise the way it is written might suggest we turn "ourselves" into pictures. [just a suggestion] The praise from Mind is hardly surprising, it being the in-house periodical of the Oxbridge view of philosophy of which P&M are themselves representatives [and Popper is not, Mind rejected Pp's 'Poverty of Historicism' for publication; each to his own]. One might be more intrigued by such puffery, and more inclined to accept it must have something to it, if it were being offered by the Catholic Herald for a marxist-leninist translation of the Bible. You ask: <In what way can an object *have* an element of a picture, in particular one "corresponding to them"? Does Mona Lisa's smile *have* the painted smile in Da Vinci's painting "corresponding to" it?> These questions do have an element of teasing ambiguity, perhaps leading to confusion. I can see it is an error to think that the oily paint on the Mona Lisa's picture corresponds to the face pictured because that face is made of oily paint etc. Although, this kind of error does not, I think, mean it is necessarily an error to think that the oily paint can only correspond to the face because it can be arranged in a structure that corresponds to the structure of the face in some way. However, the error and poor translations you identify are not, I think, really responsible for whatever difficulties I have with understanding W's EPs. So I disagree with the suggestion, whatever mess they made, that:- "Perhaps if Pears and McGuinness had not made such a mess of this sentence people like Donal would not have had so much trouble accepting that in the proposition/picture "The dot at the bottom of this window between 'www' and 'andreas' is blue" is an elementary proposition and all the elements of this proposition/picture correspond to the objects named/described in it." As to this final suggestion:- "By the way, not you, but maybe some others might be thinking that because "atomic fact" and "atomic proposition" were Wittgenstein's and Russell's alternative names for these structures that that would indicate that we're not there yet if we haven't resolved every element in them to atomic and subatomic particles. Not you, but others should not think that." It is not that pictorial elements need correspond to particles in the sense of physics but rather whether they need to correspond with objects of a kind that cannot be analysed further into _logically_ smaller elements - in order that the proposition be regarded as an EP rather than a non-EP. You seem to say this is not necessary, whereas I for the meantime am exploring the view that this is necessary. Hence the question at the outset. After all, not every p is an EP, is it? Donal London ____________________________________________________________ Yahoo! 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