[Wittrs] Re: Mode of Existence for Subjective Experience
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 21 May 2010 12:12:08 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Joseph Polanik <jPolanik@...> wrote:
<snip>
>
> Searle says that subjective experiences such as an afterimage have an
> experiencer-dependent mode of existence; so, for Searle, these are not
> 'bottom line' entities.
>
> Does Dennett admit that subjective experiences have an experiencer-
> dependent mode of existence; or, does he deny that they have any mode of
> existence at all?
>
> Joe
Dennett does not deny subjective experiences. He explains them, i.e., he
provides an account of how the brain may produce them, an account which he
reconciles with our sense that our experiences and our selves are uniquely
unified, bottom line, etc., etc. Searle, on the other hand, falls into thinking
our subjective experiences are "bottom line entities" even while denying this
very thing in his account of brains. THAT is the contradiction. But since he is
in contradiction and is vague about brains, he and some of his defenders can
get away with comming up with references to things he has said that contradict
claims I, and others, make about other things he has said. Well, of course you
can do that. He makes contradictory claims! But my job is to point out the
contradictions, not defend them or suggest he is consistent when he isn't. --
SWM
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