[Wittrs] Is Homeostasis the Answer? (Re: Variations in the Idea of Consciousness)

  • From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
  • To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Thu, 04 Feb 2010 19:01:24 -0000

--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "jrstern" <jrstern@...> wrote:
>
> --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "SWM" <SWMirsky@> wrote:

<snip

> > I said this, Josh, not Neil (in case you are confusing the two of us in 
> > your question above). My issue, in saying it, was not to wonder how there 
> > could be minds in the world at all but to wonder how minds happen in the 
> > world, given the evident physical and, therefore, apparently inanimate, 
> > nature of this world in which minds occur?


> Yes, Stuart, I'm clear it was you saying this.
>
> But I wanted to take issue with it, and Neil had responded without
> taking issue with it, so I responded to both separately.

>
>
> > That is, my "how" was not a metaphysical "how" (how can things come to be, 
> > whether particular things or things in general) but a scientific one, i.e., 
> > what is it about some physical things that produces the subjectness of 
> > minds that have manifestly come to be in this world?
>
> But the question is, whether there are ANY different issues
> regarding mind, that do not also concern any mereological or
> phenomenal entities.
>

> This is a methodological question Fodor spend extensive time
> on, what questions of "mind" are really questions of scientific
> or philosophical methods more generally?  Because there does seem
> to be a tendency to treat any questions of mind as if they were
> specific to minds only - as I suppose a fisherman considers all
> questions of the world in the context of fish.
>
> Josh
>
>
> =========================================


Fish, eh? I'm confused, Josh. What is Fodor taking issue with exactly? After 
all, my question is really only about what it is that SOME brains do which 
prompts us to speak of the creatures that have them in their skulls as being 
"conscious"?

(Is that a clean way of saying this in order to avoid the alleged mereological 
fallacy of ascribing consciousness to brains out of context, etc.?)

It seems to me that the question I initially expressed above ("what is it about 
some physical things that produces the subjectness of minds that have 
manifestly come to be in this world?") is a perfectly scientific question, even 
if what we mean by "consciousness" is not, i.e., THAT question would either be:

1) linguistic -- if the issue is what speakers of a particular language use the 
sounds made by those letters when pronounced to mean; or

2) philosophic -- if the issue is what kind of thinking the users of that word 
in the English language are engaged in (i.e., what is the conception of the 
presumed referent they have or think they have)?

The linguistic version of this question could, of course, be answered by 
recourse to a dictionary (either bi-lingual or in the language at issue, if the 
speaker already has facility with that language), or by asking an acknowledged 
fluent speaker of the language. It might also entail some ancillary questions 
including what other words is "consciousness" related to, what are its 
eytemological origins, what contexts are appropriate for its deployment(s), etc.

The philosophic version of this question would be answered, on the other hand, 
by exploring a range of uses demonstrated by sufficiently versed speakers of 
the language (in which the word occurs) and could then prompt further concerns 
re: what kind(s) of referring is going on when we use a term like 
"consciousness", what particular kind of usage (language game) is the term 
appropriate to, what kinds of things can count as referents (and under what 
circumstances), and are there different kinds of referents and referencing 
within which we need to orient the usage under scrutiny, etc.

It seems to me there are lots of kinds of things we can ask and say here about 
"consciousness" but note that my point is to consider the philosophic concerns 
with regard to the scientific usage (as expressed in my initially formulated 
question above: "what is it about some physical things that produces the 
subjectness of minds that have manifestly come to be in this world?").

But note, too, that my aim is NOT to ANSWER the scientific question 
definitively here! THAT is not a question answered in a settled way by argument 
alone. My effort here is ONLY to explore whether or not the scientific question 
is a legitimate one to ask for the purpose of applying scientific research 
practices to brains AND the conscious beings which have them.

SWM

=========================================
Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/

Other related posts: