--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "iro3isdx" <xznwrjnk-evca@...> wrote: > I deliberately choose a very simple example, > so that it was clear to Stuart that I was not > assuming anything non-physical. Even then, > Stuart seems to say that I am assuming something non-physical. There are two issues here. 1- Physical substances: Are there "features" of mind (to use Stuart's term) that are not physical? Since Stuart has the physical brain causing mind, he must call all mental features physical, in order to retain Monis, 2- Mechanical vs. Purposive: Stuart seems to agree that we attribute causal-mechanics to all physical entities and purpose, at least in part, to "aware" organisms. So, biological adaptation would be mechanical but social adaption would be purposive. Stuart's problem, as I see it, is to reconcile brain causation with mental purposive. An example: My brain causes me to be in pain. I keep the pain to myself because complaining serves no purpose, as I see it. If my brain causes me not to complain, then I'm not acting with purpose, because "I" drops out of the account. bruce ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/