[Wittrs] On the Varieties of Dualism
- From: Joseph Polanik <jpolanik@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 25 Jan 2010 07:29:16 -0500
SWM wrote:
>Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>SWM on accounting for consciousness:
>>>There are a four ways on the table that I can think of offhand here:
>>>1) The self or subject is seen as a separate existent from the things
>>>it apprehends. (This is dualism though it may have more than one form
>>>or way of being described: It could be a transcendental subject a la
>>>Kant or a monad a la Leibniz or it could be a parallel dimension of
>>>existence, co-existing with the physical phenomena of the world and
>>>of which it is aware -- a Cartesian kind of dualism.)
>>this account of substance dualism is quite confused.
>It's intended as a generic account ... to cover a variety of bases.
that's precisely why it is confused. the whole point of a taxonomy is to
distinguish types --- it's like ... a typology!
>>a hard core physicalist would likely agree that the experiencing I is
>>not identical to the stone, or the afterimage that it apprehends. that
>>alone doesn't make the physicalist a dualist.
>The point is that one either must presume that subjectness is lodged in
>the physical world (is an aspect of it) or it isn't, in which case it
>is a co-existent, etc., etc.
>>what's important is how many 'substances' (types of metaphenomenal
>>objects) and/or how many sets of properties are needed to explain the
>>phenomenon in question: experiencing *as* an experiencing I, the self
>>or subject.
>The idea of a "susbtance" is somewhat antiquated today. One needn't
>speak in such terms to suppose that consciousness is ontologically
>distinct, in some basic sense, from other existents which, presumably,
>are physically derived. However, the point that needs to be made is
>that whether one calls it "substance" or something else, if one
>supposes this ontological divide (that one thing is not reducible to
>the other in terms of how it comes about) then one is on dualist
>ground.
conflating all forms of dualism into one is not likely to be helpful;
and, of course, it defeats the purpose of having a taxonomy in the first
place.
Searle, in trying to explain why he is not a property dualist, claims
that consciousness has an irreducibly first-person ontology; but, he is
not admitting to Cartesian style substance dualism.
in my opinion, Searle should have said that consciousness has and
irreducibly first-person phenomenology. that would mean only that he
accepts what I call phenomenological dualism -- the irreducible
difference between measurable phenomena and experienceable phenomena.
the point is that claiming that there is an irreducible phenomenological
dualism is to stand on dualist ground; but, it is not to stand where
Descartes stands.
similarly, to claim that this phenomenological dualism is explained by a
dualism of properties (physical objects have a set of properties that
explain measurable phenomena and some objects have a set of properties
that explain experienceable phenomena) is also to stand on dualist
ground; but, again, it is not to stand where Descartes stands.
it is only where you postulate a second type of metaphenomenal object
that you stand where Descartes stood.
Joe
--
Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware
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http://what-am-i.net
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