[lit-ideas] Re: Does the sign say its own sense? An Austrian example
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 24 Apr 2012 19:37:16 +0100 (BST)
From: Phil Enns <phil.enns@xxxxxxxxx>
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Sent: Tuesday, 24 April 2012, 18:49
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Does the sign say its own sense? An Austrian example
>Donal wrote:
"Absent anything explicit, Phil would have us believe there can be no
rational argument as to what is implicit here."
I would have people believe no such thing. In fact, I very clearly
implied the need for rational argument when I wrote:
'Since Donal's claims concern what is implicit, the appropriate
response is not a rebuttal or refutation but rather an acknowledgement
that the claim is convincing or not.'>
No, Phil. Being "convinced" is a matter of one's state of belief - this can be
rationally based or not. To now say "As I understand it, to be convinced is to
be convinced with reasons" is to give a special, additional meaning to
convinced (i.e. that it is "with reasons") that was not explicit or implicit
when referring to "convincing or not".
Why was it not implicit? Because "convincing or not" was previously placed in
opposition to "rebuttal or refutation", which denote rational counter-argument:
so it would seem implicit in Phil's earlier post that he was suggesting that
rational counter-argument was not "appropriate" but rather we fall back on
whether we find the claim "convincing" ie. whether we are have a strong belief
in it or not.
Again: strong belief need not be rational belief. Einstein did not rely on his
being convinced as evidence for his theories. The reference to "convincing or
not" is a belief-state side-show if we are really interested in reasons: for
the reasons speak for themselves rationally, irrespective of how convinced we
are.
So my comments were justified given what was in Phil's post.
Also Phil has dragged in the potentially misleading terms "proof or
demonstration" as if these have here some useful meaning aside from being a
potentially misleading synonym for "rational argument". They do not. There is
no more "proof or demonstration", in any sense over and above "rational
argument", in cases where meaning is so-called 'explicit' than in the case of
construing "accident" where it must be implicit what the meaning is. Yet Phil
seemed clearly to suggest otherwise: as if there is something better than
"rational argument" - something better like "proof or demonstration" - where
meaning is explicit but not where it must be implicit. Of course, this is wrong.
It may be helpful that Phil now clearly acknowledges that what is "implicit"
may be the subject of rational argument: however, the following kind of eyewash
is no rational argument at all, though it might seem Phil thinks it is (it is
at best Phil saying he is not convinced - a so-what fact given without reasons):
>My point is that the rational argument in this case is of a kind that
does not permit proof or demonstration, only more or less convincing.
And in this case, Donal's argument is not convincing, and in need of
more and better rational arguments.>
I guess Phil thinks we should think this kind of conclusion proves itself -
being rational an' all before we are convinced of anything.
I suggest presenting this kind of conclusion is no substitute for rational
arguments to support it - and the opinion "Donal's argument is not convincing"
cannot be taken in itself as a rational argument at all. Unless we are deluded
that what is "convincing" itself is automatically "with reasons" (and what is
"not convincing" is itself "without reasons"). In which case Einstein should
have rested on the fact he was convinced of his own theories (though of course
he wasn't) and we all should have bowed down and not bothered with anything
troubling like examining the "rational arguments" for and against.
Donal
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