[lit-ideas] Re: A serious inquiry: Hannah
- From: "Judith Evans" <judithevans1@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sun, 13 Aug 2006 21:41:12 +0100
I didn't realise your first question was serious, hence my
flippant reply.
> Empirical research does seem to suggest that women, from a very
early age, are
> much more interested in dialogue and discussion than are men.
So the question
> clearly is: should we have more women in political
decision-making or men? How
> about philosophical decision-making?
Almost all such research is unable to show a biological basis for
such a difference. More, of course, even a biological base can
be
overidden by social forces and circumstance. So these questions
are not easy to decide. I take it your "(in) philosophical
decision-making"
means "in the discipline of Philosophy"; I'm reminded of
Natalie Bluestone Harris's comments on this in her _Women
and the Ideal Society: Plato's Republic and Modern Myths. of
Gender_, to
the effect that if the sexes are equally good at reasoning, we
have no need
of female -- one might also say, of course, of male --
philosophers. If
the sexes are not equally good but there are a sufficient number
of
women (or men) who can reason adequately, to fill the posts,
again we might say we have no need of male (or female)
philosophers.
Hence perhaps the arguments from difference, characteristically,
of course,
deployed on women's behalf. Bluestone deploys one that does not
rely
on the normal notion of a gendered difference:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
...for generations to come women will have a unique
connection with all females before them who were
condemned because of their physiology...For there is
no philosophy performed by disembodied souls, and all
thought arises out of a particular situation... It is
we who were confined to household chores, whose sex
life was regulated and whose mental capacities
were denigrated. We who reason, think, imagine
alternatives, weigh the just with the unjust, must
keep alive the memory of those inequities.
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
for a rather different argument re women in politics, see
the late Susan Okin, for a trenchant attack on difference
justifications, see -- yes! -- the early work of Elshtain.
(Hope this helps)
----- Original Message -----
From: <wokshevs@xxxxxx>
To: <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>; "Judith Evans"
<judithevans1@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Sunday, August 13, 2006 8:33 PM
Subject: Re: [lit-ideas] Re: The Female Brain, or, why women talk
so damned much
> I would have said that your remark is terribly sexist and,
hence, politically
> incorrect, but with all the recent scholarship into biological
differences
> between our two kinds of brains, what does "political
incorrectness" mean
> anymore?
>
> Empirical research does seem to suggest that women, from a very
early age, are
> much more interested in dialogue and discussion than are men.
So the question
> clearly is: should we have more women in political
decision-making or men? How
> about philosophical decision-making?
>
> Walter C. Okshevsky
> Society for Aphroditic and Hermaphroditic Epistemology
> Catholic University of America
> Washington, D.C.
>
>
> Quoting Judith Evans <judithevans1@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>:
>
> > > Would anyone wish to speculate as to whether any of this
> > empirical research
> > > entails or suggests any differences between how men and
women
> > learn to
> > > philosophize or come to appreciate the value of philosophy
to
> > their personal
> > > and professional lives?
> >
> > women learn it by discussion, men need to have it thumped
into
> > them -- or offered sexual incentives -- yes?
> >
----- Original Message -----
From: <wokshevs@xxxxxx>
To: <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Sunday, August 13, 2006 7:59 PM
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: A serious inquiry: Hannah
> Phil --
>
> A very thoughtful post. I'll get to it as soon as Summer grades
are in. In the
> meantime, could you provide me with the references to the
quotations you cite
> below? Prussian Academy if possible. I'd much appreciate it.
>
> One of the difficulties I have with Kant's political writings
has to do with him
> not abiding by the same maxim M. Ali did not abide by: "Know
when it's time to
> hang up the gloves." I think his political theory is a mess.
But Arendt is a
> subtle and honest thinker, so I will give her the benefit of
the doubt ... for
> now. A bientot, Walter
>
>
> Quoting Phil Enns <phil.enns@xxxxxxxxxxx>:
>
> > Walter Okshevsky wrote:
> >
> > "Moral judgement for Kant has no necessary relation to ends
desired.
> > Moral judgements are practical judgements (and conversely).
Morality and
> > politics are separate spheres for Kant ..."
> >
> >
> > Certainly there is no necessary relation between moral
judgments and
> > ends desired, and morality and politics are separate spheres,
but it
> > seems to me there is a relationship between the two for Kant
that comes
> > out in _Conflict_. Government has a responsibility to
promote proper
> > moral judgments.
> >
> > "According to reason (that is, objectively), the following
order exists
> > among the incentives that the government can use to achieve
its end (of
> > influencing the people): first comes the eternal well-being
of each ...
> > By public teachings about the first of these [i.e. eternal
well-being],
> > the government can exercise very great influence to uncover
the inmost
> > thoughts and guide the most secret intentions of its
subjects."
> >
> > The manner in which Kant thinks religion can be used to
promote proper
> > moral judgments is described in _Religion Within the Limits_,
but
> > clearly Kant here sees a role for Government in guiding moral
judgments.
> > This role is a role proper to Government not practical reason
yet the
> > proper exercise of practical reason facilitates the operation
of good
> > Government and so Government ought to concern itself with
practical
> > reason.
> >
> > Government concerns itself with practical reason not only
through the
> > practice of religion but also through legislative power.
> >
> > "To refuse to obey an external and supreme will on the
grounds that it
> > allegedly does not conform with reason would be absurd; for
the dignity
> > of the government consists precisely in this: that it does
not leave its
> > subjects free to judge what is right or wrong according to
their own
> > notions, but [determines right and wrong - trans.] for them
by precepts
> > of the legislative power."
> >
> > The exercise of practical reason is not a solitary practice
but communal
> > and so there is a place for Government to guide practical
reason through
> > its legislative power. To be clear, Kant is not at all
suggesting that
> > this legislative power determines practical judgments but
rather
> > functions as a reification of a common practical reason.
> >
> > To guard against the conflation of the moral and political
spheres, Kant
> > turns to philosophy.
> >
> > "Now we may well comply with a practical teaching out of
obedience, but
> > we can never accept it as true simply because we are ordered
to. This
> > is not only objectively impossible (a judgment that ought not
to be
> > made), but also subjectively quite impossible (a judgment
that no one
> > can make). ... So when it is a question of the truth of a
certain
> > teaching to be expounded in public, the teacher cannot appeal
to a
> > supreme command nor the pupil pretend that he believed it by
order.
> > This can happen only when it is a question of action, and
even then the
> > pupil must recognize by a free judgment that such a command
was really
> > issued and that he is obligated or at least entitled to obey
it;
> > otherwise, his acceptance of it would be an empty pretense
and a lie.
> > Now the power to judge autonomously - that is, freely
(according to
> > principles of thought in general) - is called reason. So the
philosophy
> > faculty, because it must answer for the truth of the
teachings it is to
> > adopt or even allow, must be conceived as free and subject
only to laws
> > given by reason, not by the government."
> >
> > The Philosophy faculty serves the interests of the Government
by testing
> > the truth of any public teaching so that what is authorized
by the
> > Government not only has the force of legislative power but
also, and
> > most importantly, the force of reason. Philosophy determines
whether
> > particular practical judgments is true and therefore to be
endorsed by
> > the Government while also determining whether any particular
act of
> > Government is true and therefore ought to be disseminated as
part of the
> > communal practical reason. In this way political judgment
and moral
> > judgment are distinguished yet a necessary relationship
between the two
> > comes into view.
> >
> > I agree with Walter that it is all very messy but I think one
can find
> > in Kant's writing, and in particular _Conflict_, a sense that
there is a
> > necessary relationship between the exercise of political
judgment and
> > practical judgment.
> >
> >
> > Sincerely,
> >
> > Phil Enns
> > Toronto, ON
> >
>
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