[lit-ideas] Re: Do ideas exist before being articulated?

  • From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
  • To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2007 08:44:45 EDT

I found it slightly offensive when McCreery fails to comment on my post --  
which, admittedly, was pretty heavy, handling on authors like Ryle and others,  
and dropping names like analytic behaviourism, functionalism, etc. He thought 
it  was my _onus_ to prove the relevance.
 
On top of it, he calls my reading as being once-in-a-time, and refers to  
some process of cut and paste which escapes me. I read Grice as often as I can, 
 
ditto Grice. They are (and a few others) my only mentors. And while I see that 
 McCreery is looking for a ready answer, "do ideas exist before being  
articulated? () yes () no", I'm quoting here from the very last passage back in 
 
1867, when dear old Grice closed his William James Lectures. This last lecture  
was left unpublished till 1989 -- and the sad thing is that Grice died in 1988, 
 so never saw it in print. It's so confessional that I find touching:
 
"The solution to this seemingly knotty problem [as to whether exist before  
being articulated] may perhaps liek in the idea that the psychological 
attitudes  which, in line with my theory of meaning, attend the word flows of 
_thought_ do  so as causes and effects of the word flows in question, but not 
as 
*natural*  causes and effects and so _not_ as states that are manifested in 
psychological  episodes or thoughts WHICH ARE NUMERICALLY DISTINCT from word 
flows 
which set me  off or arise from them; they are due or proper antecedents or 
consequences of  the word flows in question and as such are LEGITIMATELY DEEMED 
to 
be present in  those roles; this is part of ONE'S AUTHORITY as a RATIONAL 
THINKER to assign  acceptable interpretations to one's own internal word flows."
 
--- This reminds me of Geary's claim that he knows what's going on _within_  
his *own* head, hardly others'.
 
Grice continues:

"What they may be deemed to generate or arise from  is ipso facto something 
which they do generate or arise from. The  interpretation, therefore, of one's 
on VERBALLY FORMULATED THOUGHTS is part of  the PRIVILEGE of a thinking being. 
The association of our word flows and our  psychological attitudes is fixed 
by us an OUTFLOW from our HAVING LEARNED TO USE  OUR LANGUAGE [like a parrot 
may not, or like a second-language speaker may not]  for definite purposes to 
describe the world, so the attitudes which, when  speaking SPONTANEOUSLY and 
yet 
nonarbitrarily, we assign as causes of effects of  our word flows HAVE TO BE 
ACCEPTED as properly occupying that position." (1967,  ed. 1989, p. 143).
 
In 1991, Judith Baker, Grice's literary executor, published his 1975  "Method 
in philosophical psychoogy" where Grice presents a more elaborate (and  to my 
view satisfying) scheme for the view of psychological attitudes as  
_theoretical_ concepts, in the sense that 'psychology' is a theory -- in line  
with a 
classical Aristotelian view of thinking processes as "function" of a  living 
organism.
 
Cheers,
 
JL



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