Ah I see. 🌻👋
On Monday, November 8, 2021, Mike Price <pricemia97@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
I didn’t write this?!?👆♣️🥀
On Sunday, November 7, 2021, Mike P <mike_p_5@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
NRC nicely stated.....
The same can be said for people who are determined to have you talk about
something that they know little about and when you tell them you don't want
to talk about it, without having them first study it themselves, and then
they get PO'd at you....."Kill your unproductive time" is very nicely
said....
------------------------------
*From:* administrating-your-public-servants-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx <
administrating-your-public-servants-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> on behalf of
nrcwinner@xxxxxxxxx <nrcwinner@xxxxxxxxx>
*Sent:* Saturday, November 6, 2021 1:10 PM
*To:* administrating-your-public-servants@xxxxxxxxxxxxx <
administrating-your-public-servants@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>; cfc <
dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
*Subject:* [administrating-your-public-servants] Re: Dissent in Julliard
v Greenman... some distillations I find worth preserving for future
reference....
NELSON:
I am compelled to say this: Are you Lack of basic discernment or just
pampering your bordom at our expense?
NELSON : Why do you constantly pick personally-flavored studies/cases for
unnecessary discussion?
You have to CREATE questions to seek attentions and kill your
unconstrained compulsions?
What does that benefit others other than " at our expense keep deleting
them"?
Are so lonely, attention-seeking that you have to use all-bolded message
saying " look at me, listen to my useless comments" subconsciously?
why don't you focus on solutions in a structured manner instead of
distracting us, wasting our time to delete your non-signifcant messages?
You are being selfish posting to all just to " kill your unproductive
time "? Perhaps take it to private, as suggested before, to fill your inner
emptiness?
Sent from Yahoo Mail on Android
<https://go.onelink.me/107872968?pid=InProduct&c=Global_Internal_YGrowth_AndroidEmailSig__AndroidUsers&af_wl=ym&af_sub1=Internal&af_sub2=Global_YGrowth&af_sub3=EmailSignature>
On Sat, Nov 6, 2021 at 6:38, cfc
<dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
have the scent on my tracks how to save rest of clan
On Friday, October 1, 2021, 09:17:43 AM CDT, NELSON DICE <
nelsondice@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
*FIELD, J., dissenting.*
*32*
*From the judgment of the court in this case, and from all the positions
advanced in its support, I dissent. The question of the power of congress
to impart the quality of legal tender to the notes of the United States,
and thus make them money and a standard of value, is not new here.
Unfortunately, it has been too frequently before the court, and its latest
decision, previous to this one, has never been entirely accepted and
approved by the country. Nor should this excite surprise; for whenever it
is declared that this government, ordained to establish justice, has the
power to alter the condition of contracts between private parties, and
authorize their payment or discharge in something different from that which
the parties stipulated, thus disturbing the relations of commerce and the
business of the community generally, the doctrine will not and ought not to
be readily accepted. There will be many who will adhere to the teachings
and abide by the faith of their fathers So the question has come again, and
will continue to come until it is settled so as to uphold, and not impair,
the contracts of parties, to promote and not defeat justice.*
*33*
*If there be anything in the history of the constitution which can be
established with moral certainty, it is that the framers of that instrument
intended to prohibit the issue of legal-tender notes both by the general
government and by the states, and thus prevent interference with the
contracts of private parties. During the revolution and the period of the
old confederation, the continental congress issued bills of credit, and
upon its recommendation the states made them a legal tender, and the
refusal to receive them an extinguishment of the debts for which they were
offered. They also enacted severe penalties against those who refused to
accept them at their nominal value, as equal to coin, in exchange for
commodities. And previously, as early as January, 1776, congress had
declared that if any person should be 'so lost to all virtue and regard for
his country' as to refuse to receive in payment the bills then issued, he
should, on conviction thereof, be 'deemed, published, and treated as an
enemy of his county, and precluded from all trade and intercourse with the
inhabitants of the colonies.' Yet this legislation proved ineffectual; the
universal law of currency prevailed, which makes promises of money valuable
only as they are convertible into coin. The notes depreciated until they
became valueless in the hands of their possessors. So it always will be;
legislative declaration cannot make the promise of a thing the equivalent
of the thing itself.*
*34*
*The legislation to which the states were thus induced to resort was not
confined to the attempt to make paper money a legal tender for debts; but
the principle that private contracts could be legally impaired, and their
obligation disregarded, being once established, other measures equally
dishonest and destructive of good faith between parties were adopted. What
followed is thus stated by Mr. Justice STORY, in his Commentaries: 'The
history, indeed,' he says, 'of the various laws which were passed by the
states, in their colonial and independent character, upon this subject, is
startling at once to our morals, to our patriotism, and to our sense of
justice. Not only was paper money issued and declared to be a tender in
payment of debts, but laws of another character, well known under the
appellation of tender laws, appraisement laws, installment laws, and
suspension laws, were from time to time enacted, which prostrated all
private credit and all private morals. By some of these laws the due
payment of debts was suspended; debts were, in violation of the very terms
of the contract, authorized to be paid by installments at different
periods; property of any sort, however worthless, either real or personal,
might be tendered by the debtor in payment of his debts; and the creditor
was compelled to take the property of the debtor, which he might seize on
execution, at an appraisement wholly disproportionate to its known value.
Such grievances and oppressions, and others of a like nature, were the
ordinary results of legislation during the revolutionary war and the
intermediate period down to the formation of the constitution. They
entailed the most enormous evils on the country, and introduced a system of
fraud, chicanery, and profligacy which destroyed all private confidence and
all industry and enterprise.' Vol. 2, § 1371.*
*35*
*To put an end to this vicious system of legislation which only
encouraged fraud, thus graphically described by STORY, the clauses which
forbid the states from emitting bills of credit or making anything but gold
and silver a tender in payment of debts, or passing any law imparing the
obligation of contracts, were inserted in the constitution. 'The attention
of the convention, therefore,' says Chief Justice MARSHALL, 'was
particularly directed to paper money and to acts which enable the debtor to
discharge his debt otherwise than was stipulated in the contract. Had
nothing more been intended, nothing more would have been expressed, but, in
the opinion of the convention, much more remained to be done. The same
mischief might be effected by other means. To restore public confidence
completely, it was necessary, not only to prohibit the use of particular
means by which it might be effected, but to prohibit the use of any means
by which the same mischief might be produced. The convention appears to
have intended to establish a great principle, that contracts should be
inviolable.' Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 206. It would be difficult
to believe, even in the absence of the historical evidence we have on the
subject, that the framers of the constitution, profoundly impressed by the
evils resulting from this kind of legislation, ever intended that the new
government, ordained to establish justice, should possess the power of
making its bills a legal tender, which they were unwilling should remain
with the states, and in which the past had proved so dangerous to the peace
of the community, so disturbing to the business of the people, and so
destructive of their morality.*
*36*
*The great historian of our country has recently given to the world a
history of the convention, the result of years of labor in the examination
of all public documents relating to its formation and of the recorded
opinions of its framers; and thus he writes: 'With the full recollection of
the need or seeming need of paper money in the revolution, with the menace
of danger in future time of war from its prohibition, authority to issue
bills of credit that should be legal tender was refused to the general
government by the vote of nine states against New Jersey and Maryland. It
was Madison who decided the vote of Virginia, and he has left his testimony
that 'the pretext for paper currency, and particularly for making the bills
a tender, either for public or private debts, was cut off.' This is the
interpretation of the clause made at the time of its adoption, alike by its
authors and by its opponents, accepted by all the statesmen of that age,
not open to dispute because too clear for argument, and never disputed so
long as any one man who took part in framing the constitution remained
alive. History cannot name a man who has gained enduring honor by causing
the issue of paper money. Wherever such paper has been employed it has, in
every case, thrown upon its authors the burden of exculpation under the
plea of pressing necessity.' Bancroft's History of the formation of the
constitution of the United States, vol. 2, p. 134. And when the convention
came to the prohibition upon the states, the historian says that the
clause, 'No state shall make anything but gold and silver a tender in
payment of debts,' was accepted without a dissentient state. 'So the
adoption of the constitution,' he adds, 'is to be the end forever of paper
money, whether issued by the several states or by the United States, if the
constitution shall be rightly interpreted and honestly obeyed.' Id. 137.*
*37*
*For nearly three-quarters of a century after the adoption of the
constitution, and until the legislation during the recent civil war, no
jurist and no statesman of any position in the country ever pretended that
a power to impart the quality of legal tender to its notes was vested in
the general government. There is no recorded word of even one in favor of
its possessing the power. All conceded, as an axiom of constitutional law,
that the power did not exist.*
*38*
*Mr. Webster, from his first entrance into public life in 1812, gave
great consideration to the subject of the currency, and in an elaborate
speech on that subject, made in the senate in 1836, then sitting in this
room, he said: 'Currency, in a large and perhaps just sense, includes not
only gold and silver and bank bills, but bills of exchange also. it may
include all that adjusts exchanges and settles balances in the operations
of trade and business; but if we understand by currency the legal money of
the country, and that which constitutes a legal tender for debts, and is
the standard measure of value, then undoubtedly nothing is included but
gold and silver. Most unquestionably there is no legal tender, and there
can be no legal tender in this country, under the authority of this
government or any other, but gold and silver, either the coinage of our own
mints or foreign coins at rates regulated by congress. This is a
constitutional principle, perfectly plain and of the highest importance.
The states are expressly prohibited from making anything but gold and
silver a legal tender in payment of debts; and although no such express
prohibition is applied to congress, yet, as congress has no power granted
to it in this respect but to coin money and to regulate the value of
foreign coins, it clearly has no power to substitute paper or anything else
for coin as a tender in payment of debts and in discharge of contracts.
Congress has exercised this power fully in both its branches; it has coined
money and still coins it; it has regulated the value of foreign coins, and
still regulates their value. The legal tender, therefore, the
constitutional standard of value, is established and cannot be overthrown.
To overthrow it would shake the whole system.' 4 Webster's Works, 271.*
*39*
*When the idea of imparting the legal-tender quality to the notes of the
United States, issued under the first act of 1862, was first broached, the
advocates of the measure rested their support of it on the ground that it
was a war measure, to which the country was compelled to resort by the
exigencies of its condition, being then sorely pressed by the confederate
forces, and requiring the daily expenditure of enormons sums to maintain
its army and navy and to carry on the government. The representative who
introduced the bill in the house declared that it was a measure of that
nature, 'one of necessity and not of choice;' that the times were
extraordinary; and that extraordinary measures must be resorted to in order
to save our government and preserve our nationality. Speech of Spaulding,
of New York; Cong. Globe, 1861-62, pt. 1, 523. Other members of the house
frankly confessed their doubt as to its constitutionality, but yielded
their support of it under the pressure of this supposed necessity.*
*40*
*In the senate also the measure was pressed for the same reasons. When
the act was reported by the committee on finance, its chairman, while
opposing the legal-tender provision, said: 'It is put on the ground of
absolute, overwhelming necessity; that the government has now arrived at
that point when it must have funds, and those funds are not to be obtained
from ordinary sources, or from any of the expedients to which we have
heretofore had recourse, and therefore this new, anomalous, and remarkable
provision must be resorted to in order to enable the government to pay off
the debt that it now owes, and afford circulation which will be available
for other purposes.' Cong. Globe, 1861-62, pt. 1, 764. And upon that ground
the provision was adopted, some of the senators stating that in the
exigency then existing money must be had, and they therefore sustained the
measure, although they apprehended danger from the experiment. 'The
medicine of the constitution,' said Senator Summer, 'must not become its
daily food.' Id. 800. A similar necessity was urged upon the state
tribunals and this court in justification of the measure, when its validity
was questioned. The dissenting opinion in Hepburn v. Griswold referred to
the pressure that was upon the government at the time to enable it to raise
and support an army, and to provide and maintain a navy. Chief Justice
CHASE, who gave the prevailing opinion in that case, also spoke of the
existence of the feeling when the bill was passed that the provision was
necessary. He favored the provision on that ground when secretary of the
treasury, although he had come to that conclusion with reluctance, and
recommended its adoption by congress. When the question as to its validity
reached this court, this expression of favor was referred to, and by many
it was supposed that it would control his judicial action. But after long
pondering upon the subject, after listening to repeated arguments by able
counsel, he decided against the constitutionality of the provision; and,
holding in his hands the casting vote, he determined the judgment of the
court. He thus preferred to preserve his integrity as a judicial officer
rather than his consistency as a statesman. In his opinion he thus referred
to his previous views: 'It is not surprising that amid the tumult of the
late civil war, and under the influence of apprehensions for the safety of
the republic almost universal, different views, never before entertained by
American statesmen or jurists, were adopted by many. The time was not
favorable to considerate reflection upon the constitutional limits of
legislative or executive authority. If power was assumed from patriotic
motives, the assumption found ready justification in patriotic hearts. Many
who doubted yielded their doubts; many who did not doubt were silent. Some
who were strongly averse to making government notes a legal tender felt
themselves constrained to acquiesce in the views of the advocates of the
measure. Not a few who then insisted upon its necessity, or acquiesced in
that view, have, since the return of peace, and under the influence of the
calmer time, reconsidered their conclusions, and now concur in those which
we have just announced. These conclusions seem to us to be fully sanctioned
by the letter and spirit of the constitution.' 8 Wall. 625.*
*41*
*It must be evident, however, upon reflection that, if there were any
power in the government of the United States to impart the quality of legal
tender to its promissory notes, it was for congress to determine when the
necessity for its exercise existed; that war merely increased the urgency
for money; it did not add to the powers of the government nor change their
nature; that if the power existed it might be equally exercised when a loan
was made to meet ordinary expenses in time of peace, as when vast sums were
needed to support an army or a navy in time of war. The wants of the
government could never be the measure of its powers. But in the excitement
and apprehensions of the war these considerations were unheeded; the
measure was passed as one of overruling necessity in a perilous crisis of
the country. Now it is no longer advocated as one of necessity, but as one
that may be adopted at any time. Never before was it contended by any
jurist or commentator on the constitution that the government, in full
receipt of ample income, with a treasury overflowing, with more money on
hand than it knows what to do with, could issue paper money as a legal
tender. What was in 1862 called the 'medicine of the constitution' has now
become its daily bread. So it always happens that whenever a wrong
principle of conduct, political or personal, is adopted on a plea of
necessity, it will be afterwards followed on a plea of convenience.*
*42*
*The advocates of the measure have not been consistent in the designation
of the power upon which they have supported its validity, some placing it
on the power to borrow money, some on the coining power, and some have
claimed it as an incident to the general powers of the government. In the
present case it is placed by the court upon the power to borrow money, and
the alleged sovereignty of the United States over the currency. It is
assumed that this power, when exercised by the government, is something
different from what it is when exercised by corporations or individuals,
and that the government has, by the legal tender provision, the power to
enforce loans of money, because the sovereign governments of European
countries have claimed and exercised such power. 'The words 'to borrow
money," says the court, 'are not to receive that limited and restricted
interpretation and meaning which they would have in a penal statute or in
an authority conferred by law or by contract upon trustees or agents for
private purposes.' And it adds that 'the power, as incident to the power of
borrowing money and issuing bills or notes of the government for money
borrowed, of impressing upon those bills or notes the quality of being a
legal tender for the payment of private debts, was a power universally
understood to belong to sovereignty, in Europe and America, at the time of
the framing and adoption of the constitution of the United States. The
governments of Europe, acting through the monarch or the legislature,
according to the distribution of powers under their respective
constitutions, had and have as sovereign a power of issuing paper money as
of stamping coin,' and that 'the exercise of this power not being
prohibited to congress by the constitution, it is included in the power
expressly granted to borrow money on the credit of the United States.'*
*43*
*As to the terms 'to borrow money,' where, I would ask, does the court
find any authority for giving to them a different interpretation in the
constitution from what they receive when used in other instruments, as in
the charters of municipal bodies or of private corporations, or in the
contracts of individuals? They are not ambiguous; they have a well-settled
meaning in other instruments. If the court may change that in the
constitution, so it may the meaning of all other clauses; and the powers
which the government may exercise will be found declared, not by plain
words in the organic law, but by words of a new significance resting in the
minds of the judges. Until some authority beyond the alleged claim and
practice of the sovereign governments of Europe be produced, I must believe
that the terms have the same meaning in all instruments, wherever they are
used; that they mean a power only to contract for a loan of money, upon
considerations to be agreed between the parties. The conditions of the
loan, or whether any particular security shall be given to the lender, are
matters of arrangement between the parties; they do not concern any one
else. They do not imply that the borrower can give to his promise to refund
the money any security to the lender outside of property or rights which he
possesses. The transaction is completed when the lender parts with his
money and the borrower gives his promise to pay at the time and in the
manner and with the securities agreed upon. Whatever stipulations may be
made, to add to the value of the promise, or to secure its fulfillment,
must necessarily be limited to the property, rights, and privileges, which
the borrower possesses. Whether he can add to his promises any element
which will induce others to receive them beyond the security which he gives
for their payment depends upon his power to control such element. If he has
a right to put a limitation upon the use of other persons' property, or to
enforce an exaction of some benefit from them, he may give such privilege
to the lender; but if he has no right thus to interfere with the property
or possession of others, of course he can give none. It will hardly be
pretended that the government of the United States has any power to enter
into an engagement that, as security for its notes, the lender shall have
special privileges with respect to the visible property of others, shall be
able to occupy a portion of their lands or their houses, and thus interfere
with the possession and use of their property. If the government cannot do
that, how can it step in and say, as a condition of loaning money, that the
lender shall have a right to interfere with contracts between private
parties? A large proportion of the property of the world exists in
contracts, and the government has no more rignt to deprive one of their
value by legislation operating directly upon them than it has a right to
deprive one of the value of any visible and tangible property. No one, I
think, will pretend that individuals or corporations possess the power to
impart to their evidences of indebtedness any quality by which the holder
will be able to affect the contracts of other parties, strangers to the
loan; nor would any one pretend that congress possesses the power to impart
any such quality to the notes of the United States, except from the clause
authorizing it to make laws necessary and proper to the execution of its
powers. That clause, however, does not enlarge the expressly designated
powers; it merely states what congress could have done without its
insertion in the constitution. Without it congress could have adopted any
appropriate means to borrow; but that can only be appropriate for that
purpose which has some relation of fitness to the end, which has respect to
the terms essential to the contract, or to the securities which the
borrower may furnish for the repayment of the loan. The quality of legal
tender does not touch the terms of the contract; that is complete without
it; nor does it stand as a security for the loan, for a security is a thing
pledged, over which the borrower has some control, or in which he holds
some interest.*
*44*
*The argument presented by the advocates of legal tender is, in
substance, this: The object of borrowing is to raise funds, the addition of
the quality of legal tender to the notes of the government will induce
parties to take them, and funds will thereby be more readily loaned. But
the same thing may be said of the addition of any other quality which would
give to the holder of the notes some advantage over the property of others,
as, for instance, that the notes should serve as a pass on the public
conveyances of the country, or as a ticket to places of amusement, or
should exempt his property from state and municipal taxation, or entitle
him to the free use of the telegraph lines, or to a percentage from the
revenues of private corporations. The same consequence—a ready acceptance
of the notes—would follow; and yet no one would pretend that the addition
of privileges of this kind with respect to the property of others, over
which the borrower has no control, would be in any sense an appropriate
measure to the execution of the power to borrow. Undoubtedly the power to
borrow includes the power to give evidences of the loan in bonds, treasury
notes, or in such other form as may be agreed between the parties. These
may be issued in such amounts as will fit them for circulation, and for
that purpose may be made payable to bearer, and transferable by delivery.
Experience has shown that the form best fitted to secure their ready
acceptance is that of notes payable to bearer, in such amounts as may suit
the ability of the lender. The government, in substance, says to parties
with whom it deals: Lend us your money, or furnish us with your products or
your labor, and we will ultimately pay you, and as evidence of it we will
give you our notes, in such form and amount as may suit your convenience,
and enable you to transfer them; we will also receive them for certain
demands due to us. In all this matter there is only a dealing between the
government and the individuals who trust it. The transaction concerns no
others. The power which authorizes it is a very different one from a power
to deal between parties to private contracts in which the government is not
interested, and to compel the receipt of these promises to pay in place of
the money for which the contracts stipulated. This latter power is not an
incident to the former; it is a distinct and far greater power. There is no
legal connection between the two—between the power to borrow from those
willing to lend and the power to interfere with the independent contracts
of others. The possession of this latter power would justify the
interference of the government with any rights of property of other
parties, under the pretense that its allowance to the holders of the notes
would lead to their more ready acceptance, and thus furnish the needed
means.*
*45*
*The power vested in congress to coin money does not in my judgment
fortify the position of the court, as its opinion affirms. So far from
deducing from that power any authority to impress the notes of the
government with the quality of legal tender, its existence seems to me
inconsistent with a power to make anything but coin a legal tender. The
meaning of the terms 'to coin money' is not at all doubtful. It is to mould
metallic substances into forms convenient for circulation and to stamp them
with the impress of the government authority indicating their value with
reference to the unit of value established by law. Coins are pieces of
metal of definite weight and value, stamped such by the authority of the
government. If any doubt could exist that the power has reference to
metallic substances only it would be removed by the language which
immediately follows, authorizing congress to regulate the value of money
thus coined and of foreign coin, and also by clauses making a distinction
between coin and the obligations of the general government and of the
states. Thus, in the clause authorizing congress 'to provide for the
punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United
States,' a distinction is made between the obligations and the coin of the
government.*
*46*
*Money is not only a medium of exchange, but it is a standard of value.
Nothing can be such standard which has not intrinsic value, or which is
subject to frequent changes in value. From the earliest period in the
history of civilized nations we find pieces of gold and silver used as
money. These metals are scattered over the world in small quantities; they
are susceptible of division, capable of easy impression, have more value in
proportion to weight and size, and are less subject to loss by wear and
abrasion than any other material possessing these qualities. It requires
labor to obtain them; they are not dependent upon legislation or the
caprices of the multitude; they cannot be manufactured or decreed into
existence; and they do not perish by lapse of time. They have, therefore,
naturally, if not necessarily, become throughout the world a standard of
value. In exchange for pieces of them, products requiring an equal amount
of labor are readily given. When the product and the piece of metal
represent the same labor, or an approximation to it, they are freely
exchanged. There can be no adequate substitute for these metals. Says Mr.
Webster, in a speech made in the house of representatives in 1815: 'The
circulating medium of a commercial community must be that which is also the
circulating medium of other commercial communities, or must be capable of
being converted into that medium without loss. It must also be able not
only to pass in payments and receipts among individuals of the same society
and nation, but to adjust and discharge the balance of exchanges between
different nations. It must be something which has a value abroad as well as
at home, by which foreign as well as domestic debts can be satisfied. The
precious metals alone answer these purposes. They alone, therefore, are
money, and whatever else is to perform the functions of money must be their
representative, and capable of being turned into them at will. So long as
bank paper retains this quality it is a substitute for money; divested of
this, nothing can give it that character.' 3 Webster's Works, 41. The
clause to coin money must be read in connection with the prohibition upon
the states to make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of
debts. The two taken together clearly show that the coins to be fabricated
under the authority of the general government, and as such to be a legal
tender for debts, are to be composed principally, if not entirely, of the
metals of gold and silver. Coins of such metals are necessarily a legal
tender to the amount of their respective values, without any legislative
enactment, and the statute of the United States providing that they shall
be such tender is only declaratory of their effect when offered in payment.*
*47*
*When the constitution says, therefore, that congress shall have the
power to coin money, interpreting that clause with the prohibition upon the
states, it says it shall have the power to make coins of the precious
metals a legal tender, for that alone which is money can be a legal tender.
If this be the true import of the language, nothing else can be made a
legal tender. We all know that the value of the notes of the government in
the market, and in the commercial world generally, depends upon their
convertibility on demand into coin; and as confidence in such
convertibility increases or diminishes, so does the exchangeable value of
the notes vary. So far from becoming themselves standards of value by
reason of the legislative declaration to that effect, their own value is
measured by the facility with which they can be exchanged into that which
alone is regarded as money by the commercial world. They are promises of
money, but they are not money in the sense of the constitution. The term
'money' is used in that instrument in several clauses,—in the one
authorizing congress 'to borrow money;' in the one authorizing congress 'to
coin money;' in the one declaring that 'no money' shall be drawn from the
treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and in the one
declaring that no state shall 'coin money.' And it is a settled rule of
interpretation that the same term occurring in different parts of the same
instrument shall be taken in the same sense, unless there is something in
the context indicating that a different meaning was intended. Now, to coin
money is, as I have said, to make coins out of metallic substances, and the
only money the value of which congress can regulate is coined money, either
of our mints, or of foreign countries. It should seem, therefore, that to
borrow money, is to obtain a loan of coin money; that is, money composed of
the precious metals, representing value in the purchase of property and
payment of debts. Between the promises of the government, designated as its
securities, and this money, the constitution draws a distinction, which
disappears in the opinion of the court. The opinion not only declares that
it is in the power of congress to make the notes of the government a legal
tender and a standard of value, but that under the power to coin money and
regulate the value thereof, congress may issue coins of the same
denominations as those now already current, but of less intrinsic value, by
reason of containing a less weight of the precious metals, and thereby
enable debtors to discharge their debts by payment of coins of less real
value. This doctrine is put forth as in some way a justification of the
legislation authorizing the tender of nominal money in place of real money
in payment of debts. Undoubtedly congress has power to alter the value of
coins issued, either by increasing or diminishing the alloy they contain;
so it may alter, at its pleasure, their denominations; it may hereafter
call a dollar an eagle, and it may call an eagle a dollar. But if it be
intended to assert that congress can make the coins changed the equivalent
of those having a greater value in their previous condition, and compel
parties contracting for the latter to receive coins with diminished value,
I must be permitted to deny any such authority. Any such declaration on its
part would be not only utterly inoperative in fact, but a shameful
disregard of its constitutional duty. As I said on a former occasion: 'The
power to coin money, as declared by this court, is a great trust devolved
upon congress, carrying with it the duty of creating and maintaining a
uniform standard of value throughout the Union, and it would be a manifest
abuse of this trust to give to the coins issued by its authority any other
than their real value. By debasing the coins, when once the standard is
fixed, is meant giving to the coins by their form and impress a certificate
of their having a relation to that standard different from that which in
truth they possess; in other words, giving to the coins a false certificate
of their value. Arbitrary and profligate governments have often resorted to
this miserable scheme of robbery, which Mill designates as a shallow and
impudent artifice, the 'least covert of all modes of knavery, which
consists in calling a shilling a pound, that a debt of one hundred pounds
may be canceled by the payment of one hundred shillings." No such
debasement has ever been attempted in this country, and none ever will be
so long as any sentiment of honor influences the governing power of the
nation. The changes from time to time in the quantity of alloy in the
different coins has been made to preserve the proper relative value between
gold and silver, or to prevent exportation, and not with a view of debasing
them. Whatever power may be vested in the government of the United States,
it has none to perpetrate such monstrous iniquity. One of the great
purposes of its creation, as expressed in the preamble of the constitution,
was the establishment of justice, and not a line nor a word is found in
that instrument which sanctions any intentional wrong to the citizen,
either in war or in peace.*
*48*
*But beyond and above all the objections which I have stated to the
decision recognizing a power in congress to impart the legal-tender quality
to the notes of the government, is my objection to the rule of
construction, adopted by the court to reach its conclusions—a rule which,
fully carried out, would change the whole nature of our constitution, and
break down the barriers which separate a government of limited from one of
unlimited powers. When the constitution came before the conventions of the
several states for adoption, apprehension existed that other powers than
those designated might be claimed; and it led to the first 10 amendments.
When these were presented to the states they were preceded by a preamble
stating that the conventions of a number of the states had, at the time of
adopting the constitution, expressed a desire, 'in order to prevent
misconception or abuse of its powers, that further declaratory and
restrictive clauses should be added.' One of them is found in the tenth
amendment, which declares that 'the powers not delegated to the United
States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are
reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.' The framers of the
constitution, as I have said, were profoundly impressed with the evils
which had resulted from the vicious legislation of the states making notes
a legal tender, and they determined that such a power should not exist any
longer. They therefore prohibited the states from exercising it, and they
refused to grant it to the new government which they created. Of what
purpose is it, then, to refer to the exercise of the power by the absolute
or the limited governments of Europe, or by the states previous to our
constitution? Congress can exercise no power by virtue of any supposed
inherent sovereignty in the general government. Indeed, it may be doubted
whether the power can be correctly said to appertain to sovereignty in any
proper sense, as an attribute of an independent political community. The
power to commit violence, perpetrate injustice, take private property by
force without compensation to the owner, and compel the receipt of promises
to pay in place of money, may be exercised, as it often has been, by
irresponsible authority, but it cannot be considered as belonging to a
government founded upon law. But be that as it may, there is no such thing
as a power of inherent sovereignty in the government of the United States.
It is a government of delegated powers, supreme within its prescribed
sphere, but powerless outside of it. In this country, sovereignty resides
in the people, and congress can exercise no power which they have not, by
their constitution, intrusted to it; all else is withheld. It seems,
however, to be supposed that, as the power was taken from the states, it
could not have been intended that it should disappear entirely, and
therefore it must, in some way, adhere to the general government,
notwithstanding the tenth amendment and the nature of the constitution. The
doctrine that a power not expressly forbidden may be exercised would, as I
have observed, change the character of our government. If I have read the
constitution aright, if there is any weight to be given to the uniform
teachings of our great jurists and of commentators previous to the late
civil war, the true doctrine is the very opposite of this. If the power is
not in terms granted, and is not necessary and proper for the exercise of a
power which is thus granted, it does not exist. And in determining what
measures may be adopted in executing the powers granted, Chief Justice
MARSHALL declares that they must be appropriate, plainly adapted to the
end, not prohibited, and consistent with the letter and spirit of the
constitution. Now, all through that instrument we find limitations upon the
power, both of the general government and the state governments, so as to
prevent oppression and injustice. No legislation, therefore, tending to
promote either can consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution.
A law which interferes with the contracts of others, and compels one of the
parties to receive in satisfaction something different from that
stipulated, without reference to its actual value in the market,
necessarily works such injustice and wrong.*
*49*
*There is, it is true, no provision in the constitution of the United
States forbidding in direct terms the passing of laws by congress impairing
the obligation of contracts, and there are many express powers conferred,
such as the power to declare war, levy duties, and regulate commerce, the
exercise of which affects more or less the value of contracts. Thus, war
necessarily suspends intercourse between the citizens or subjects of
belligerent nations, and the performance during its continuance of previous
contracts. The imposition of duties upon goods may affect the prices of
articles imported or manufactured, so as to materially alter the value of
previous contracts respecting them. But these incidental consequences
arising from the exercise of such powers were contemplated in the grant of
them. As there can be no solid objection to legislation under them, no just
complaint can be made of such consequences. But far different is the case
when the impairment of the contract does not follow incidentally, but is
directly and in terms allowed and enacted. Legislation operating directly
upon private contracts, changing their conditions, is forbidden to the
states; and no power to alter the stipulations of such contracts by direct
legislation is conferred upon congress. There are also many considerations,
outside of the fact that there is no grant of the power, which show that
the framers of the constitution never intended that such power should be
exercised. One of the great objects of the constitution, as already
observed, was to establish justice, and what was meant by that in its
relations to contracts, as said by the late chief justice in his opinion in
Hepburn v. Griswold, was not left to interference or conjecture. And in
support of this statement he refers to the fact that when the constitution
was undergoing discussion in the convention, the congress of the
confederation was engaged in framing the ordinance for the government of
the Northwest territory, in which certain articles of compact were
established between the people of the original states and the people of the
territory 'for the purposes,' as expressed in the instrument, 'of extending
the fundamental principles of civil and religious liberty, whereon these
republics, [the states united under the confederation,] their laws and
constitutions, are erected.' That congress was also alive to the evils
which the loose legislation of the states had created by interfering with
the obligation of private contracts and making notes a legal tender for
debts; and the ordinance declared that in the just preservation of rights
and property no law 'ought ever to be made, or have force in the said
territory, that shall in any manner whatever interfere with or affect
private contracts, or engagements, bona fide and without fraud previously
formed.' This principle, said the chief justice, found more condensed
expression in the prohibition upon the states against impairing the
obligation of contracts, which has always been recognized 'as an efficient
safeguard against injustice;' and the court was then of opinion that 'it is
clear that those who framed and those who adopted the constitution intended
that the spirit of this prohibition should pervade the entire body of
legislation, and that the justice which the constitution was ordained to
establish was not thought by them to be compatible with legislation of an
opposite tendency.' Soon after the constitution was adopted the case of
Calder v. Bull came before this court, and it was there said that there
were acts which the federal and state legislatures could not do without
exceeding their authority; and among them was mentioned a law which
punished a citizen for an innocent act, and a law which destroyed or
impaired the lawful private contracts of citizens. 'It is against all
reason and justice,' it was added, 'for a people to intrust a legislature
with such powers, and therefore it cannot be presumed that they have done
it.' 3 Dall. 388. And Mr. Madison, in one of the articles in the
Federalist, declared that laws impairing the obligation of contracts were
contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every
principle of sound legislation. Yet this court holds that a measure
directly operating upon and necessarily impairing private contracts, may be
adopted in the execution of powers specifically granted for other purposes
because it is not in terms prohibited, and that it is consistent with the
letter and spirit of the constitution.*
*50*
*From the decision of the court I see only evil likely to follow. There
have been times within the memory of all of us when the legal-tender notes
of the United States were not exchangeable for more than one-half of their
nominal value. The possibility of such depreciation will always attend
paper money. This inborn infirmity no mere legislative declaration can
cure. If congress has the power to make the notes a legal tender and to
pass as money or its equivalent, why should not a sufficient amount be
issued to pay the bonds of the United States as they nature? Why pay
interest on the millions of dollars of bonds now due when congress can in
one day make the money to pay the principal? And why should there be any
restraint upon unlimited appropriations by the government for all imaginary
schemes of public improvement, if the printing-press can furnish the money
that is needed for them?*
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