"Kripke also makes the point that different names for the same thing can highlight how the way we refer to something can affect the truth of propositions about that thing, e.g. it’s true that Mary Jane knows that Peter Parker is Peter Parker, and that Spiderman is Spiderman, but it’s not true that she knows that Peter Parker is Spiderman." No disrespect to Kripke [though his 'Kripkenstein' is a misreading of Wittgenstein, nor does it offer a correct 'solution' to the problems of induction which lie at the back of Kripke's take on "rules", which he treats as though they create a sort of inductive paradox - whereas Wittgenstein's concern is with issues like how "rules" are shown given that their sense cannot be said], but who denied this point? And how important is it? Where do we go with it? I mean, which is here better: "Kripke also makes the frequently overlooked and important point that..." or "Kripke makes the bloody obvious point, admitted even by most school-children who know something about Spiderman, that..." That people can present this Kripke point without acute intellectual embarrassment explains why they are also the kind of people unembarrassed that Popper is nowhere on their list [which makes room for Foucault, that hardboiled egghead of gay liberation, and bothers to give an honourable mention to "post-Lacanian readings of contingency and fate"]. Shame on you all. D ----- Original Message ----- From: Robert Paul <rpaul@xxxxxxxx> To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx Cc: Sent: Wednesday, 16 January 2013, 0:24 Subject: [lit-ideas] Aristotle beats Anscombe, Kripke wallops Nussbaum http://philosophynow.org/issues/93/Twenty-First_Anniversary_Survey Robert Paul Secretary, the Heraclitus Society ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html