NELSON:
I am compelled to say this: Are you Lack of basic discernment or just pampering
your bordom at our expense?
NELSON : Why do you constantly pick personally-flavored studies/cases for
unnecessary discussion? You have to CREATE questions to seek attentions and
kill your unconstrained compulsions?What does that benefit others other than "
at our expense keep deleting them"?
Are so lonely, attention-seeking that you have to use all-bolded message saying
" look at me, listen to my useless comments" subconsciously? why don't you
focus on solutions in a structured manner instead of distracting us, wasting
our time to delete your non-signifcant messages?
You are being selfish posting to all just to " kill your unproductive time "?
Perhaps take it to private, as suggested before, to fill your inner emptiness?
Sent from Yahoo Mail on Android
On Sat, Nov 6, 2021 at 6:38, cfc<dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: have
the scent on my tracks how to save rest of clan
On Friday, October 1, 2021, 09:17:43 AM CDT, NELSON DICE
<nelsondice@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
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FIELD, J., dissenting.
32
From the judgment of the court in this case, and from all the positions
advanced in its support, I dissent. The question of the power of congress to
impart the quality of legal tender to the notes of the United States, and thus
make them money and a standard of value, is not new here. Unfortunately, it has
been too frequently before the court, and its latest decision, previous to this
one, has never been entirely accepted and approved by the country. Nor should
this excite surprise; for whenever it is declared that this government,
ordained to establish justice, has the power to alter the condition of
contracts between private parties, and authorize their payment or discharge in
something different from that which the parties stipulated, thus disturbing the
relations of commerce and the business of the community generally, the doctrine
will not and ought not to be readily accepted. There will be many who will
adhere to the teachings and abide by the faith of their fathers So the question
has come again, and will continue to come until it is settled so as to uphold,
and not impair, the contracts of parties, to promote and not defeat justice.
33
If there be anything in the history of the constitution which can be
established with moral certainty, it is that the framers of that instrument
intended to prohibit the issue of legal-tender notes both by the general
government and by the states, and thus prevent interference with the contracts
of private parties. During the revolution and the period of the old
confederation, the continental congress issued bills of credit, and upon its
recommendation the states made them a legal tender, and the refusal to receive
them an extinguishment of the debts for which they were offered. They also
enacted severe penalties against those who refused to accept them at their
nominal value, as equal to coin, in exchange for commodities. And previously,
as early as January, 1776, congress had declared that if any person should be
'so lost to all virtue and regard for his country' as to refuse to receive in
payment the bills then issued, he should, on conviction thereof, be 'deemed,
published, and treated as an enemy of his county, and precluded from all trade
and intercourse with the inhabitants of the colonies.' Yet this legislation
proved ineffectual; the universal law of currency prevailed, which makes
promises of money valuable only as they are convertible into coin. The notes
depreciated until they became valueless in the hands of their possessors. So it
always will be; legislative declaration cannot make the promise of a thing the
equivalent of the thing itself.
34
The legislation to which the states were thus induced to resort was not
confined to the attempt to make paper money a legal tender for debts; but the
principle that private contracts could be legally impaired, and their
obligation disregarded, being once established, other measures equally
dishonest and destructive of good faith between parties were adopted. What
followed is thus stated by Mr. Justice STORY, in his Commentaries: 'The
history, indeed,' he says, 'of the various laws which were passed by the
states, in their colonial and independent character, upon this subject, is
startling at once to our morals, to our patriotism, and to our sense of
justice. Not only was paper money issued and declared to be a tender in payment
of debts, but laws of another character, well known under the appellation of
tender laws, appraisement laws, installment laws, and suspension laws, were
from time to time enacted, which prostrated all private credit and all private
morals. By some of these laws the due payment of debts was suspended; debts
were, in violation of the very terms of the contract, authorized to be paid by
installments at different periods; property of any sort, however worthless,
either real or personal, might be tendered by the debtor in payment of his
debts; and the creditor was compelled to take the property of the debtor, which
he might seize on execution, at an appraisement wholly disproportionate to its
known value. Such grievances and oppressions, and others of a like nature, were
the ordinary results of legislation during the revolutionary war and the
intermediate period down to the formation of the constitution. They entailed
the most enormous evils on the country, and introduced a system of fraud,
chicanery, and profligacy which destroyed all private confidence and all
industry and enterprise.' Vol. 2, § 1371.
35
To put an end to this vicious system of legislation which only encouraged
fraud, thus graphically described by STORY, the clauses which forbid the states
from emitting bills of credit or making anything but gold and silver a tender
in payment of debts, or passing any law imparing the obligation of contracts,
were inserted in the constitution. 'The attention of the convention,
therefore,' says Chief Justice MARSHALL, 'was particularly directed to paper
money and to acts which enable the debtor to discharge his debt otherwise than
was stipulated in the contract. Had nothing more been intended, nothing more
would have been expressed, but, in the opinion of the convention, much more
remained to be done. The same mischief might be effected by other means. To
restore public confidence completely, it was necessary, not only to prohibit
the use of particular means by which it might be effected, but to prohibit the
use of any means by which the same mischief might be produced. The convention
appears to have intended to establish a great principle, that contracts should
be inviolable.'Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 206. It would be difficult to
believe, even in the absence of the historical evidence we have on the subject,
that the framers of the constitution, profoundly impressed by the evils
resulting from this kind of legislation, ever intended that the new government,
ordained to establish justice, should possess the power of making its bills a
legal tender, which they were unwilling should remain with the states, and in
which the past had proved so dangerous to the peace of the community, so
disturbing to the business of the people, and so destructive of their morality.
36
The great historian of our country has recently given to the world a history of
the convention, the result of years of labor in the examination of all public
documents relating to its formation and of the recorded opinions of its
framers; and thus he writes: 'With the full recollection of the need or seeming
need of paper money in the revolution, with the menace of danger in future time
of war from its prohibition, authority to issue bills of credit that should be
legal tender was refused to the general government by the vote of nine states
against New Jersey and Maryland. It was Madison who decided the vote of
Virginia, and he has left his testimony that 'the pretext for paper currency,
and particularly for making the bills a tender, either for public or private
debts, was cut off.' This is the interpretation of the clause made at the time
of its adoption, alike by its authors and by its opponents, accepted by all the
statesmen of that age, not open to dispute because too clear for argument, and
never disputed so long as any one man who took part in framing the constitution
remained alive. History cannot name a man who has gained enduring honor by
causing the issue of paper money. Wherever such paper has been employed it has,
in every case, thrown upon its authors the burden of exculpation under the plea
of pressing necessity.' Bancroft's History of the formation of the constitution
of the United States, vol. 2, p. 134. And when the convention came to the
prohibition upon the states, the historian says that the clause, 'No state
shall make anything but gold and silver a tender in payment of debts,' was
accepted without a dissentient state. 'So the adoption of the constitution,' he
adds, 'is to be the end forever of paper money, whether issued by the several
states or by the United States, if the constitution shall be rightly
interpreted and honestly obeyed.' Id. 137.
37
For nearly three-quarters of a century after the adoption of the constitution,
and until the legislation during the recent civil war, no jurist and no
statesman of any position in the country ever pretended that a power to impart
the quality of legal tender to its notes was vested in the general government.
There is no recorded word of even one in favor of its possessing the power. All
conceded, as an axiom of constitutional law, that the power did not exist.
38
Mr. Webster, from his first entrance into public life in 1812, gave great
consideration to the subject of the currency, and in an elaborate speech on
that subject, made in the senate in 1836, then sitting in this room, he said:
'Currency, in a large and perhaps just sense, includes not only gold and silver
and bank bills, but bills of exchange also. it may include all that adjusts
exchanges and settles balances in the operations of trade and business; but if
we understand by currency the legal money of the country, and that which
constitutes a legal tender for debts, and is the standard measure of value,
then undoubtedly nothing is included but gold and silver. Most unquestionably
there is no legal tender, and there can be no legal tender in this country,
under the authority of this government or any other, but gold and silver,
either the coinage of our own mints or foreign coins at rates regulated by
congress. This is a constitutional principle, perfectly plain and of the
highest importance. The states are expressly prohibited from making anything
but gold and silver a legal tender in payment of debts; and although no such
express prohibition is applied to congress, yet, as congress has no power
granted to it in this respect but to coin money and to regulate the value of
foreign coins, it clearly has no power to substitute paper or anything else for
coin as a tender in payment of debts and in discharge of contracts. Congress
has exercised this power fully in both its branches; it has coined money and
still coins it; it has regulated the value of foreign coins, and still
regulates their value. The legal tender, therefore, the constitutional standard
of value, is established and cannot be overthrown. To overthrow it would shake
the whole system.' 4 Webster's Works, 271.
39
When the idea of imparting the legal-tender quality to the notes of the United
States, issued under the first act of 1862, was first broached, the advocates
of the measure rested their support of it on the ground that it was a war
measure, to which the country was compelled to resort by the exigencies of its
condition, being then sorely pressed by the confederate forces, and requiring
the daily expenditure of enormons sums to maintain its army and navy and to
carry on the government. The representative who introduced the bill in the
house declared that it was a measure of that nature, 'one of necessity and not
of choice;' that the times were extraordinary; and that extraordinary measures
must be resorted to in order to save our government and preserve our
nationality. Speech of Spaulding, of New York; Cong. Globe, 1861-62, pt. 1,
523. Other members of the house frankly confessed their doubt as to its
constitutionality, but yielded their support of it under the pressure of this
supposed necessity.
40
In the senate also the measure was pressed for the same reasons. When the act
was reported by the committee on finance, its chairman, while opposing the
legal-tender provision, said: 'It is put on the ground of absolute,
overwhelming necessity; that the government has now arrived at that point when
it must have funds, and those funds are not to be obtained from ordinary
sources, or from any of the expedients to which we have heretofore had
recourse, and therefore this new, anomalous, and remarkable provision must be
resorted to in order to enable the government to pay off the debt that it now
owes, and afford circulation which will be available for other purposes.' Cong.
Globe, 1861-62, pt. 1, 764. And upon that ground the provision was adopted,
some of the senators stating that in the exigency then existing money must be
had, and they therefore sustained the measure, although they apprehended danger
from the experiment. 'The medicine of the constitution,' said Senator Summer,
'must not become its daily food.' Id. 800. A similar necessity was urged upon
the state tribunals and this court in justification of the measure, when its
validity was questioned. The dissenting opinion inHepburn v. Griswold referred
to the pressure that was upon the government at the time to enable it to raise
and support an army, and to provide and maintain a navy. Chief Justice CHASE,
who gave the prevailing opinion in that case, also spoke of the existence of
the feeling when the bill was passed that the provision was necessary. He
favored the provision on that ground when secretary of the treasury, although
he had come to that conclusion with reluctance, and recommended its adoption by
congress. When the question as to its validity reached this court, this
expression of favor was referred to, and by many it was supposed that it would
control his judicial action. But after long pondering upon the subject, after
listening to repeated arguments by able counsel, he decided against the
constitutionality of the provision; and, holding in his hands the casting vote,
he determined the judgment of the court. He thus preferred to preserve his
integrity as a judicial officer rather than his consistency as a statesman. In
his opinion he thus referred to his previous views: 'It is not surprising that
amid the tumult of the late civil war, and under the influence of apprehensions
for the safety of the republic almost universal, different views, never before
entertained by American statesmen or jurists, were adopted by many. The time
was not favorable to considerate reflection upon the constitutional limits of
legislative or executive authority. If power was assumed from patriotic
motives, the assumption found ready justification in patriotic hearts. Many who
doubted yielded their doubts; many who did not doubt were silent. Some who were
strongly averse to making government notes a legal tender felt themselves
constrained to acquiesce in the views of the advocates of the measure. Not a
few who then insisted upon its necessity, or acquiesced in that view, have,
since the return of peace, and under the influence of the calmer time,
reconsidered their conclusions, and now concur in those which we have just
announced. These conclusions seem to us to be fully sanctioned by the letter
and spirit of the constitution.' 8 Wall. 625.
41
It must be evident, however, upon reflection that, if there were any power in
the government of the United States to impart the quality of legal tender to
its promissory notes, it was for congress to determine when the necessity for
its exercise existed; that war merely increased the urgency for money; it did
not add to the powers of the government nor change their nature; that if the
power existed it might be equally exercised when a loan was made to meet
ordinary expenses in time of peace, as when vast sums were needed to support an
army or a navy in time of war. The wants of the government could never be the
measure of its powers. But in the excitement and apprehensions of the war these
considerations were unheeded; the measure was passed as one of overruling
necessity in a perilous crisis of the country. Now it is no longer advocated as
one of necessity, but as one that may be adopted at any time. Never before was
it contended by any jurist or commentator on the constitution that the
government, in full receipt of ample income, with a treasury overflowing, with
more money on hand than it knows what to do with, could issue paper money as a
legal tender. What was in 1862 called the 'medicine of the constitution' has
now become its daily bread. So it always happens that whenever a wrong
principle of conduct, political or personal, is adopted on a plea of necessity,
it will be afterwards followed on a plea of convenience.
42
The advocates of the measure have not been consistent in the designation of the
power upon which they have supported its validity, some placing it on the power
to borrow money, some on the coining power, and some have claimed it as an
incident to the general powers of the government. In the present case it is
placed by the court upon the power to borrow money, and the alleged sovereignty
of the United States over the currency. It is assumed that this power, when
exercised by the government, is something different from what it is when
exercised by corporations or individuals, and that the government has, by the
legal tender provision, the power to enforce loans of money, because the
sovereign governments of European countries have claimed and exercised such
power. 'The words 'to borrow money," says the court, 'are not to receive that
limited and restricted interpretation and meaning which they would have in a
penal statute or in an authority conferred by law or by contract upon trustees
or agents for private purposes.' And it adds that 'the power, as incident to
the power of borrowing money and issuing bills or notes of the government for
money borrowed, of impressing upon those bills or notes the quality of being a
legal tender for the payment of private debts, was a power universally
understood to belong to sovereignty, in Europe and America, at the time of the
framing and adoption of the constitution of the United States. The governments
of Europe, acting through the monarch or the legislature, according to the
distribution of powers under their respective constitutions, had and have as
sovereign a power of issuing paper money as of stamping coin,' and that 'the
exercise of this power not being prohibited to congress by the constitution, it
is included in the power expressly granted to borrow money on the credit of the
United States.'
43
As to the terms 'to borrow money,' where, I would ask, does the court find any
authority for giving to them a different interpretation in the constitution
from what they receive when used in other instruments, as in the charters of
municipal bodies or of private corporations, or in the contracts of
individuals? They are not ambiguous; they have a well-settled meaning in other
instruments. If the court may change that in the constitution, so it may the
meaning of all other clauses; and the powers which the government may exercise
will be found declared, not by plain words in the organic law, but by words of
a new significance resting in the minds of the judges. Until some authority
beyond the alleged claim and practice of the sovereign governments of Europe be
produced, I must believe that the terms have the same meaning in all
instruments, wherever they are used; that they mean a power only to contract
for a loan of money, upon considerations to be agreed between the parties. The
conditions of the loan, or whether any particular security shall be given to
the lender, are matters of arrangement between the parties; they do not concern
any one else. They do not imply that the borrower can give to his promise to
refund the money any security to the lender outside of property or rights which
he possesses. The transaction is completed when the lender parts with his money
and the borrower gives his promise to pay at the time and in the manner and
with the securities agreed upon. Whatever stipulations may be made, to add to
the value of the promise, or to secure its fulfillment, must necessarily be
limited to the property, rights, and privileges, which the borrower possesses.
Whether he can add to his promises any element which will induce others to
receive them beyond the security which he gives for their payment depends upon
his power to control such element. If he has a right to put a limitation upon
the use of other persons' property, or to enforce an exaction of some benefit
from them, he may give such privilege to the lender; but if he has no right
thus to interfere with the property or possession of others, of course he can
give none. It will hardly be pretended that the government of the United States
has any power to enter into an engagement that, as security for its notes, the
lender shall have special privileges with respect to the visible property of
others, shall be able to occupy a portion of their lands or their houses, and
thus interfere with the possession and use of their property. If the government
cannot do that, how can it step in and say, as a condition of loaning money,
that the lender shall have a right to interfere with contracts between private
parties? A large proportion of the property of the world exists in contracts,
and the government has no more rignt to deprive one of their value by
legislation operating directly upon them than it has a right to deprive one of
the value of any visible and tangible property. No one, I think, will pretend
that individuals or corporations possess the power to impart to their evidences
of indebtedness any quality by which the holder will be able to affect the
contracts of other parties, strangers to the loan; nor would any one pretend
that congress possesses the power to impart any such quality to the notes of
the United States, except from the clause authorizing it to make laws necessary
and proper to the execution of its powers. That clause, however, does not
enlarge the expressly designated powers; it merely states what congress could
have done without its insertion in the constitution. Without it congress could
have adopted any appropriate means to borrow; but that can only be appropriate
for that purpose which has some relation of fitness to the end, which has
respect to the terms essential to the contract, or to the securities which the
borrower may furnish for the repayment of the loan. The quality of legal tender
does not touch the terms of the contract; that is complete without it; nor does
it stand as a security for the loan, for a security is a thing pledged, over
which the borrower has some control, or in which he holds some interest.
44
The argument presented by the advocates of legal tender is, in substance, this:
The object of borrowing is to raise funds, the addition of the quality of legal
tender to the notes of the government will induce parties to take them, and
funds will thereby be more readily loaned. But the same thing may be said of
the addition of any other quality which would give to the holder of the notes
some advantage over the property of others, as, for instance, that the notes
should serve as a pass on the public conveyances of the country, or as a ticket
to places of amusement, or should exempt his property from state and municipal
taxation, or entitle him to the free use of the telegraph lines, or to a
percentage from the revenues of private corporations. The same consequence—a
ready acceptance of the notes—would follow; and yet no one would pretend that
the addition of privileges of this kind with respect to the property of others,
over which the borrower has no control, would be in any sense an appropriate
measure to the execution of the power to borrow. Undoubtedly the power to
borrow includes the power to give evidences of the loan in bonds, treasury
notes, or in such other form as may be agreed between the parties. These may be
issued in such amounts as will fit them for circulation, and for that purpose
may be made payable to bearer, and transferable by delivery. Experience has
shown that the form best fitted to secure their ready acceptance is that of
notes payable to bearer, in such amounts as may suit the ability of the lender.
The government, in substance, says to parties with whom it deals: Lend us your
money, or furnish us with your products or your labor, and we will ultimately
pay you, and as evidence of it we will give you our notes, in such form and
amount as may suit your convenience, and enable you to transfer them; we will
also receive them for certain demands due to us. In all this matter there is
only a dealing between the government and the individuals who trust it. The
transaction concerns no others. The power which authorizes it is a very
different one from a power to deal between parties to private contracts in
which the government is not interested, and to compel the receipt of these
promises to pay in place of the money for which the contracts stipulated. This
latter power is not an incident to the former; it is a distinct and far greater
power. There is no legal connection between the two—between the power to borrow
from those willing to lend and the power to interfere with the independent
contracts of others. The possession of this latter power would justify the
interference of the government with any rights of property of other parties,
under the pretense that its allowance to the holders of the notes would lead to
their more ready acceptance, and thus furnish the needed means.
45
The power vested in congress to coin money does not in my judgment fortify the
position of the court, as its opinion affirms. So far from deducing from that
power any authority to impress the notes of the government with the quality of
legal tender, its existence seems to me inconsistent with a power to make
anything but coin a legal tender. The meaning of the terms 'to coin money' is
not at all doubtful. It is to mould metallic substances into forms convenient
for circulation and to stamp them with the impress of the government authority
indicating their value with reference to the unit of value established by law.
Coins are pieces of metal of definite weight and value, stamped such by the
authority of the government. If any doubt could exist that the power has
reference to metallic substances only it would be removed by the language which
immediately follows, authorizing congress to regulate the value of money thus
coined and of foreign coin, and also by clauses making a distinction between
coin and the obligations of the general government and of the states. Thus, in
the clause authorizing congress 'to provide for the punishment of
counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States,' a
distinction is made between the obligations and the coin of the government.
46
Money is not only a medium of exchange, but it is a standard of value. Nothing
can be such standard which has not intrinsic value, or which is subject to
frequent changes in value. From the earliest period in the history of civilized
nations we find pieces of gold and silver used as money. These metals are
scattered over the world in small quantities; they are susceptible of division,
capable of easy impression, have more value in proportion to weight and size,
and are less subject to loss by wear and abrasion than any other material
possessing these qualities. It requires labor to obtain them; they are not
dependent upon legislation or the caprices of the multitude; they cannot be
manufactured or decreed into existence; and they do not perish by lapse of
time. They have, therefore, naturally, if not necessarily, become throughout
the world a standard of value. In exchange for pieces of them, products
requiring an equal amount of labor are readily given. When the product and the
piece of metal represent the same labor, or an approximation to it, they are
freely exchanged. There can be no adequate substitute for these metals. Says
Mr. Webster, in a speech made in the house of representatives in 1815: 'The
circulating medium of a commercial community must be that which is also the
circulating medium of other commercial communities, or must be capable of being
converted into that medium without loss. It must also be able not only to pass
in payments and receipts among individuals of the same society and nation, but
to adjust and discharge the balance of exchanges between different nations. It
must be something which has a value abroad as well as at home, by which foreign
as well as domestic debts can be satisfied. The precious metals alone answer
these purposes. They alone, therefore, are money, and whatever else is to
perform the functions of money must be their representative, and capable of
being turned into them at will. So long as bank paper retains this quality it
is a substitute for money; divested of this, nothing can give it that
character.' 3 Webster's Works, 41. The clause to coin money must be read in
connection with the prohibition upon the states to make anything but gold and
silver coin a tender in payment of debts. The two taken together clearly show
that the coins to be fabricated under the authority of the general government,
and as such to be a legal tender for debts, are to be composed principally, if
not entirely, of the metals of gold and silver. Coins of such metals are
necessarily a legal tender to the amount of their respective values, without
any legislative enactment, and the statute of the United States providing that
they shall be such tender is only declaratory of their effect when offered in
payment.
47
When the constitution says, therefore, that congress shall have the power to
coin money, interpreting that clause with the prohibition upon the states, it
says it shall have the power to make coins of the precious metals a legal
tender, for that alone which is money can be a legal tender. If this be the
true import of the language, nothing else can be made a legal tender. We all
know that the value of the notes of the government in the market, and in the
commercial world generally, depends upon their convertibility on demand into
coin; and as confidence in such convertibility increases or diminishes, so does
the exchangeable value of the notes vary. So far from becoming themselves
standards of value by reason of the legislative declaration to that effect,
their own value is measured by the facility with which they can be exchanged
into that which alone is regarded as money by the commercial world. They are
promises of money, but they are not money in the sense of the constitution. The
term 'money' is used in that instrument in several clauses,—in the one
authorizing congress 'to borrow money;' in the one authorizing congress 'to
coin money;' in the one declaring that 'no money' shall be drawn from the
treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and in the one
declaring that no state shall 'coin money.' And it is a settled rule of
interpretation that the same term occurring in different parts of the same
instrument shall be taken in the same sense, unless there is something in the
context indicating that a different meaning was intended. Now, to coin money
is, as I have said, to make coins out of metallic substances, and the only
money the value of which congress can regulate is coined money, either of our
mints, or of foreign countries. It should seem, therefore, that to borrow
money, is to obtain a loan of coin money; that is, money composed of the
precious metals, representing value in the purchase of property and payment of
debts. Between the promises of the government, designated as its securities,
and this money, the constitution draws a distinction, which disappears in the
opinion of the court. The opinion not only declares that it is in the power of
congress to make the notes of the government a legal tender and a standard of
value, but that under the power to coin money and regulate the value thereof,
congress may issue coins of the same denominations as those now already
current, but of less intrinsic value, by reason of containing a less weight of
the precious metals, and thereby enable debtors to discharge their debts by
payment of coins of less real value. This doctrine is put forth as in some way
a justification of the legislation authorizing the tender of nominal money in
place of real money in payment of debts. Undoubtedly congress has power to
alter the value of coins issued, either by increasing or diminishing the alloy
they contain; so it may alter, at its pleasure, their denominations; it may
hereafter call a dollar an eagle, and it may call an eagle a dollar. But if it
be intended to assert that congress can make the coins changed the equivalent
of those having a greater value in their previous condition, and compel parties
contracting for the latter to receive coins with diminished value, I must be
permitted to deny any such authority. Any such declaration on its part would be
not only utterly inoperative in fact, but a shameful disregard of its
constitutional duty. As I said on a former occasion: 'The power to coin money,
as declared by this court, is a great trust devolved upon congress, carrying
with it the duty of creating and maintaining a uniform standard of value
throughout the Union, and it would be a manifest abuse of this trust to give to
the coins issued by its authority any other than their real value. By debasing
the coins, when once the standard is fixed, is meant giving to the coins by
their form and impress a certificate of their having a relation to that
standard different from that which in truth they possess; in other words,
giving to the coins a false certificate of their value. Arbitrary and
profligate governments have often resorted to this miserable scheme of robbery,
which Mill designates as a shallow and impudent artifice, the 'least covert of
all modes of knavery, which consists in calling a shilling a pound, that a debt
of one hundred pounds may be canceled by the payment of one hundred shillings."
No such debasement has ever been attempted in this country, and none ever will
be so long as any sentiment of honor influences the governing power of the
nation. The changes from time to time in the quantity of alloy in the different
coins has been made to preserve the proper relative value between gold and
silver, or to prevent exportation, and not with a view of debasing them.
Whatever power may be vested in the government of the United States, it has
none to perpetrate such monstrous iniquity. One of the great purposes of its
creation, as expressed in the preamble of the constitution, was the
establishment of justice, and not a line nor a word is found in that instrument
which sanctions any intentional wrong to the citizen, either in war or in peace.
48
But beyond and above all the objections which I have stated to the decision
recognizing a power in congress to impart the legal-tender quality to the notes
of the government, is my objection to the rule of construction, adopted by the
court to reach its conclusions—a rule which, fully carried out, would change
the whole nature of our constitution, and break down the barriers which
separate a government of limited from one of unlimited powers. When the
constitution came before the conventions of the several states for adoption,
apprehension existed that other powers than those designated might be claimed;
and it led to the first 10 amendments. When these were presented to the states
they were preceded by a preamble stating that the conventions of a number of
the states had, at the time of adopting the constitution, expressed a desire,
'in order to prevent misconception or abuse of its powers, that further
declaratory and restrictive clauses should be added.' One of them is found in
the tenth amendment, which declares that 'the powers not delegated to the
United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are
reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.' The framers of the
constitution, as I have said, were profoundly impressed with the evils which
had resulted from the vicious legislation of the states making notes a legal
tender, and they determined that such a power should not exist any longer. They
therefore prohibited the states from exercising it, and they refused to grant
it to the new government which they created. Of what purpose is it, then, to
refer to the exercise of the power by the absolute or the limited governments
of Europe, or by the states previous to our constitution? Congress can exercise
no power by virtue of any supposed inherent sovereignty in the general
government. Indeed, it may be doubted whether the power can be correctly said
to appertain to sovereignty in any proper sense, as an attribute of an
independent political community. The power to commit violence, perpetrate
injustice, take private property by force without compensation to the owner,
and compel the receipt of promises to pay in place of money, may be exercised,
as it often has been, by irresponsible authority, but it cannot be considered
as belonging to a government founded upon law. But be that as it may, there is
no such thing as a power of inherent sovereignty in the government of the
United States. It is a government of delegated powers, supreme within its
prescribed sphere, but powerless outside of it. In this country, sovereignty
resides in the people, and congress can exercise no power which they have not,
by their constitution, intrusted to it; all else is withheld. It seems,
however, to be supposed that, as the power was taken from the states, it could
not have been intended that it should disappear entirely, and therefore it
must, in some way, adhere to the general government, notwithstanding the tenth
amendment and the nature of the constitution. The doctrine that a power not
expressly forbidden may be exercised would, as I have observed, change the
character of our government. If I have read the constitution aright, if there
is any weight to be given to the uniform teachings of our great jurists and of
commentators previous to the late civil war, the true doctrine is the very
opposite of this. If the power is not in terms granted, and is not necessary
and proper for the exercise of a power which is thus granted, it does not
exist. And in determining what measures may be adopted in executing the powers
granted, Chief Justice MARSHALL declares that they must be appropriate, plainly
adapted to the end, not prohibited, andconsistent with the letter and spirit of
the constitution. Now, all through that instrument we find limitations upon the
power, both of the general government and the state governments, so as to
prevent oppression and injustice. No legislation, therefore, tending to promote
either can consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution. A law which
interferes with the contracts of others, and compels one of the parties to
receive in satisfaction something different from that stipulated, without
reference to its actual value in the market, necessarily works such injustice
and wrong.
49
There is, it is true, no provision in the constitution of the United States
forbidding in direct terms the passing of laws by congress impairing the
obligation of contracts, and there are many express powers conferred, such as
the power to declare war, levy duties, and regulate commerce, the exercise of
which affects more or less the value of contracts. Thus, war necessarily
suspends intercourse between the citizens or subjects of belligerent nations,
and the performance during its continuance of previous contracts. The
imposition of duties upon goods may affect the prices of articles imported or
manufactured, so as to materially alter the value of previous contracts
respecting them. But these incidental consequences arising from the exercise of
such powers were contemplated in the grant of them. As there can be no solid
objection to legislation under them, no just complaint can be made of such
consequences. But far different is the case when the impairment of the contract
does not follow incidentally, but is directly and in terms allowed and enacted.
Legislation operating directly upon private contracts, changing their
conditions, is forbidden to the states; and no power to alter the stipulations
of such contracts by direct legislation is conferred upon congress. There are
also many considerations, outside of the fact that there is no grant of the
power, which show that the framers of the constitution never intended that such
power should be exercised. One of the great objects of the constitution, as
already observed, was to establish justice, and what was meant by that in its
relations to contracts, as said by the late chief justice in his opinion
inHepburn v. Griswold, was not left to interference or conjecture. And in
support of this statement he refers to the fact that when the constitution was
undergoing discussion in the convention, the congress of the confederation was
engaged in framing the ordinance for the government of the Northwest territory,
in which certain articles of compact were established between the people of the
original states and the people of the territory 'for the purposes,' as
expressed in the instrument, 'of extending the fundamental principles of civil
and religious liberty, whereon these republics, [the states united under the
confederation,] their laws and constitutions, are erected.' That congress was
also alive to the evils which the loose legislation of the states had created
by interfering with the obligation of private contracts and making notes a
legal tender for debts; and the ordinance declared that in the just
preservation of rights and property no law 'ought ever to be made, or have
force in the said territory, that shall in any manner whatever interfere with
or affect private contracts, or engagements,bona fide and without fraud
previously formed.' This principle, said the chief justice, found more
condensed expression in the prohibition upon the states against impairing the
obligation of contracts, which has always been recognized 'as an efficient
safeguard against injustice;' and the court was then of opinion that 'it is
clear that those who framed and those who adopted the constitution intended
that the spirit of this prohibition should pervade the entire body of
legislation, and that the justice which the constitution was ordained to
establish was not thought by them to be compatible with legislation of an
opposite tendency.' Soon after the constitution was adopted the case ofCalder
v. Bull came before this court, and it was there said that there were acts
which the federal and state legislatures could not do without exceeding their
authority; and among them was mentioned a law which punished a citizen for an
innocent act, and a law which destroyed or impaired the lawful private
contracts of citizens. 'It is against all reason and justice,' it was added,
'for a people to intrust a legislature with such powers, and therefore it
cannot be presumed that they have done it.' 3 Dall. 388. And Mr. Madison, in
one of the articles in theFederalist, declared that laws impairing the
obligation of contracts were contrary to the first principles of the social
compact, and to every principle of sound legislation. Yet this court holds that
a measure directly operating upon and necessarily impairing private contracts,
may be adopted in the execution of powers specifically granted for other
purposes because it is not in terms prohibited, and that it is consistent with
the letter and spirit of the constitution.
50
From the decision of the court I see only evil likely to follow. There have
been times within the memory of all of us when the legal-tender notes of the
United States were not exchangeable for more than one-half of their nominal
value. The possibility of such depreciation will always attend paper money.
This inborn infirmity no mere legislative declaration can cure. If congress has
the power to make the notes a legal tender and to pass as money or its
equivalent, why should not a sufficient amount be issued to pay the bonds of
the United States as they nature? Why pay interest on the millions of dollars
of bonds now due when congress can in one day make the money to pay the
principal? And why should there be any restraint upon unlimited appropriations
by the government for all imaginary schemes of public improvement, if the
printing-press can furnish the money that is needed for them?
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